

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

**Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600**

UMI[®]

THE POWER OF CHOICE:
A CRITIQUE OF JOSEPH CAMPBELL'S "MONOMYTH," NORTHROP FRYE'S
THEORY OF MYTH, MARK TWAIN'S ORTHODOXY TO HERESY AND C. G.

JUNG'S GOD-IMAGE

A dissertation submitted

by

DRUSCILLA FRENCH

to

PACIFICA GRADUATE INSTITUTE

in partial fulfillment of

the requirement for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

MYTHOLOGICAL STUDIES

This dissertation has been
accepted for the faculty of
Pacifica Graduate Institute by:



Ginette Paris, Ph. D.

Chair



David L. Miller, Ph. D.

Advisor



Richard Rubenstein, J. D.

External Reader

UMI Number: 9962485

**Copyright 2000 by
French, Druscilla**

All rights reserved.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform 9962485

Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.

**All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

**Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346**

Author: Druscilla French
Title: The Power of Choice
Subtitle: A critique of Joseph Campbell's "monomyth," Northrop Frye's theory Of myth, Mark Twain's evolution from orthodoxy to heresy, and C. G. Jung's God-image.

Published: 1998
Description: vii, 185 leaves
Notes: The purpose of this study is to critique the work of a mythologist, Joseph Campbell, a literary critic, Northrop Frye, a fiction writer, Mark Twain and a depth psychologist, C. G. Jung in order to discover the underlying assumptions about life which influence these authors' lives and the lives of their readers.

Joseph Campbell's four functions of mythology are expanded to include a distinction between orthodox functions and heretical functions of myth. Campbell's mythological formula, the "monomyth," is shown as a construct that subtly imposes its dogmatic frame of reference by insisting that a certain kind of heroic journey is universally recognized as the path of divinity and highest form of individuation.

The critique of Northrop Frye's theory of myth is an attempt to challenge the notion that his is "a rational account of some of the structural principles of western literature." This study will argue that Frye's "structural principles of literature" are instead an accurate description of western literary orthodoxy, an orthodoxy that, by definition, cannot hear the voice of "heretics" who do not view life through the filters of this world order.

Mark Twain's two novels of boyhood, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876) and The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1884) provide examples of the distinction between an orthodox novel and an heretical one.

The concept of divinity which is described by C. G. Jung distinguishes between God and "God-image," a distinction based upon Kantian philosophical perspective. This study will attempt to show how much of Jung's "God-image" was influenced, not only by Kantian "categories of knowing," such as time and space, but by Jung's culture, religion and historical circumstances. Additionally, his personal relationships with his mother and father and his relationship with Freud affected his image of divinity.

It is the unending task of individuals and human collectives to become increasingly conscious of the mythologies we live in. The greater our awareness, the greater our capacity to chose the manner in which we participate in them. This dissertation is in the tradition of the humanities, whose task it is to revisit and critique all assumptions regarding what is a lived life or a wasted life, an individuated life or an unindividuated one.

OCTOBER 4, 1998

**Copyright by
DRUSCILLA FRENCH
1998**

Acknowledgments

David Miller has dazzled me since I heard his first lecture on my first day as a student at Pacifica Graduate Institute. He has provided a thread of continuity from the very beginning, leading his students to an understanding of the importance and magnitude of this field we have chosen. In those early months, I listened to the tapes of his lectures repeatedly until I had some inkling of what a Mythological Studies Program was all about. David shares my belief that humor is the highest form of human behavior. He is extraordinarily generous with his time, his encyclopedic mine, his considerable talents, and combines this professionalism with a generosity of spirit that is extremely rare. Dr. David Miller has amazing grace.

It was Ginette Paris who taught me about pagan morality. She tamed my rhetoric without quenching the fire. She taught me how to honor my anger so that it might fuel my writing rather than scorch those around me. She has an incredible gift for correcting and directing without demoralizing or demolishing. Her passion for archetypal psychology, her feminine knowing and intuition, and her uncompromising standards allowed me to trust her guidance implicitly. She often could see where I was going before I could. She was able to articulate the intuitive nudges that were playing peek-a-boo in my mind and soul. Dr. Ginette Paris has pagan grace.

Richard Rubenstein shares my dream that some day we shall understand what causes humanity to engage in ruthless, bloody conflict. In the knowledge of the *why* of violent conflict and deep-rooted hatred may lie the *how* of choosing another reality. Rich, too, shares my love of humor. Together we have lived through the grief of losing some of the best people we have known, people who were also lured by this same dream. It is partly in memory of them that we continue to go on looking for solutions, or at least asking questions.

Many thanks to all my professors at Pacifica and to the wonderful staff in the library and bookstore. They were terrific about supplying me with everything I requested,

despite the distance and the sometime "second miles" required. I thank Chris Downing for pointing me in the right direction more than once, for opening up the questions regarding Freud and Jung, and for sharing her library when I was up against the "out of print" wall. Kathleen Jenks has been my cheering section and supporter. Her early observations helped steer me to a broader perspective on the functions of myth. Both of these women have provided generous assistance when they didn't have to and when they had plenty of other dissertations calling for their attention as well.

Thanks to all the marvelous professors, teachers, and students I have had along the way and to all my *alma maters*. I am particularly grateful to J. Gayle Shumate, who encouraged the academic aspirations of a young teenager in a small town on the Texas prairie, where girls were not expected to have aspirations beyond homecoming queen or head cheerleader.

And of course I offer my deepest thanks to my parents, my husband, and my daughter, who have supported me in my academic endeavors, regardless of how impractical they appeared to be at the time.

My love and my gratitude to you all. Blessed be.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1: The Functions of Myth	5
Campbell's Four Functions of Myth	6
The metaphysical function	9
The cosmological function	10
The sociological function	12
The psychological function	15
The Power of Heresy	18
The metaphysical function of heresy	19
The cosmological function of heresy	22
The sociological function of heresy	23
The psychological function of heresy	29
Breaking the Fishbowl	31
Chapter 2: Contemplating the Monomyth	33
Monomythic Structure	38
Part 1: separation and departure	38
Part 2: trials and victories of initiation	42
Part 3: return and reintegration with society	53
Chapter 3: Northrop Frye's Archetypal Criticism, Theory of Myths	58
Theory of Archetypal Meaning: Domains of Imagery	59
Theory of Archetypal Meaning: Theory of Mythos	66
Mythos of Spring: Comedy	67
Mythos of Summer: Romance	71
Mythos of Autumn: Tragedy	74
Mythos of Winter: Irony and Satire	76
Conclusion	82

Chapter 4: Mark Twain's Twins	86
Chapter 5: C. G. Jung's God-image	98
Immanuel Kant	98
Jung and Kant	101
God and the God-image	107
Jung's Father-images	110
Father	110
Freud	115
The God-image	127
Job	127
Jungian quaternity	145
Logical quaternity, a modest proposal	152
Conclusion	155
Review of Chapters	155
The Search for Alternatives	163
The Cure for Mono	166
Why Study Myth?	168
Power Over the Power of Myth—Do We Live the Myths or Do They Live Us"	
or I am Not a Fish	175
The Heroic Attitude: Wonder	178
Works Cited	181

Introduction

My most frequently used metaphor for myths, the one I like best, is that myths are like quilts. They are assembled from snips of the past and ideas about the future. Myths are made of cultures, religions, dreams, fantasies, and imagination, as are quilts. They are multi-functional and sometimes the underlying pattern or theme takes a bit of work to discern. They are passed from one generation to another and are, in the course of time, mended, recycled, and used in a variety of ways.

I come from a long line of quilters. Some of them were pioneer women who had to make every scrap count. Some were affluent urban women, able to pick and choose from an abundance of fabrics in order to get just the right colors and textures they desired. For all of them, the appeal of quilts was that they are not only useful and thrifty, but also beautiful and creative. Thoughtful preparation and careful construction produce attractive results. The lights and darks are both important, each contrasting in an illuminating way with the other. There are not many absolutes. The whole is definitely greater than the sum of its parts, lying on the table as piles of useless rags until ingenuity and craftiness create magic. Quilts are purposeful.

Sometimes quilts have hidden meanings and messages. Long after I was born, my grandmother made a quilt from fabrics she had used in my mother's dresses. On this quilt my mother and I had picnics and took naps. The various "dresses" on the Sunbonnet Sue quilt would serve as an introduction to stories of my mother's childhood. I made a crazy quilt during the time I was pregnant with my daughter. Perhaps I choose "crazy" because I was endangering my own health by consciously choosing a pregnancy I had been warned against. Perhaps it was a premonition of the nature of the wild, tempestuous Scorpio who made her appearance shortly after its completion. Quilts have encoded messages of love, comfort, affection, welcome, loneliness, desire, future dreams, civic responsibility. My grandmother and great-grandmother had a closet full of new quilts which were designated as gifts for newcomers, preachers, departing friends, burned-out neighbors or new

mothers. Quilts were their way of wrapping others in good wishes and love. I have never seen a hateful, violent quilt.

With this heritage, it is not surprising that this is the manner in which I constructed this dissertation. It is an academic quilt, a collection of intellectual adventures and fabrics, which have been re-visited and remodeled at various times in my academic career. Here are found snippets of my interest in literature, film, religion and philosophy--intellectual forays of mine long before I was attracted to psychology. This dissertation reveals my Southern background, my American soul, and my love of the feminine. By now I have lived a half century. Some of the things I have learned are tucked in here, stitched among the quotations from recognized scholars.

I first read Joseph Campbell's The Hero with a Thousand Faces as an undergraduate when studying for a degree in English literature. I thought I had discovered the secret of the universe. I wrote an exegesis of Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom based on the monomythic formula. My essay was lavishly praised, or at least as lavishly as praise was afforded to undergraduates in those days. I took the accolades with appropriate self-deprecating humor. Little did I know then that there are no waters more patriarchal than those of an old Southern university and no literature more reflective of that patriarchy than Southern literature. My praise of the monomyth and admiration of Faulkner's literary expertise in its application were evidence that I had been thoroughly indoctrinated. My education had "taken," so to speak. In truth, I was sleeping with the enemy.

Almost twenty years later, I turned to Campbell for answers as to how one might live a life of purpose and meaning. I designed a five-day existential course based on the monomyth. The students who participated in my class found it to be extremely powerful. In most cases there were dramatic changes in their lives, but I was growing increasingly uncomfortable about the magnitude of the effect. I was discovering the power of myth for myself. It was scary. There was a dark, inexplicable side to this mythology, and I wanted

to understand it before I did any more waving of my magic wand. This led me to Pacifica Graduate Institute.

The chapter on Northrop Frye also grew out of my days as a student of literature. In the English departments of American universities in the late sixties, Frye was considered the ultimate authority. There was something about his careful delineation of literary genres that irritated me even then. I rebelled against him—constantly raising an annoying, impertinent hand in the classroom. My impudent questions inevitably resulted in my being humiliated for my ignorance. Nevertheless, I felt left out by the schema. The battle between me and the Knights of Fryedom remained unresolved. Frye is no longer the darling of the English departments, and most of the professors I battled with have gone on to greener golf courses or cemeteries. I doubt that they will ever bother to read this final "backtalk."

Emotionally, this dissertation has been a crazy quilt as well. As I began to discover the depth of this cultural bias toward the masculine, I first felt bewilderment and a deep sense of betrayal. Regardless of how beloved are the women in Western society, ultimately the males will sacrifice them for the good of the patriarchy. Our fathers, our lovers, our brothers, and our friends have over and over, for thousands of years, participated in a conspiracy to privilege the masculine over the feminine. In the course of time, this has resulted in much humiliation and subjugation. There rose in me a great anger, a swelling of indignation so great that I could not keep the profanity out of my writing. Eventually I came to a process of writing whereby I allowed myself to vent in the first draft, then come back and create a more restrained version. Nevertheless, the anger remains, and I hope that it still sings in this work as a kind of energy fueling the argument. Eventually, after thousands of hours of reading and writing, pacing and storming, I came to a deep sense of sorrow. Not only is the world getting worse after one hundred years of psychotherapy, but two thousand years of Christianity have passed, and the world is perhaps only getting meaner. It doesn't seem that this should be so, but there is plenty of evidence that it may

be. The stories we are telling do not seem to be carrying us to a world of tolerance, harmony, and conscious living.

Is it possible that we could invent stories that would help us to accept all of who we are? Might there be a way for us to accept the conditions of existence and make peace with the panoply of experiences that life offers? This dissertation seeks to identify some aspects of the "water we are swimming in" and thereby create an opportunity to clean up the pollution.

Chapter 1

The Functions of Myth

A discussion of the functions of myth is essentially an attempt to answer simple questions. Why do people tell these stories called myths? Why does anyone listen to them? What happens when this telling and listening occur? What motivates the storyteller to select *this* story at *this* time? Who is the intended audience? What is the intention of the storyteller regarding the listener? The storyteller is trying to tell the listener something, to make a point, to educate, to instruct, or to entertain. Stories have been told for many reasons--to stupefy children who resist all efforts to put them to bed or to admonish them for behavior deemed unsuitable by the teller. Stories have been told to avert impending disasters and pass long tedious hours. Stories instruct, enlighten, transform, open new possibilities, and describe the human condition. Are *all* these stories myths, or is there something essentially distinctive that separates myth from story?

It is the element of commonality that attracts us to stories in the first place. Literary theorists call it empathy. We want stories to be about ourselves and people we know. We want to use them to instruct our children, to provide maps for life's inevitable challenges, to reassure ourselves that life's travails can at least be endured, if not surmounted. Stories can be maps of hope. We look for a story that offers the possibility of guidance, initiation and healing. The power of myth is generated by our desire to believe, by the way in which myths resonate psychologically with our deepest desires. Without what Samuel Coleridge describes as the "willing suspension of disbelief," (437) myths are powerless, curiosities of alien cultures or ancient world views of historical interest, but having little psychological impact. The power of myth to inspire empathy is what attracts. Today's global society affords a look not only at our own culture but at others as well. The search for something useful in unfamiliar cultures embodies a hope to find a magic cure that we feel is missing in our own mythos. Do *they* know something we don't know? What are their secrets? Are there mysteries hidden in their rituals, their traditions, their stories? A respectful approach

suggests that we regard other mythologies as we would the stories told by an elder to the young and ignorant, for we are not initiates in this culture. The reward can sometimes be both the discovery of commonalties and new possibilities. The current examination of nontechnological cultures may provide clues for reinventing a relationship with nature in order to avoid our ecological destruction.

Campbell's Four Functions of Myth

Joseph Campbell spent forty years studying myths, examining stories, discussing the way they function in various cultures and societies. He identified what he considered to be the four functions of myth and he discussed them many times over the course of his lifetime. In this section I will compare one of his earliest articulations of those functions (1964) in The Masks of God: Occidental Mythology with later versions written in the late 1980s.

What distinguishes a myth, according to Campbell, is the presence of archetypal themes. "[T]he 'elementary ideas' (Bastian), or 'archetypes of the collective unconscious' (Jung), of this single species—which are biologically grounded and at once the motivating powers and connoted references of the historically conditioned metaphorical figures of mythologies throughout the world—are, like the laws of space, unchanged by changes of location" (Inner Reaches of Outer Space 19). Commonalties, on the other hand, may not be of such a grandiose nature. Although they may cross cultural and temporal lines, they may simply be the stuff of shared human experience—shared by some but not by all. They may not be immutable. Rather, they may evolve just as do all things. The recurrence of these mythemes may be the effect of simple human exchange, of everyday interaction between people who are living their everyday lives, not focused on social, cultural, or religious distinctions. These stories may have moved about in a conscious attempt to soothe, instruct, heal, or help. For some they may be effective, and for others they may evoke no resonance. Perhaps stories which are considered mythic may generate no sense of

commonality with some persons. In later chapters, it is with this in mind that we will consider Campbell's "monomyth" as well as other examples of the "heroic journey."

Stories have a life of their own. They defy ownership. Stories pass from hand to hand, tailored by the tellers, heard through the mental filters of listeners. Once tellers have told the narrative, they relinquish exclusive ownership of even their particular version. It is theirs for the retelling, but any listener may become a teller and is free to modify or adjust as desired. Many religions have attempted to prevent this kind of transformation, with varying degrees of success. Sacred writings and holy books seem to capture the essential forms of some stories, but many still escape, reappearing in magically modified forms. There seems to be no way to defeat the human propensity for tailoring tales to meet the needs and desires of the moment. Storytellers and mythmakers persist in constructing the narratives as they wish. Claude Lévi-Strauss makes the "striking claim that he can show 'not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact'" (qtd. in Doty, Mythography 199).

Perhaps Lévi-Strauss's analytical method may best be described as a process of decomposition and recomposition: mythological narratives are "decomposed" by identifying and charting their most elementary constituent units, termed "mythemes" (on the analogy with the smallest units of spoken language, phonemes). Lévi-Strauss's notes that these units are not usually high-sounding religious themes but are often bits and pieces from many everyday sectors of the society. We are asked to recognize that the mythmaker works much as does the maker of a collage or a fix-it person (*bricoleur*), using whatever happens along to create by organizing and structuring the bits and pieces into coherent wholes.

The mythmaker assembles these units into meaningful wholes according to structures that are deeply imbedded within the cultural framework of meaning available at a particular time. (Doty, Mythography 199-200)

Myths are quilts of the imagination, assembled from intellectual, metaphysical, sociological, cultural snippets. They are mundane things, created to contribute comfort, warmth, and a bit of beauty to the world, sometimes under the bleakest of circumstances. Like quilts, they seem to embody templates, but they defy permanent stabilization of form or content. We construct them from what we have available.

It is a fundamental tenet of communication theory that communication exists only when the message sent becomes a message received. The power of myth comes into being when a story told is a story heard and taken to heart, or when a message encoded in a story is a message received, however imperfectly interpreted. Campbell's four functions of myth focus on the effect that myths are expected to have upon the intended listener, and these he identifies as the metaphysical, the cosmological, the sociological, and the psychological. He sees mythology as a way of containing, of curtailing what he sees as the essentially dangerous nature of humanity and of subjugating the savage desires of individuals to the higher good of society. To continue with the quilt metaphor, this is rather like insisting that all quilts are for keeping people from freezing to death. Certainly they function as a means of keeping people warm, but they have other functions as well. They may illustrate stories, provide entertainment and creative outlets, pass tedious hours, and send messages of caring and comfort. They are, to use William Doty's term, "polyfunctional" (Mythography 55). Stories of all kinds may represent the human impulses to heal, instruct, warm, love, guide, surprise, inspire, and connect as well as to domesticate, subjugate, indoctrinate, shame, dominate, and control. There are and have always been many who are looking for that thread of commonality that will somehow enlighten and, perhaps, allow us to contribute to the "other" as well as to receive, or use.

The primary function of myths might very well be the metaphorical equivalent of "goosebumps," according to Lily Tomlin. In the play The Search for Signs of Intelligent Life in the Universe by Jane Wagner, Tomlin plays Trudy, a bag lady who has been employed as consultant and guide by "aliens from outer space." It is Trudy whose function is to provide metaphysical, cosmological, social, and psychological information that will orient the aliens to our planet. Within the play, she sends them to a play. At the conclusion, she tells us that they have had to depart, but left behind this message:

"Dear Trudy, thanks for making our stay here so jam-packed and fun-filled. Sorry to abort our mission--it is not over, just temporarily scrapped. We have orders to go to a higher bio-vibrational plane. Just wanted you to know, the neurochemical imprints of our cardiocortical experiences here on

earth will remain with us always, but what we take with us into space that we cherish the most is the 'goose bump' experience."

Did I tell you what happened at the play? We were at the back of the theater, standing there in the dark, all of a sudden I feel one of 'em tug my sleeve, whispers, "Trudy, look." I said, "Yeah, goose bumps. You definitely got goose bumps. You really like the play that much?" They said it wasn't the play gave 'em goose bumps, it was the audience.

I forgot to tell 'em to watch the play; they'd been watching the *audience*! Yeah, to see a group of strangers sitting together in the dark, laughing and crying about the same things. . . that just knocked 'em out.

They said, "Trudy,
the play was soup . . .
the audience. . .
art."

So they're taking goose bumps home with 'em. Goose bumps! Quite a souvenir. I like to think of them out there in the dark, watching us. Sometimes we'll do something and they'll laugh. Sometimes we'll do something and they'll cry. And maybe one day we'll do something so magnificent, everyone in the universe will get goose bumps. (212-13)

That is a powerful function of myth--to give us all goose bumps. The art is the beauty of the beholder.

Assuming then that the message sent by myth is a message received by an attentive listener, and that the message is of such power as to create "goosebumps," or some similar manifestation of psychological resonance, what are the effects of this extraordinary human connection? Let us examine Campbell's four functions of myth as he expressed them over the course of his lifetime. Subtle changes occur.

The metaphysical function. The first function Campbell entitles the metaphysical or the mystical function. In 1964 he wrote,

In the long view of the history of mankind, four essential functions of mythology can be discerned. The first and most distinctive--vitalizing all--is that of eliciting and supporting a sense of awe before the mystery of being. Professor Rudolf Otto has termed this recognition of the *numinous*, the characteristic mental state of all religions properly so called.[. . .] Defined, it may be talked about and taught; but talk and teaching cannot produce it. Nor can authority enforce it. Only the accident of experience and the sign symbols of a living myth can elicit and support it; but such signs cannot be invented. They are found. Whereupon they function of themselves. And those who find them are the sensitized, creative, living minds that once were known as seers, but now as poets and creative artists. More important, more effective for the future of a culture than its statesmen or its armies are these masters of the spiritual breath by which the clay of man wakes to life. (Masks of God: Occidental Mythology 519)

Notice the shamanic nature of this interpretation. The seer, more creative, sensitive, and alive than ordinary mortals, accidentally discovers the signs that reveal the numinous nature of all existence. The seer becomes the bearer of this news to his society. This is rarefied air, accessible only to the initiate, available to the common folk only by way of an intercessor.

In later life, Campbell was expressing this metaphysical function differently. For purposes of comparison, one might look at the transcripts of recorded dialogue between Bill Moyers and Joseph Campbell in 1985 and 1986. Campbell's spontaneous responses to Moyers' questions may reflect more accurately his thinking at that time than well-considered writing designed to be consistent with past versions. The Power of Myth provides excerpts of these conversations:

CAMPBELL: The individual has to find an aspect of myth that relates to his own life. Myth basically serves four functions. The first is the mystical function—that is the one I've been speaking about, realizing what a wonder the universe is and what a wonder you are, and experiencing awe before this mystery. Myth opens the world to the dimension of mystery, to the realization of the mystery that underlies all forms. If you lose that, you don't have a mythology. If mystery is manifest through all things, the universe becomes, as it were, a holy picture. You are always addressing the transcendent mystery through the conditions of your actual world. (31)

In the earlier version the focus is on the "heroic" aspect of the artist's journey and the "boon" of the mythical symbol which is returned to the mundane world for the less creative. By the time he is conversing with Moyers, over twenty years later, he has dispensed with the role of the heroic intercessor. He sees this search for metaphysical meaning as the task of every individual, the need to interact with the "holy picture." The numinous experience has become more direct.

The cosmological function. Campbell's second function is the cosmological. Myths provide "an image of the universe that will support and be supported by this sense of awe before the mystery of a presence and the presence of a mystery. The cosmology has to correspond, however, to the actual experience, knowledge, and mentality of the culture folk involved" (Masks of God: Occidental Mythology 519). The failure of contemporary

mythology to adequately perform this function was to become one of Campbell's major complaints about contemporary religious life. Modern mythologies, he feels, provide no adequate cosmological map which can be seen to be consistent with modern science. Indeed, the major religions have clung tenaciously to outmoded world views and deprived societies of this badly needed function. By 1988 Campbell described the cosmological dimension as "the dimension with which science is concerned--showing you what the shape of the universe is, but showing it in such a way that the mystery again comes through. Today we tend to think that scientists have all the answers. But the great ones tell us, 'No, we haven't got all the answers. We're telling you how it works--but what is it?'" (Power of Myth 31). In the later view he seems less committed to the absolutism of a scientific perspective. There is a softening in his attitude and a realization that science perhaps may be incapable of providing all the answers that we might have anticipated in the earlier part of the century.

Doty, in writing about the cosmological function says that "Campbell has brought devastating criticisms to bear upon contemporary forms of the world's great religions for failing to relate modern scientific world views to the metaphysics of traditional religion" (Mythography 53). It may not be the responsibility of religion to fulfill this function, and it is imperative to remember that mythologies do not equate with religions. The mythology of modern science seems to provide a cosmology that is acceptable to most of contemporary humanity. Campbell's "devastating criticisms" of the inability of Christianity, or any other religion, to reconcile orthodox theology with the scientific mythology we use as cosmology is a common theme of modern literature. The reconciliation of this dilemma is similar to the subtle shift between the explanations of the mystical or metaphysical function of myth. We can no longer wait for a messiah, a poet, or a priest to rescue us heroically from our angst. It is the task of each one of us to determine for ourselves our place and purpose in the vast cosmos. Mythologies can only function as maps--in the past, some human beings found answers that satisfied them by proceeding thusly. However, that last big Kierkegaardian

leap of faith, that step to "This is who and what I am and this is what my existence means," is a solitary journey for contemporary individuals. In this sense, it might be a mythological truth that for many of us: "God is dead." There can be no messiah to undertake the difficult task of assigning meaning to existence on behalf of all the others. We have come to the realization that to "banish the darkness" is to cripple our perception of reality and to create pathologies within ourselves and our society.

Campbell longs for a Redeemer. He would like to believe that it is possible for a heroic figure through extraordinary suffering and sacrifice to transform the conditions of life for all of humanity forevermore. The function of myth becomes, therefore, to tell the "good news" over and over, to initiate repeatedly or to baptize new generations into the fold, thus entitling them to protection and reassurance, to exempt them from having to descend into the depths and from having to endure the trials and tribulations of the shadow journey. The function of mythology becomes the perpetuation of the status quo, the perpetuation of the hero's story. It is the task of the theologian or priest, therefore, to continue to refresh the stories in such a way that they stay compatible with a changing world view. Failure to do this evokes irritation from Campbell. He longs for the comforting existence of eternal truths. He insists that the concept of Redeemer withstands the test of time. He wants to be protected, and simultaneously to provide protection for us all, from the wounds of the soulful descent. Ultimately, however, no matter how determined his wishful thinking may be, the scholar in him seems to come to the realization that each of us must undertake the journey for ourselves.

The sociological function. Campbell's third function is

[. . .] to support the current social order, to integrate the individual organically with his group [. . . to move toward] a single world society [. . .] .

The social function of a mythology and of the rites by which it is rendered is to establish in every member of the group concerned a "system of sentiments" that can be depended upon to link him spontaneously to its ends. The "system of sentiments" proper to a hunting tribe would be improper to an agricultural one; that proper to a matriarchy is improper to a patriarchy; and that of any tribal group is improper to this day of developed individuals crossing paths from east to west and from north to south[. . .].

The older mythic orders gave authority to their symbols by attributing them to gods, to culture heroes, or to some such high impersonal force as the order of the universe. [. . .] Today we know, for the most part, that our laws are not from God or from the universe, but from ourselves; are conventional, not absolute; and that breaking them we offend not God but man. Neither animals nor plants, not the zodiac or its supposed maker, but our fellows have now become the masters of our fate and we of theirs. In the recent past it may have been possible for intelligent men of good will honestly to believe that their own society (whatever it happened to be) was the only good, that beyond its bounds were the enemies of God, and that they were called upon, consequently to project the principle of hatred outward upon the world, while cultivating love within, toward those whose "system of sentiments" was of God. Today, however, there is no such outward. Enclaves of national, racial, religious, and class provincialism persist, but the physical facts have made closed horizons illusory. The old god is dead, with his little world and his little, closed society. The new focal center of belief and trust is mankind. And if the principle of love cannot be awakened actually within each—as it was mythologically in God—to master the principle of hate, the Waste Land alone can be our destiny and the masters of the world its fiends. (Masks of God: Occidental Mythology 520-21)

Campbell's discussion of this function is significantly different in the later version.

There is less of an emphasis upon a single world order, but an insistence on conformity nonetheless:

The third function is the sociological—supporting and validating a certain social order. And here's where the myths vary enormously from place to place. You can have a whole mythology for polygamy, a whole mythology for monogamy. Either one's okay. It depends on where you are. It is this sociological function of myth that has taken over in our world and it is out of date.[. . .].

MOYERS: What do you mean?

CAMPBELL: Ethical laws. The laws of life as it should be in the good society. All of Yahweh's pages and pages and pages of what kind of clothes to wear, how to behave to each other, and so forth, in the first millennium BC. (Power of Myth 31)

Campbell tells us that myths "validate, support, and imprint the norms of a given specific moral order" (qtd. in Doty, Mythography 54). Furthermore, they "authorize 'its moral code as a construct beyond criticism or human emendation'" (54).

In the earlier version, there is a recognition of variations of values or differing "systems of sentiments," but the notion of progress is present in the earlier version, implying that we are evolving in a progressive manner toward this "single world society." Most disturbing is this acceptance of the inevitable projection of "principle of hatred

outward upon the world" which can only be ameliorated by the mastery of the principle of love. Where exactly this principle of love will come from remains undisclosed. Later there appears to be more tolerance for differences, as exemplified in his example of monogamous and polygamous societies. "Either one's okay," he says. But then he adds: "It is this sociological function of myth that has taken over in our world and it is out of date" (Power of Myth 31). It is a confusing remark, unimproved by his response to Moyer's request for clarification. "Ethical laws," he replies. "The laws of life as it should be in the good society" (31). We are back to a moral rigidity, a notion of "good" societies and "bad" societies that seems to invalidate his tolerance for various styles of marital arrangements or other social constructs.

There is great enthusiasm in the earlier version for mankind's advancement toward a "single world society." Perhaps the lingering aroma of victory after World War II was leading Campbell to conclude that undeniable progress was being made toward a higher civilization by the collective Western mind. This explanation is loaded with the usual ethnocentrism and anthropocentrism of the postwar period. "The new focal center of belief and trust is mankind" (521). By the mid-sixties, however, the rough beasts of the counterculture were already slouching toward Woodstock to be born. Of course, the dissenters are, and have always been, with us. Campbell was far too well educated and well read not to have known this. He makes reference to the "wasteland" images of Pound, Eliot, and Auden when he writes, "if the principle of love cannot be awakened within each--as it was mythologically in God--to master the principle of hate, the Waste Land alone can be our destiny and the masters of the world its fiend" (521). The foreshadowing of the fiendish Darth Vader lurks about in this image of the modern world.

Campbell wants there to be a God, and he is willing for that god to reside within, but he desperately wants it to be the same within all of us. Differences of values or "systems of sentiment" can be explained away by a progressive evolution, a macro-evolution mirroring Jungian micro-individuation. Individuation becomes a process of

conformity rather than distinction, which enables us to "nail down" good and evil without having to endure the horrible ambiguity of the existential dilemma. This segues directly into the fourth function.

The psychological function. Campbell originally refers to the fourth function as the "psychological" and later as the "pedagogical" function:

The fourth function of mythology is to initiate the individual into the order of realities of his own psyche, guiding him toward his own spiritual enrichment and realization. Formerly—but in archaic cultures still—the way was to subordinate all individual judgment, will and capacities absolutely to the social order: the principle of ego [. . .] was to be suppressed and, if possible, even erased; while the archetypes, the ideal roles, of the social order were impressed upon all inexorable, according to their social stations. In a world of static forms, such a massacre of the creative personality was acceptable, and where the archaic mind prevails today such patterns still goes on. (Masks of God: Occidental Mythology 521)

Reasoning from this position, it would seem to me that the authorization of a "moral code as a construct beyond criticism or human emendation" would be consistent with this archaic culture that he dismisses so chauvinistically. I'm not sure he was any clearer by 1988. He has, however, changed his term for this function.

But there is a fourth function of myth, and this is the one that I think everyone must try today to relate to—and that is the pedagogical function, of how to live a human lifetime under any circumstances. Myths can teach you that.

MOYERS: So the old story, so long known and transmitted through the generations, isn't functioning, and we have not yet learned a new one?

CAMPBELL: The story that we have in the West, so far as it is based on the Bible, is based on a view of the universe that belongs to the first millennium B.C. It does not accord with our concept either of the universe or of the dignity of man. It belongs entirely somewhere else.

We have today to learn to get back into accord with the wisdom of nature and realize again our brotherhood with the animals and with the water and the sea. To say that the divinity informs the world and all things is condemned as pantheism. But *pantheism* is a misleading word. It suggests that a personal god is supposed to inhabit the world, but that is not the idea at all. The idea is trans-theological. It is of an undefinable, inconceivable mystery, thought of as power, that is the source and end and supporting ground of all life and being. (Power of Myth 31)

At another point the psychological function is described as the process "having to do with 'shaping individuals to the aims and ideals of their various social groups' and guiding the individual 'stage by stage, in health, strength, and harmony of spirit, through the whole

foreseeable course of a useful life" (qtd. in Doty, Mythography 54-55). Doty points out that Campbell stresses the "tension between the local and particular, and the global and universal" (55). It is clear that Doty interprets the psychological function as the process by which an individual learns his or her proper place in society and lives the honorable life by committing himself or herself to maintaining proper roles which sustain the culture:

The person who has learned by means of an origin myth that there are various social roles available within the articulated social cosmos, various possible ways for him or her to fulfill a proper position within the social hierarchies or to find ways of operating meaningfully as a contributing member of his or her society--this person will have gained from the mythic stories, reinforced by ritual dramatizations, a very clear sense of what that society defines as psychological health. The person who is healthy is the person who "fits in," as we are fond of saying, and we can look either at traditional legendary stories or at modern mass-media plots to substantiate the pressure toward conformity that such a position implies. (55)

Doty points out that the Campbell's heroic characters initiate a challenge to conformities, but "after their initial challenge to the status quo, or even after altering the status quo somewhat, become in turn its defenders and resist further change" (55). Doty here recognizes Campbell's aversion to myth as destroyer, as creator of chaos. Campbell's heroes have to break a few eggs, but the valuable boon is an adherence to an ever higher world order. Doty's personal opinion differs from Campbell. He writes, "I am not as inclined as Campbell is to search for *the* image or for one ultimate mythic answer. Rather I am impressed with the polyfunctionality of myths [. . .]" (55). That is, Doty's perspective is more fluid, emphasizing the "dynamism of myths" and "regarding their polyfunctionality as an essential part of their very nature" (56).

In The Power of Myth, Campbell calls this fourth function "pedagogical," a word which refers to the educational, instructional qualities of myths, but which summons up an image of the pedagogue, dry as dust, pedantic and dogmatic. The word is deliberately inflexible. He does not say that myths are enlightening, instructive, or broadening. They are "pedagogical," with connotations of tutelage, adherence to a rigid ethos and immutable conditions of existence. The pedagogical function, Campbell says, is the process by which myths teach you "how to live a human lifetime under any circumstances" (31). Our current

difficulty, he contends, is that the Western story is based on Biblical sources and contains a vision of the universe that is inconsistent with current thinking. Such uncertainty would certainly cripple a pedagogue.

Although Campbell still sees the problem of contemporary culture as a critical need for a cosmological myth that allows us to orient ourselves in a hierarchy, he does slip slightly off his anthropocentric pedestal at this point. He does not concede that mankind no longer functions as the "focal center of belief," but he does acknowledge that "[w]e have today to learn to get back into accord with the wisdom of nature and realize again our brotherhood with the animals and with the water and the sea" (31).

There is less emphasis here on archetypal patterns, which he defined earlier as "ideal roles of the social order." However, he still is struggling with the idea of gods within versus the God above who determines world order and whose commandments should be obeyed, whose will justifies all actions of the hero who battles on behalf of good, whose "might for right" will carry him to glory and bring him to a *godlike* position in the hierarchy. Fame and glory are *like* being immortal, the distinction of divinities.

Campbell can't seem to decide whether a world order exists independently of mankind, which might be reflected in the natural world, which carries no inherent values but merely reflects what is—or if humanity stands at the pinnacle of a universal hierarchical world order, that "[n]either animals or plants, not the zodiac or its supposed maker, but our fellows have now become the masters of our fate and we of theirs" (Masks of God: Occidental Mythology 521). This is a critical point, for these four functions, as he has outlined them, serve to perpetuate the status quo. Mythology becomes the methodology by which orthodoxy may be determined and maintained. Were we assured of a timeless, divine world order and were we confident of our ability to perceive it, there might be justification for the perpetuation of an established world order. However, since we are unable to determine whether such a thing exists, and if it does we are still unable to comprehend it, then perhaps harnessing the power of myth to the perpetuation of imperfect

world views is a grievous error. Campbell's four functions of myth is a schema with a built-in flaw—inflexibility. Perhaps when monogamy is confronted with polygamy, or monotheism with polytheism, either is "okay," as Campbell terms it, but which is to be officially sanctioned by the sociological function as the correct psychological path for the individual, as consistent with the cosmology of the universe, as metaphysically appropriate? The rigidity of this functional design would render mythology ineffective in dealing with contemporary problems such as cultural differences and differing perceptions, if indeed these four functions were inclusive. This is clearly not the case. These four functions of myth demonstrate the power of orthodoxy, the way in which mythology may be used to resist change and to endorse an established point of view. Myths may also be used to unravel, disempower, deconstruct, desanctify. Stories have the power to reveal that the emperor has no clothes, to name the methods of persecution, to illuminate the road to freedom, to re-member that which has been mutilated, destroyed, repressed. This I would call the power of heresy.

The Power of Heresy

I can only speculate as to why Campbell fails to identify the obvious. He wants life to have verities, and he wishes to carry them in the vessel of mythology. He would prefer a world that is well-ordered, where chaos is banished forever. He understands the power of myth to deconstruct, but like the inventors of the atomic bomb, he imagines he can control the use of that power by keeping this knowledge to himself. It is almost as if this power must remain in the shadow, unspoken, like the name of Yahweh. There is and has always been justifiable fear of this power. It is the power to undo, to disassemble, to undermine. It is crafted to protect the radical, to encode the countercultural, the antisocial, the revolutionary. It is anathema to bullies and power mongers, the weapon of the underdog. It provides alternative explanations and points of view which challenge and test "established" truths, thereby strengthening their veracity or knocking them off their

pedestals. The power of heresy is the antidote to the power of orthodoxy. It protects us from totalitarianism, keeps things fluid, dissolves rigidity.

Neither Joseph Campbell nor Bill Moyers wants to introduce this insidious element into their discussion of the power of myth. It strains credulity to imagine that they are oblivious. No well-brought-up Catholic boy, as Campbell was, is unaware of the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*. Moyers, a Southern Baptist minister, is aware that his religion has its own list of books considered too dangerous for the eyes of school children. These conversations were conducted on the ranch of George Lucas, whose Star Wars hero, Luke Skywalker, is a young man struggling to keep alive a repressed system of values in a totalitarian political system. The films themselves are thematically based on the power of story to embody "The Force."

In his discussion of Campbell, Doty acknowledges the existence of this power and begins with a reference to Star Trek as "the adolescent (or grandparent, for that matter!) for whom the television series represented a means of voicing a radically new vision of the world" (Mythography 52). Doty goes on to dismiss this power to voice a new vision and continues with the remark, " But let us assume for now that we are talking about materials that truly matter, that have mattered in centering and guiding a society. [. . .] I am referring in these instances to ways myths and rituals function from the perspective of their function *within* working mythological systems" (52). Myths and rituals, indeed, can be the very process by which the insurgent works from within to undermine the ethical verities that favor some and demonize others, that establish judgmental dualities of good and bad, black and white, positive and negative. The power of myth to keep things flexible does indeed "truly matter," particularly when "guiding a society" or a planet.

The metaphysical function of heresy. Campbell uses the phrase "recognition of the numinous" (Masks of God: Occidental Mythology 519) to explain his metaphysical function. The word *numinous* implies a mysterious benevolence, a basking in the warm glow of divine magnificence. The metaphysics of heresy are less cozy. The view is more

closely described as recognition of the dangerous, an unsettling recognition that we occupy an unknown, terrifying, limitless cosmos, indifferent to the fate of a human, a race, a species, a planet, a galaxy. These stories remind us of our utter insignificance in the overall scheme, that even time and space are constructs of the human mind and have no inherent validity. The overwhelming realization that we are without significance does nothing to quiet our fears. The "clay of man" must recognize his "clayness." Awe may be appropriate here also, but it is of the knee-knocking, heart thumping variety. The only antidote to the overwhelming fear is surrender, unconditional acceptance of what is so.

We are the hollow men
 We are the stuffed men
 Leaning together
 Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!
 Our dried voices, when
 We whisper together
 Are quiet and meaningless
 As wind in dry grass
 Or rats' feet over broken glass
 In our dry cellar. [. . .]

This is the dead land
 This is the cactus land
 Here the stone images
 Are raised, here they receive
 The supplication of a dead man's hand
 Under the twinkle of a fading star. [. . .]

Between the desire
 And the spasm
 Between the potency
 And the existence
 Between the essence
 And the descent
 Falls the Shadow
 For Thine is the Kingdom
 For Thine is
 Life is
 For Thine is the

*This is the way the world ends
 This is the way the world ends
 This is the way the world ends
 Not with a bang but a whimper.*

"The Hollow Men"
 T. S. Eliot (1925-26).

Eliot is describing a world without hierarchies. No being is greater or lesser than any other by reason of birth, achievement, or divine intervention. All exist as a part of an incomprehensible whole. Each is born and will die, like the butterfly or the rose. Change is the only verity. Days are numbered, destinies unknown and uncontrollable. Each living part is dependent upon the whole to sustain it, and will eventually provide sustenance for another living thing. From dust each of us comes, and to dust we shall return. Like wind in the grass, we pass insignificantly.

It should be noted, however, that this metaphysical realization is "heresy" only in the context of the Western mind. Such acknowledgment of one's personal insignificance and of the value of surrender to the position of the "beginner's mind" is a wisdom long available in Eastern traditions. Hermann Hesse describes this state of mind in his novel, Siddhartha:

"There is one thought I have had, Govinda, which you will again think is jest or folly: that is in every truth the opposite is equally true. For example, a truth can only be expressed in words if it is one-sided. Everything that is thought and expressed in words is one-sided, only half the truth; it lacks totality, completeness, unity. When the Illustrious Buddha taught about the world, he had to divide it into Samsara and Nirvana, into illusion and truth, into suffering and salvation. One cannot do otherwise, there is no other method for those who teach. But the world itself, being in and around us, is never one-sided. Never is a man or a deed wholly Samsara or wholly Nirvana, never is a man wholly a saint or a sinner. This only seems so because we suffer the illusion that time is something real. Time is not real [. . .]. And if time is not real, then the dividing line that seems to lie between this world and eternity, between suffering and bliss, between good and evil, is also an illusion."

"How is that?" asked Govinda, puzzled.

"Listen, my friend! I am a sinner and you are a sinner, but someday the sinner will be Brahma again, will someday attain Nirvana, will someday become a Buddha. Now this 'someday' is illusion; it is only a comparison. The sinner is not on the way to a Buddha-like state; he is not evolving, although our thinking cannot conceive things otherwise. No, the potential Buddha already exists in the sinner; his future is already there. The potential hidden Buddha must be recognized in him, in you, in everybody. The world, Govinda, is not imperfect or slowly evolving along a long path to perfection. No, it is perfect at every moment; every sin already carries grace within it, all small children are potential old men, all sucklings have death within them, all dying people—eternal life. It is not possible for one person to see how far another is on the way; the Buddha exists in the robber and dice player; the robber exists in the Brahmin. During deep meditation it is possible to dispel time, to see simultaneously all the past, present and future, and then everything is good, everything is perfect, everything is

Brahman. Therefore, it seem to me that everything that exists is good—death as well as life, sin as well as holiness, wisdom as well as folly. Everything is necessary, everything needs only my agreement, my assent, my loving understanding; then all is well with me and nothing can harm me. I learned through my body and soul that it was necessary for me to sin, that I needed lust, that I had to strive for property and experience nausea and the depths of despair in order to learn not to resist them, in order to learn to love the world, and no longer compare it with some kind of desired imaginary world, some imaginary vision of perfection, but to leave it as it is, to love it and be glad to belong to it. These, Govinda, are some of the thoughts that are in my mind." (143-44)

The cosmological function of heresy. Stephen Hawking writes, in A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes:

If we do discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all, philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people be able to take part in the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist. If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason—for then we would know the mind of God. (175)

Here is one of our most highly regarded theoretical physicists valiantly attempting to reassure the likes of Campbell that perhaps, some day, we will be able to offer a cosmological explanation of the universe that not only would be consistent with scientific thinking, but would reflect "the mind of God." With due respect for Hawking's integrity, it is the voice of orthodoxy that is speaking here. It is possible, suggests the insidious heretic, that we shall never know all there is to know, that theories are just . . . theoretical. It is possible that what we think we know, what we call knowledge, is in fact, riddled with imponderables, incommensurables, and inaccuracies. Human thinking and perceptions are limited, fallible. It is hubris even to pretend that we can ever know with certainty the mind of God, the mind of Creation, the laws of the Cosmos. It is the function of the cosmological serpent to remind us that uncertainty is a given of existence. Humbling though it may be, we are able only to grasp a morsel of reality, albeit imperfectly. The bit of time and space that we occupy is ours on loan. Perhaps a useful cosmological view would be that we should pay careful attention to this bit, to the part that we occupy. We might be wise to tend it carefully, acknowledging that our ephemeral existence depends upon it. Our lives necessitate taking from this tiny cosmos, using, digesting, absorbing.

As living creatures we necessarily pollute—breathing, excreting, defecating. Perhaps we might feel a desire to become more conscious of the environment we occupy, to expend our efforts on accountably caring for that which we know best and depend on for life, rather than straining to pretend that we can "know the mind of God." There is no ecological redeemer who can forgive us our ecological sins. We have to clean the mess up ourselves. No astronaut/knight on a white horse/missile can carry us away to another universe, another space in time. That nasty, truth-telling serpent keeps reminding us of the earthy realities of our everyday existence. Black holes are less of a threat than toxic dumps, actually.

In Jerry Mander's book, In the Absence of the Sacred, he quotes from an Iroquois address delivered at the 1977 United Nations Conference on Indigenous Peoples:

In the beginning we were told that the human beings who walk about on the Earth have been provided with all the things necessary for life. We were instructed to carry a love for one another, and to show a great respect for all the beings of this Earth. We were shown that our life exists with the tree of life, and that our well-being depends on the well-being of the Vegetable Life, that we are close relatives of the four-legged beings.

The original instructions direct that we who walk about on Earth are to express a great respect, an affection and a gratitude toward all the spirits which create and support Life. [. . .] When people cease to respect and express gratitude for these many things, then all life will be destroyed and human life on this planet will come to an end. (191)

The Cherokee tribe has a myth of the creation which contains a similar hair-raising image.

Earth is floating on the waters like a big island, hanging from four rawhide ropes fastened at the top of the sacred four directions. The ropes are tied to the ceiling of the sky, which is made of hard rock crystal. When the ropes break, this world will come tumbling down, and all living things will fall with it and die. Then everything will be as if the earth had never existed, for water will cover it. Maybe the white man will bring this about. (Erdoes and Ortiz 105)

The sociological function of heresy. Stories and myths are possibly the most powerful weapons of the seditionist. They may also serve those whose goal is to undermine authority, incite rebellion, unmask impostors' stories. Stories provide an opportunity to encode secret information, identify the oppressors, or introduce the possibility of a new regime. Satire may be used to make the exalted objects of ridicule. This

inflammatory, traitorous material appears in seemingly benign disguises such as song, image, or bedtime story.

If our laws are not from God, as Campbell points out, but rather are creations of mankind, then they have no divine status. There is no moral code "beyond criticism or human emendation," despite Campbell's assertion that such exists (qtd. in Doty, Mythography 54). Social systems are created to serve the purposes of those in power at a certain time and space. There is no system, no order that can be perfected, that will stand for all time. There is no principle—love or otherwise—that can deliver paradise or redeem us from the conditions of existence. The "fiends" are aspects of ourselves. The "wasteland" is as real and as metaphorical as Eden.

This being so, it is the responsibility of all rational beings to subject these systems to constant scrutiny, a sociological and moral imperative to point out fallacies, outmoded concepts and structures which have outlived their usefulness. Just as myths may be used to validate a "certain social order," so they may be used to invalidate. Many contemporary writers are engaged in the process of identifying anthropocentrism, racism, and sexism in our society, to "name" the fallacies and to disempower those privileged aspects by citing the destructive consequences of such hierarchies.

It is a sociological function of story to dream a better world, to imagine new possibilities, to invent social conditions that haven't come true and give them life. This is the method by which societies stay fluid and find ways out of oppression. When a dream becomes an image, it takes on a new reality. When that image is shared amongst a number of minds, it becomes a possibility and eventually takes on the force of inevitability.

I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self evident; that all men are created equal."

I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slaveowners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.

I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a desert state sweltering with the heat of injustice and oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice.

I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. (King)

Martin Luther King spoke these words from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in August of 1963 to a crowd of 210,000 assembled for the March on Washington. His words were electrifying. There was then, and continues to be, great power in the images of his dream of equality, the same dream voiced by the founders of this country, who had in mind, however, liberty and justice only for the white and the masculine. There lingers still, in the red hills of Georgia, long after the assassination of Dr. King, an image of black and white together, meeting with mutual respect in the spirit of love. King is both endorsing a seditious mythology and attacking its pathology—the sociological power of myth functioning at its finest.

Myths allow repressed cultures to stay alive. The story of the struggle for racial equality in this country provides some of the most graphic examples of the way in which mythology can function as a force of rebellion.

When the Sun comes back
And the first quail calls
Follow the Drinking Gourd.
For the old man is a-waiting for to carry you to freedom
If you follow the Drinking Gourd.

The riverbank makes a very good road.
The dead trees will show you the way.
Left foot, peg foot, traveling on
Follow the Drinking Gourd.

The river ends between two hills
Follow the Drinking Gourd.
There's another river on the other side
Follow the Drinking Gourd.

When the great river meets the little river.
Follow the Drinking Gourd.
For the old man is a-waiting for to carry you to freedom.
If you follow the drinking gourd. (Magruder and Keas)

Kerry Magruder, director of the Oklahoma Baptist University Planetarium, writes "A carpenter called Peg Leg Joe traveled from farm to farm and plantation to plantation, teaching slaves a song that would cryptically remind them of his instructions to find their

way northward." The reference to quail calls refers to the time when the birds migrate, after the December solstice, when it is easiest to navigate by the Big Dipper, or the Drinking Gourd, whose handle points toward the North Star. "The riverbank" is the Tombigbee River, along which slaves traveled northward from the Gulf of Mexico into Tennessee. The way was marked additionally by dead trees bearing charcoal and mud drawings of a bare foot and a peg leg. The second river referred to is the Tennessee River. Underground Railroad guides would meet fugitive slaves where the Tennessee met the Ohio and from there they would be transported into the nonslavery states of the North. It is easy to imagine slaveowners smiling at the melodious voices of the field hands raised in song, the masters being quite oblivious as, all the while, plans for escape were being engraved upon the minds of the enslaved workers.

Dreams of racial equality are not the exclusive property of the black race. Many white writers have used the power of the pen to argue for the dream of equality. Huckleberry Finn, considered by many to be the greatest American novel, was a powerful tool utilized by Mark Twain to nibble at the underlying assumptions that Americans held concerning slavery and the rights of the white man to dominate those he considered inferior. Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin was less artfully crafted, but nonetheless was a powerful weapon against the same institution.

Joel Chandler Harris was a white journalist who wrote for the Atlanta Constitution. His tales of Uncle Remus, written in the 1880s and 90s, were purported to be authentic reconstructions of slave lore he had heard as a child. Their theme is the outwitting of the powerful by the subservient. Brer Fox is constantly threatening to eat Brer Rabbit, if he can catch him, which consistently proves difficult. The most familiar story of these two characters is the tale of the Tar Baby. Brer Fox concocts a "contrapshun" made of calamus, turpentine, and tar and sets it out on the road to attract the attention of Brer Rabbit. "Brer Rabbit come prancin' 'long twel he spy de Tar-Baby, en den he fotch up on his behime legs like he woz 'stonished. De Tar Baby, she sot dar, she did, en Brer Fox he lay low."

Brer Rabbit repeatedly addresses the Tar Baby, who "ain't saying nothing." Brer Rabbit, angered by this rudeness, strikes Tar Baby and is soon completely stuck to the gooey creature. "Den Brer Fox, he sa'ntered fort', lookin' dez ex innercent ex wunner yo' mammy's mockin'-birds." It seems inevitable that Brer Fox would dine on the rabbit this time.

"W'en Brer Fox fine Brer Rabbit mixt up wid de Tar-baby, he feel mighty good, en he roll on de groun' en laff. Bimeby he up'n say, sezee: 'Well, I speck I got you dis time, Brer Rabbit,' sezee; 'maybe I ain't but I speck I is. You been runnin' 'roun' here sassin' atter me a mighty long time, but I speck you done come ter de cen' er de row. You bin currin' up yo' capers en bouncin' 'roun' in dis naberhood ontwel you come ter b'leeve yo'se'f de boss er de whole gang. En der youer allers some'rs whar you got no bixness,' ses Brer Fox, sezee. 'Who ax you fer ter come en strike up a 'quaintence wid dish yer Tar-Baby? En who stuck you up dar whar you iz? Nobody in de 'roun' worril. You des tuck en jam yo'se'f ondat Tar-Baby widout waintin' fer enny invite,' sez Brer Fox, sezee, 'en dar you is, en dar you'll stay twel I fixes up a bresh-pile and fires her up, kaze I'm gwinteter bobbycue you dis day, sho,' sez Brer Fox, sezee.

"Den Brer Rabbit talk mighty 'umble, "'I don't keer w'at you do wid me, Brer Fox,' sezee, 'so you don't fling me in dat brier-patch. Roas' me, Brer Fox,' sezee, 'but don't fling me in dat brier-patch,' sezee.

"'I ain't got no string,' sez Brer Fox, sezee, 'en now I speck I'll hatter drwon you,' sezee.

"'Drown me des ez deep es you please, Brer Fox," sez Brer Rabbit, sezee, 'but do don't fling me in dat brier-patch, ' sezee.

"'Dey ain't no water nigh,' sez Brer Fox, sezee, 'en now I speck I'll hatter skin you,' sezee.

"'Skin me, Brer Fox,' sez Brer Rabbit, sezee, 'snatch out my eyeballs, t'ar out my yeras by de roots, en cut off my legs,' sezee, 'but do please, Brer Fox, don't fling me in dat brier-patch,' sezee.

"Co'se Brer Fox wnater hurt Brer Rabbit bad ez he kin, so he cotch 'im by de behime legs en slung 'im right in de middle er de brierpatch. Dar wuz a considerbul flutter whar Brer Rabbit struck de bushes, en Brer Fox sorter hang 'roun' fer ter see w'at wuz gwinter happen. Bimeby he hear somebody call im, en way up de hill he see Brer Rabbit settin' crosslegged on a chinkapin log koamin' de pitch outen his har wid a chip. Den Brer Fox know dat he bin swop off mighty bad.

Brer Rabbit wuz bleedzed fer ter fling back some er his sass, en he holler out: "'Bred en bawn in a brier-patch, Brer Fox--bred en bawn in a brier-patch!' en wid dat he skip out des ez lively as a cricket in de embers."
(Harris)

Such is the power of myth to outwit the master who believes he knows what the "laws of life" in "the good society" should be.

Another collection of "masters," the British imperialists, have deservedly attracted their fair share of such attacks. In the early eighteenth century, Jonathan Swift took great

glee in wielding the weapon of satire at the "privileged" members of society whom he saw as the oppressors--the English Protestants whose assumption of superiority made them prime targets. Gulliver's Travels is a prime example of the deflationary power of a wonderfully irreverent, heretical social satire. In regard to the annoying problem of too many pesky Irish inferiors inhabiting the earth, he offers a solution in the form of "A Modest Proposal." "It is a melancholy object to those who walk through this great town or travel in the country, when they see the streets, the roads, and cabin-doors crowded with beggars of the female sex, followed by three, four, or six children all in rags, and importuning every passenger for an alms" (396).

I have been assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance in London, that a young healthy child well nursed is at a year old a most delicious, nourishing and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, baked, or boiled; and I make no doubt that it will equally serve in a fricassee, or a ragout.

I do therefore humbly offer it to public consideration, that of the hundred and twenty thousand children, already computed, twenty thousand may be reserved for breed. [. . .] That the remaining hundred thousand may at a year old be offered in sale to the persons of quality and fortune, through the kingdom, always advising the mother to let them suck plentifully in the last month, so as to render them plump and fat for a good table. (397)

Gandhi, somewhat of a Brer Rabbit in his own right, relied on the power of images to illustrate his point. He was a master showman, a magician who could be counted on to provide dramatic surprises with emotional punch and graphic content. One example is that of salt. Scantily clad in a loin cloth, emaciated from fasting, leaning on a staff for support, Gandhi walked two hundred miles to the sea, where he knelt at the shore and picked up a small bit of salt that had accumulated there. With this action he broke the salt law and forced the British to arrest him. Eventually one hundred thousand people were arrested for the same offense (Jack 240). Salt is a necessity of life, particularly valuable in warm climates. It collects on the shore of the Black Sea, free to anyone who would pick it up and use it, one of life's daily requirements, provided by nature for the humble and lofty alike. Gandhi made the British soldiers appear absurd in their determination to deny the impoverished natives this simple element of life, showcasing their inhumanity as they beat

the Indians senseless for stooping to pick it up. With each unresisted blow, the soldiers made themselves appear foolish and brutal, more "half-devil" (to use Kipling's phrase for the natives) than their saintly victims. Gandhi accomplished this with an image so effective that any photographer or filmmaker would willingly record this image for public exposure.

Another example of the use of the image can be found in his spinning. He seized upon the idea of the native production of textiles as a major economic opportunity for the impoverished masses of India. He pledged to spin each and every day. Whenever possible, he tried to be photographed at this task which he calmly pursued during most of his interviews with the press. It was a masterful piece of showmanship. The metaphors bloom from the image--the simple act of spinning, available even to the lowest individuals who would, through their industry and virtue contribute individual threads, weaving a fabric of national unity, a connected tapestry of common purpose. Each thread is weak when alone, but combined with the efforts of others can be woven into strong, serviceable cloth. It was this cloth that Gandhi used to wrap his body. "[. . .] Gandhi was always highly aware of the significance of clothes as uniforms which might identify at least one's aberrant identity fragments--until he learned to be himself, near-naked" (Erikson 143). This was, in itself, a kind of costume. He must have chuckled with glee when Winston Churchill called him a "half-naked fakir." The image is vivid, the slur petty and quite undignified coming from a distinguished leader such as Churchill. It was scarcely his "finest hour."

The psychological function of heresy. Psychological mythologies frequently have a strong moral tone, illustrating Campbell's point that such tales are designed to initiate the listener into an accepted social role. Not all mythical roadmaps, however, encourage conformity. Some encourage the listener to imagine other ways of being, to consider life an adventure with many possibilities. These kinds of psychological maps are labyrinthine, including valuable detours, dead ends, blue highways, and sudden disappearances into deep holes or thin air. They sometimes indicate uncharted ground, for the most courageous. Life is unpredictable, they seem to say. Here is a story about what happens

when you stray from the path. It might happen to you, but then again something different might occur. It might be fun, scary, deadly, or lively. You certainly will discover things about yourself never dreamed of.

Consider ten-year-old Alice Liddell, a conventional Victorian young lady who found herself floating down the Thames with The Reverend Robinson Duckworth and The Reverend Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (known to us as Lewis Carroll) "all in the golden afternoon" of a Friday in July. It would seem that this scarcely constitutes a seething bed of radicalism, but not all radicals are seething. Some, such as the Rev. Dodgson, are funny, clever, witty, and sly, like Brer Rabbit. On that afternoon in 1862, he began a story that would ignite the imaginations of little girls around the globe for years to come, suggesting to them that they had powers beyond their current expectations and that adventure was not reserved exclusively for the little boys.

The Caterpillar and Alice looked at each other for some time in silence: at last the Caterpillar took the hookah out of its mouth, and addressed her in a languid, sleepy voice.

"Who are *You*?" said the Caterpillar.

This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice replied, rather shyly, "I—I hardly know, Sir, just at present—at least I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then."

"What do you mean by that?" said the Caterpillar, sternly. "Explain yourself."

"I can't explain *myself*, I'm afraid, Sir," said Alice, because I'm not myself, you see."

"I don't see," said the Caterpillar. (67)

The wonderland of Alice is a world where reason only leads to confusion, where illusion is the norm and where nothing turns out anything like one's expectations. Metaphysically, cosmologically, and sociologically, the story is disorienting, disturbing, uncomfortable, and deliciously heretical. The "looking glass" mirrors a reality that the orthodoxy would prefer to remain in shadow. A century later, the counter-culture would paint similar images, take bites of mushrooms, smoke hookah pipes, and wander in a wonderland of psychedelic experiences. Another young girl, Grace Slick, would find in Alice a kindred spirit and follow her down the rabbit-hole.

One pill makes you larger, and one pill makes you small.
 And the ones that mother gives you, don't do anything at all.
 Go ask Alice, when she's ten feet tall.
 And if you go chasing rabbits, and you know you're going to fall.
 Tell 'em a hookah-smoking Caterpillar has given you the call.
 Call Alice, when she was just small.
 When men on the chessboard get up and tell you where to go,
 And you've just had some kind of mushroom, and your mind is moving
 slow.
 Go ask Alice, I think she'll know.
 When logic and proportion have fallen slightly dead,
 And the White Knight is talking backwards, and the Red Queen's off her
 head.
 Remember what the Dormouse said - Feed your head, Feed your head.
 (Slick)

Breaking the Fishbowl

Perhaps we have begun to discover why there is so much reluctance to name this powerful function of myth, the power to deflate, demystify, deconstruct. Campbell even speaks of Transformations of Myth Through Time, but a timeless, rigid ethical system would seem to preclude such transformations. Stories, songs, legends, tales, sacred stories, and mythologies defy containment, regardless of dogmatic efforts to keep them contained in orthodoxy. Such transformations of myth keep us supple, connect us to the past, and loosen us up for the challenges of the future. The process by which we construct is also the process by which we deconstruct, see through, modify, transform, reconfigure. Is it possible that myths serve to alienate us, to disorient, to discombobulate, to disturb complacency? They can do quite the opposite of each of Campbell's four functions, and slither along in between. They are indeed, "polyfunctional," slippery little creatures who surprise and delight us, disturb and horrify us, and keep the gears of change flowing well-lubricated. This paper seeks to identify the power by which dogmas have been crippling us—to identify the water that we swim in, to recognize the pollutants, the invisible limitations of the glass fishbowl. The power of heresy may be the way we blast ourselves out.

We have considered the evolution of Campbell's four functions over the course of his career. He remained consistent, however, on the position that a life lived heroically is

an ascension, spiritual in tone, masculine in flavor, and the best possible way to live one's life. In our next chapter we will examine The Hero with a Thousand Faces, in which Campbell discusses this journey.

Chapter 2

Contemplating the Monomyth

And whether it was Finnegan's Wake or the Navaho material, or the Hindu material, or Heinrich Zimmer's, it was all the same material. That was when I realized--and nobody can tell me any differently--that there's one mythology in the world. It has been inflected in various cultures in terms of their historical and social circumstances and needs and particular local ethic systems, but it's *one mythology*. (Campbell, Hero's Journey 127)

These are not the words of a young, inexperienced scholar. Rather they were spoken by Joseph Campbell in the last years of his life. The Hero's Journey: The World of Joseph Campbell is a film which premiered at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in February of 1987, only seven months before Campbell died. Stuart Brown, producer, had spent eight years working it. Excerpts of Brown's many conversations with Campbell are reported in The Hero's Journey: Joseph Campbell on His Life and Work, published in 1990, and it is from this book that the quote above is taken.

Campbell's The Hero With a Thousand Faces was published in 1949. In it he outlined the heroic journey and put forth the idea that this is a universal mythic structure which can be found embedded in the mythology of every culture. He felt then, and for the duration of his life, that the "monomyth," as he referred to it (following James Joyce), adequately described the life of every individual and addressed the social, psychological, cosmological, and metaphysical needs of all humanity. "This 'monomyth' lies at the core of Joseph Campbell's steadfast belief in one universal mythology. [. . .] The monomyth is in effect a *metamyth*, a philosophical reading of the unity of humankind's spiritual history, the Story beyond the story" (Hero's Journey xvi).

As I have pointed out, myths are often life maps. They illuminate paths that have been trodden by others who have suffered the human condition and desired to find meaning and purpose in existence. The monomyth when viewed as the life map for every human being creates difficulties and pathologies. One might question Campbell's interpretation of the symbology and the *exclusivity* of the universality that he claims for the monomyth. It has archetypal elements, but these images may lend themselves to a variety of

interpretations. Finally, there are other archetypal images and journeys which are equally valuable, possibly more so to those who have difficulty empathizing with the hero. For many, no commonality is established. The monomyth is only one among many mythic structures comprising a larger whole, many of which have been repressed for social, religious, and economic reasons.

Campbell makes an adequate case for this mythic structure's multitudinous appearances in very diverse cultures. However, there is no evidence for his conclusion that the heroic journey, the "monomyth" constitutes the one, the only true myth. He implies that an orthodoxy of mythic structure exists in all humanity, crossing all cultural, sexual, social, and temporal lines.

The whole sense of the ubiquitous myth of the hero's passage is that it shall serve as a general pattern for men and women, wherever they may stand along the scale. Therefore it is formulated in the broadest terms. The individual has only to discover his own position with reference to this general human formula, and let it then assist him past his restricting walls. (Hero With a Thousand Faces 121)

Adherence to this orthodoxy, according to Campbell, begins by complying with the injunction to follow the call. There are formulaic steps which follow. The completion of these rigidly delineated tests is the *only* method by which one may attain initiation into a sacred order of "transformed" (enlightened, individuated, redeemed) individuals. Successful completion of the trials and tribulations demonstrates superiority, distinguishes the protagonist from mere mortals. Heroism is authenticated by the process. This demonstration of redemption is sufficient evidence, according to Campbell, that there is one way, one path, one myth. The monomyth is the process for "validating and maintaining some specific social order, authorizing its moral code as a construct beyond criticism or human emendation" (Myths, Dreams and Religion 140). The monomyth allows for "reconciliation of consciousness with the preconditions of its [a person's or humanity's] own existence" (138). To assert that any construct exists which is "beyond criticism and human emendation" ignores a self-evident condition of existence. *Everything* changes, is in process, growing and decaying. Nothing is certain. Attempts to erect certainties are

doomed to failure. Time erodes all things, and mental constructs are particularly ephemeral.

The monomyth is indeed mythic, but it is not singular. Were this so, how would we account for all the other stories that appear repeatedly in such varied forms? Campbell answers by asserting that any other kind of story is not a myth. In The Power of Myth, he says that "the folk tale is for entertainment. The myth is for spiritual instruction" (59). This was a conclusion of later life, however, for The Hero With a Thousand Faces uses fairy tales and stories about gods and goddesses interchangeably. It was not until many years later that he articulated this distinction. By extension, then, any fairy tale which is monomythic in structure is a myth and any one which doesn't is for entertainment only. Clearly the logic is weak.

Marie Louise von Franz writes that "there is no difference between fairy tales and myth, but rather [. . .] they both deal with archetypal figures" (Feminine in Fairy Tales 5). She does not mean that fairy tales do not have a distinct psychological function that differs in character from the monomyth. Rather she is saying that fairy tales and tales of heroic adventures are both mythic. One of the functions of fairy tales is to carry the shadow, which both she and Jung equate with the unconscious. She writes: "We might therefore say that the shadow is the dark, unlied, and repressed side of the ego complex, but this is only partly true. Jung [. . .] said, 'This is all nonsense! The shadow is simply the whole unconscious'" (Shadow and Evil in Fairy Tales 3). According to von Franz, all civilizations and all individuals have their shadows, but they cannot see them--that is, they are unconscious of them. The fairy tales discussed by von Franz carry a different kind of instruction from the hero's manual.

In former times, until about the seventeenth century, fairy tales were not reserved for children, but were told among grownups in the lower layers of the population--woodcutters and peasants and women while spinning amused themselves with fairy tales. [. . .] We know now that there are fairy tales which are of a collective kind and handed on, like the old traditions, from one generation to another--it is a kind of common knowledge. Theories as to the origin of fairy tales are very different: some say they are degenerated remnants of religious myths and doctrines, others that they were once a part of literature which degenerated into fairy tales. (10-11)

These stories, like many stories expressing commonalities, have a kind of immortality. They are difficult to repress. Therefore they were relegated to the realm of the rude and the infantile. As we have seen, heresy is the weapon of the underdog. Fairy tales are encoded with pagan wisdom, an ethos disguised as entertainment in order to avoid persecution at the hands of Christian orthodoxy. They represent a world view deemed heretical and dangerous by the church, but there is wisdom contained there nonetheless. Eastern religions seem to provide a view of humanity that is less dogmatic.

[M]ost Eastern people think that our conscious collective attitude is absolutely unaware of certain metaphysical facts and that we are naively caught in illusions. That is how we appear to them, but we do not see it. We must have a shadow which we have not yet realized, of which we are unconscious; and the collective shadow is particularly bad because people support each other in their blindness—it is only in wars, or in hate for other nations, that the collective shadow reveals itself. (Shadow and Evil in Fairy Tales 7)

Even then, we often pretend not to notice our shadow. Right makes might. Hatreds are disguised as patriotism. This is precisely the problem with the heroic journey as the *mono-myth*. Shadow is denied, finding no outlets other than conflict and hatred. Rather than saying we are unconscious of shadow, it is more accurate to state that we are unconscious of its true nature because we deliberately deny its existence and resist exploration. This resistance is quite virulent. Those who wish to call attention to shadow are labeled heretics and are, therefore, demonized, ostracized, feminized, branded as irrational and infantile. It is believed that they must be put in their proper place by some well-documented, socially sanctioned heroic enforcer. Von Franz continues:

Earlier I said that only when a group comes up against another group does it realize its shadow; but I was not accurate, since in many civilizations religious rituals tend to make a group aware of its own shadow. In our Christian civilization these would correspond to the Black Mass where one would curse the name of Christ, kiss an animal on the anus in the name of the devil, and so on, and the point of it all would be to do exactly the reverse of what one thought was holy. These counterreligious festivals have died out and tend to be forgotten, but they were an attempt to show the crowd its shadow. In many primitive civilizations there is a group of jesters who have to do everything contrary to the group rules. They laugh when one should be serious, cry when others laugh, etc. For instance, in certain North American tribes someone is elected to perform in a ritualistic way shocking things contrary to the group standards. There is here probably the

vague idea that another side should also be brought into the open. It is a shadow catharsis festival. (9)

In other "primitive societies" this function has been performed by such jesters as Harris's Brer Rabbit and Mark Twain's Huck Finn. This is the material of Saturday Night Live and Jim Carey movies. Shadow is a pill that we will sometimes take, if it is coated with sugar--satire, comedy, absurdity, or titillation. Whatever the disguise, we are more comfortable if we can feel assured that this story has nothing to do with ourselves, but certainly points out some of the foibles of our fellow humans. It is about those others and the sick way in which they behave. We don't want to empathize with the cruel, unscrupulous, creepy, or ignorant. Westerners, and certainly Christians, are trained to find commonality with the good guys only. Americans are more tolerant of shadow revelations regarding their society than those on a more personal level. It is a free country--feel free to attack the institutions, the social mores, the religions. However, be careful about attacking an individual. Lawsuits are, for many, a ticket to the American Dream. Myths reveal to us the truth about ourselves, individually and collectively. We are grand creations--children of god[s] indeed, *and* we are insignificant globs of clay, temporarily infused with life before becoming fodder for some other organism. Myths seek to reflect what is sometimes hard to see. Myths portray the paradoxical, speaking metaphorically of the highest glories, the deepest terrors and much that is in between.

The heroic journey seems to describe most accurately that phase of life which occurs after childhood and before assuming the role of an adult. It is a map for leaving "home." Usually an adolescent is making the passage from childhood innocence (by reason of ignorance) into the assumption of adult responsibility and accountability for one's actions (by way of experience). It includes a separation from parental control and dependence. It is a story of resistance, rationalizations, childish imaginings, and surprising realizations. It is a story which explains to us how we may cope with complexities, with paradoxical circumstances and inexplicable experiences. Campbell believes that the hero transcends dualities, arrives at a resolution. His desire for a redeemer, a hero who can

perform the journey on behalf of his society, is clearly evidenced. On the other hand, these paradoxical perceptions may be the initiation into a higher level of comprehension, the lesson being about tolerating the intolerable, living without certitude, acknowledging that humanity's empirical capabilities are extremely limited. It is, according to Campbell, a heroic task to sort out all these contradictions, to establish dualities and delineate black from white, bad from good. In doing so, the hero brings order out of chaos and is worthy to become king. From an alternative point of view, it is heroic to accept the richness of complexity, indeed to rejoice in the wonderfully fluid, tempestuous nature of living with irreconcilable, contradictory "truths."

Monomythic Structure

Myths, like most stories and all lives, appear to have a beginning, a middle, and an end. In The Hero With a Thousand Faces, Campbell outlines the phases of the monomyth which he calls the separation, the trials, and the return.

Part 1: separation/departure. The "Call To Adventure" is the "first stage of the mythological journey [which] signifies that destiny has summoned the hero and transferred his spiritual center of gravity from within the pale of his society to a zone unknown" (58). There comes a time in every young person's life when he or she feels the longing to leave the nest, to try the wings. There is discomfort in too much comfort. The world of home, or hometown, family, or community, has become too small--or so it seems. The backyard has lost its charm. The adventures of childhood seemed tame. The world, which used to feel big and intimidating, has shrunk. This isn't all there is, and the young adult longs to explore the wide world. Huck finds it plum intolerable to live with the Widow Douglas any more and lights out on his raft with Jim. George Bailey keeps trying to get out of Bedford Falls, to get away from the Savings and Loan, in It's a Wonderful Life. Thornton Wilder's adolescents in Our Town converse about a mysterious letter written by a preacher to a young lady who was ill. "It said: Jane Crofut, The Crofut Farm, Grover's Corners, Sutton County, New Hampshire, United States of America. [. . .] Continent of North America,

Western Hemisphere, the Earth, the Solar System, the Universe, the Mind of God--that's what it said on the envelope. [. . .] And the postman brought it just the same" (379).

Sometimes the call is a gentle nudge like the minister's envelope addressed to Jane Crofut, and sometimes it is a shove out the door. Whatever the form, it is met with a mixture of anticipation and hesitation, with longing and rejection, with fear and awe.

The "Refusal of the Call" is the next step. This idea of setting out for the unknown seemed fine as long as it was hypothetical, but actually packing the bags and getting on the train starts to seem foolish. Great resistance to change seems to be a part of human nature, and our little hero is no exception. Rationalizations are prolific. Who needs a college education? Why not stay home and go to work with Dad? Getting married and settling down is the far more sensible path. Some of us go to extremes to avoid leaving the nest. High School girls get pregnant. Spring of senior year is prime time for drunken binges and automobile accidents--sometimes fatal. But the call will not go away and when it remains unanswered, the subject begins to feel "walled in," experiences a loss of "power of significant affirmative action," and feels that he or she is living in a wasteland (Hero With a Thousand Faces 59). Like so many of life's lessons, this one is repeated until it is learned. Eventually circumstances conspire to move the reluctant traveler down the road. Even if the parents wish to protect the child, to intervene in whatever dangers threaten, destiny will overrule. Whatever adventures are awaiting, they will no doubt take place away from "home." This is a major choice point in life, and it does indeed take great courage to take the first step--fearfully and purposefully. The choice is between growth and disintegration. Growth is illuminating--movement toward the light--but it also is one step closer to death.

This first venture out is not unrewarded. The hero experiences a bit of "Supernatural Aid." "[T]he first encounter of the journey is with a protective figure (often a little old crone or old man) who provides the adventurer with amulets against the dragon forces he is about to pass" (69).

What such a figure represents is the benign, protecting power of destiny. The fantasy is a reassurance—a promise that the peace of paradise is not to be lost; that it supports the present and stands in the future as well as the past . . . ; that though omnipotence may seem to be endangered by the threshold passages and life awakenings, protective power is always and ever present within the sanctuary of the heart and even immanent within, or just behind, the unfamiliar features of the world. One has only to know and trust, and the ageless guardians will appear. (71-72)

Supernatural assistants come in a variety of forms. Females may be a "helpful crone and fairy godmother," a religious figure—"the role is commonly played by the Virgin" or some other character representing the "protection of the Cosmic Mother" (71). Masculine figures include the "little fellow of the wood, some wizard, hermit, shepherd, or smith, who appears, to supply the amulets and advice the hero will require" (72). These figures have a distinct sense of "otherness," and yet they seem to take a kind of parental interest in the youngster--archetypal umbilical cords, if you will. They encourage behaviors that are outside our hero's everyday experience. What seems to be required is mercurial, the ability to be flexible, quick-witted, fluid, transformational. There are no verities outside the nursery. The amulet is a psychological placebo, assuring the holder support is provided by an unseen, unconscious force. The "benign, protecting power of destiny" is more likely to come from within, from learning to trust one's own judgments and listen to one's own instincts. The wise old man, rational and experienced, and the savvy crone, well-taught in the ways of nature, in tune to the unseen—both live in the psyches of us all, and it is they who accompany us into adulthood. The ageless guardians of our unconscious will provide the protection that heretofore has been supplied by parents and caretakers. The fledgling human is only beginning to catch a glimpse of the wondrous powers that are part of every psyche, and of the astounding dance of the cosmos in which we all participate.

The "promise that the peace of paradise is not to be lost" (if indeed it ever existed) is a hollow promise. "Omnipotence" is an illusion of the infantile. This is more of Campbell's wishful thinking. The most difficult thing for human beings to comprehend, particularly young ones, is the vast quantity of knowledge that is unavailable. In some sense this entire journey is designed to come to an appreciation of what we do not even know that we don't

know. That which we know we don't know--quantum physics, for example, or all the names of the Dallas Cowboys--doesn't intimidate because it seems available. If such information is needed, we can obtain it. However, to acknowledge that there are countless numbers of factors and facts of which I am unaware--this strikes the ego as intolerable. The lesson in maturity is that, on the one hand, each of us is more powerful than we know. On the other hand, none of us know, or will ever know, much at all. Omnipotence is a figment of the imagination.

"With the personifications of his destiny to guide and aid him, the hero goes forward in his adventure until he comes to the 'threshold guardian' at the entrance to the zone of magnified power" (77). Clutching an amulet, exhilarated by the thrill of the unknown, undaunted by a pounding heart and sweating palms, the hero is engaged in "Crossing of the First Threshold." "Beyond them is darkness, the unknown, and danger; just beyond the parental watch is danger to the infant and beyond the protection of his society danger to the member of the tribe. The usual person is content, even proud, to remain within the indicated bounds, and popular belief gives him every reason to fear so much as the first step into the unexplored" (77-78). We can never know who we really are if we stay in a world where we are defined by family, social position, nationality. The curious hero is on the brink of self-discovery. To step outside of these protective walls is to face the unknown, to discover strengths and weaknesses within, to confront demons and dance with angels, to die to the illusions of social constructs and stand naked, part genius/part idiot. The dying god/child is replaced by the reborn young man or young woman. It can be a heady experience, and many have lost their lives intoxicated with a new found sense of self worth. The initial impulse is often to have an inflated opinion of youth's beauty and quickness of mind.

The regions of the unknown (desert, jungle, deep sea, alien land, etc.) are free fields for the projection of unconscious content. Incestuous *libido* and patricidal *destrudo* are thence reflected back against the individual and his society in forms suggesting threats of violence and fancied dangerous delight--not only as ogres but also as sirens of mysteriously, seductive, nostalgic beauty. (79)

The teenage vamp, delirious in her new found Aphroditic powers, ignores the dangers of unprotected sex. Young Ares, testosterone coursing through his veins combined with a dozen Coors, experiences the thrill of speed and believes himself to be immortal. Awash in self-congratulations, he is poised on the brink of disaster. Hubris often goeth before a fall.

The hero then passes into what Campbell terms the "Belly of the Whale," that dark realm where he loses his sense of direction. His newborn confidence evaporates. His life appears to be hanging in the balance. Apprehension is replaced by complete and total terror. "The idea that the passage of the magical threshold is a transit into a sphere of rebirth is symbolized in the worldwide womb image of the belly of the whale. The hero, instead of conquering or conciliating the power of the threshold, is swallowed into the unknown and would appear to have died" (90). The heroic journey is characterized by these swings of self-perception. One moment we see ourselves as imbued with the powers of the gods, and the next moment we are wondering if we shall draw another breath. This underground roller coaster has a sobering effect. We realize that we have very little control over the circumstances of our lives. Nevertheless, complete attention and total commitment are required just to extricate ourselves from the results of our carelessness. Accountability is conceived. We got ourselves into this, and no one is going to get us out. No parent, no priest, no redeemer, no masked man will be riding to our rescue. We must now make choices for which we are solely responsible. Despite the fact that we do not control the circumstances of existence, we control our actions. We have a will of our own, even if we are not omnipotent. The children we were have disappeared. The arrogance of youth has evaporated, and here we sit, in the belly of the great whale, reliant upon our own wiles to wiggle out. Where is Mom when we need her? "[T]he passage of the threshold is a form of self-annihilation" (91).

Part 2: trials and victories of initiation

If we thought the belly of the whale was an ordeal, we're in for a bigger surprise. No sooner do we extricate ourselves from the solitary darkness than we land on a foreign

shore and find ourselves embroiled in the battles of the big guys. The "Road of Trials" involves interaction with the dangerous aspects of the gods—those gods who dwell within, but also those who live within others, who pull the strings on the human dramas and threaten to annihilate, maim, or cripple us if we mishandle the trials. This is the young person's first experience with playing for keeps. The stakes are high, and there are no time-outs. It is very dangerous. We are attempting to take our places in the grownup world, although we lack experience. We find ourselves without a parachute—no parents, no social support, no guardian angels or supernatural aid. This is a highwire without nets. Ignorant as we are, we have to deal with the most challenging tasks of our young lives. This is something we have to do all alone, with nothing more to guide us than our remembered myths, the prompting of our unconscious, a paltry fistful of unreliable knowledge and the courage of our convictions. We are flying blind on an important mission. We are undertaking adult responsibilities such as starting a family, beginning a career, taking over the family business, assuming responsibility for our elders. Inside we know that what we have learned is nowhere near enough. Our experience is nil. Yet important matters hang upon our ability to perform well. It is scarier than leaving home. We have inherited the earth, and we are barely able to function without phoning home. Life isn't at all as we had imagined.

And so it happens that if anyone—in whatever society—undertakes for himself the perilous journey into the darkness by descending, either intentionally or unintentionally, into the crooked lanes of his own spiritual labyrinth, he soon finds himself in a landscape of symbolical figures (any one of which may swallow him) [. . .]. In the vocabulary of the mystics, this is the second stage of the Way, that of the "purification of the self," when the senses are "cleansed and humbled," and the energies and interests "concentrated on transcendental things"; or in a vocabulary of more modern turn: this is the process of dissolving, transcending, or transmuting the infantile images of our personal past (101).

What are these labyrinthine shadow figures that make their appearance here? They are aspects of our psyches that challenge us. Who are you, they ask, to think that you can assume a place in the world alongside the titans of your childhood? Who are you to imagine yourself the equal to mother, father, the grownups of your childhood world? What makes

you think that you could ever be good enough to assume responsibility for yourself, your family, your society, your planet? Have you forgotten the still fresh lessons of humility? Or perhaps these are the voices that argue for the unfairness of life. You are a victim, they say. Why should you have to do anything this difficult? If you fail, it isn't your fault. It is your mother's fault, your father's fault. Clearly it is the fault of the school system, the brother who beat you, the lover who abandoned you, the society who enslaved your ancestors. You should not be expected to assume responsibility for the world you live in when you were born rich/poor, black/brown/yellow/white, male/female, and so on. These voices, these doubts, can undermine the determination of a young person to stay the course. In this sense they do threaten to consume, for they are able to destroy us if we succumb. These demons can indeed swallow up a life, suck all the divine power out of us, and leave a neurotic, even psychotic, shell of a human being who has lost sight of any purpose. It is a major choice on the road to maturation. Are we responsible for ourselves or shall we wallow in our defenses? Just when we have eluded one internal demon, we turn the corner and another rears its head.

The hero must engage in a dance with shadow. He encounters aspects of himself which he perceives as "evil other." Campbell writes, "The hero [. . .] discovers and assimilates his opposite [. . .] either by swallowing it or by being swallowed. One by one, the resistances are broken. He must put aside his pride, his virtue, beauty, and life, and bow or submit to the absolutely intolerable. Then he finds that he and his opposite are not of differing species, but one flesh" (108). The "swallowing" or "being swallowed" is either to repress this shadow character or to be crippled by it.

There is another choice which seems to elude Campbell—to accept, love, and honor these strangers. This horror of the opposite is a glimpse of unresolved anathema for the other which becomes more problematic later in the text. The labyrinthine shadow figures exist within in us. They are not our opposites, but aspects of ourselves which, in our own imperfect judgment, we have ruled to be demonic, imperfect, "absolutely intolerable." This

is not, for Campbell, a joyful dissolution of the illusion of opposites, but a swallowing of the intolerable truth that *every* man was born of woman, is of the same flesh as woman, and that parts of his psyche are womanly.

The heroic female, if she is following this scenario, finds herself at the end of the corridor with only one door marked "Men's Room." At this point, she can turn back, become androgynous, or recast herself in the ongoing drama. She can shift her identification to the role of Queen Goddess, but she will not like where this takes her in the next act.

The next step in this middle phase is the "Meeting with the Goddess," which Campbell describes as the "bliss of infancy regained" (109). "The ultimate adventure, when all the barriers and ogres have been overcome, is commonly represented as a mystical marriage [. . .] of the triumphant hero-soul with the Queen Goddess of the World" (109). Our hero seems to be off track here. Campbell is telling us that after all he has been through, what the young male hero wants most at this moment in time is his mommy back. His "ogres have been overcome" (i.e., repressed) and he is, I assume, a "good boy" now. He goes looking for a "girl, just like the girl that married dear old Dad."

The Lady of the House of Sleep [. . .] is the paragon of all paragons of beauty, the reply to all desire, the bliss-bestowing goal of every hero's earthly and unearthly quest. She is mother, sister, mistress, bride. Whatever in the world has lured, whatever has seemed to promise joy, has been premonitory of her existence—in the deep of sleep, if not in the cities and forests of the world. For she is the incarnation of the promise of perfection; the soul's assurance that, at the conclusion of its exile in a world of organized inadequacies, the bliss that once was known will be known again: the comforting, the nourishing, the "good" mother—young and beautiful—who was known to us and even tasted, in the remotest past. Time sealed her away, yet she is dwelling still, like one who sleeps in timelessness, at the bottom of the timeless sea. (111)

Except he wants her younger, better looking, easier to get along with, more attentive to himself, and generally a "dream girl" (product of the infantile imagination). In this case the effects of the repression of archetypal shadow figures are quite plainly illustrated—expediently and efficiently.

The remembered image is not only benign, however; for the "bad" mother too--(1) the absent, unattainable mother, against whom aggressive fantasies are directed, and from whom a counter-aggression is feared; (2) the hampering, forbidding, punishing mother; (3) the mother who would hold to herself the growing child trying to push away; and finally (4) the desired but forbidden mother (Oedipus complex) whose presence is a lure to dangerous desire (castration complex)--persists in the hidden land of the adult's infant recollection and is sometimes even the greater force. (111)

Our hero, longing for the remembered, bosomy comforts of infancy, is lured into the arms of what he believes to be a goddess. Just when he believes he has finally discovered the "bliss of infancy regained" he comes to the horrifying realization of this "Woman as Temptress." Divinity is never found in the arms of a woman, according to this construct. The she devil is a "temptress," which sounds like a euphemistic term for whore. Women equal temptations of the flesh, which are by definition, evil pitfalls luring our hero away from his true destiny--the top of the hierarchy. Anger follows the realization that infancy cannot be regained and that the teats are dry. The hero projects all this fury on to the mother and labels her bitch. Should this become the Lear complex? "How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is to have a thankless child" (Shakespeare, Lear 1, 4, 312).

This catalogue of "bad" things that moms do is easy to recognize as the grudges of a child and hard to accept as the perceptions of budding maturity. These mothers are bad when they are absent and unattainable, which covers all working mothers, all women who leave their child even temporarily and those truly reprehensible mothers who have the temerity to die. Mothers who curtail the righteous indignation of their aggressive children are evil. Those who punish, hamper, or forbid in an effort to socialize their children sufficiently that they may be allowed to attend pre-school are judged harshly. Further damned is any woman who clings to a child trying to push away or if she leaves him to his own devices. Any woman who fails to realize that the child is, and forever should be, the center of the cosmos to whom all attention and homage is to be paid, is unsuitable as spouse, mother, and lover. No matter how hard the little boy/hero searches, even the most desirable and virtuous of women will ultimately be unmasked as a trollop, a devil. This list of infantile grievances is comprised of painful memories that lurk in the mind of the hero--

the restraint of a mother whose ignorant, impetuous child wishes to chase a puppy into the street, the woman who gave him peas instead of ice cream, the perpetrator of his DTP shot.

Maturity involves the recognition that none of our childhoods happened the way we remember them. The judgments we made as children might very well be fallacious--most probably they are. What is evidenced here, however, is a tenacious adherence to those infantile perceptions and an adamant stand to defend their veracity. Campbell provides all this as a description of how life ought to be lived. He endorses the repression of our shadows in favor of what "life ought to be."

The crux of the curious difficulty lies in the fact that our conscious views of what life ought to be seldom correspond to what life really is. Generally we refuse to admit within ourselves, or within our friends, the fullness of that pushing, self-protective, malodorous, carnivorous, lecherous fever which is the very nature of the organic cell. Rather, we tend to perfume, whitewash, and reinterpret; meanwhile imaging that all the flies in the ointment, all the hairs in the soup, are the faults of some unpleasant someone else. (121-22)

He declines to desist. The price that is paid is that every "mother, sister, mistress, bride" is tainted, at least in the eyes of the little boy/hero.

But when it suddenly dawns on us, or is forced to our attention, that everything we think or do is necessarily tainted with the odor of the flesh, then not uncommonly, there is experienced a moment of revulsion: life, the acts of life, the organs of life, woman in particular as the great symbol of life, become intolerable to the pure, the pure, pure soul. (122)

What child is this that has reached manhood and is just discovering his "odor of the flesh"? His mother noticed it the first time she changed his diapers, wiped spit-up off her shoulder. Where is his awareness when he is bathing, defecating, vomiting, breathing? Does this pure deluded soul imagine that he is made of finer stuff than mortal flesh and that the woman who bore him has somehow inflicted mortality upon him? He not only imagines such, but insists that he is correct in these puerile assertions. This will result in his carrying his "revulsion" for the rest of his life, alienated from his own body and every "body" else. It is inconceivable to me that Campbell imagines that "the hero's passage [. . .] shall serve as a general pattern for men and women" (121). As a woman, as a human being, this is a path that appears to me to be losing its appeal as well as its grasp of reality.

Our hero, having renounced the feminine, embraces the masculine, as he enters the stage of "Atonement with the Father." Father is perceived as the omniscient, the omnipotent, the eternal. He is not impressed and will tolerate no bravado from the swaggering little hero. Campbell continues, quoting Jonathan Edwards, a New England pastor speaking to his congregation:

"The God that holds you over the Pit of Hell, much as one holds a Spider or some loathsome [sic] Insect over the Fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; his Wrath toward you burns like Fire; he looks upon you as Worthy of nothing else but to be cast into the Fire; he is of purer Eyes than to bear to have you in his Sight; you are Ten thousand Times so abominable in his Eyes as the most hateful venomous Serpent is in ours." (127)

This is not, however, ever referred to as a "bad" father. This is a "good" father, mistaken for a troll. "For the ogre aspect of the father is a reflex of the victim's own ego--derived from the sensational nursery scene that has been left behind [. . .] " (129). The ogre aspects of the father must have been silly misconceptions, if we follow his logic. Why can't Campbell see that the "temptress" mother is equally a product of the childish mind, "a reflex of the victim's own ego"? Indeed, it is the mark of the immature, the "innocent," to be unable to determine the shades of grey, and instead to insist on certainties of black and white. The innocent are undiscerning for they are ignorant. The proclivity for dualism prevails here. To paraphrase Emerson, "Dualism is the hobgoblin of little minds." Mother is associated with the past, with childhood and infancy, with ignorance and with flesh. Mother equals femininity, which equals evil, and no woman will ever love enough to redeem herself in the eyes of this young man--not his wife, his lover, his daughter, or his granddaughter. The father has become the future toward which our hero ascends. He will be a fountain of knowledge, of maturity, of transformation and ascension. One of these archetypal heroes said, "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child but when I became a man, I put away childish things" (Corinthians 13:11). There are many "childish things" identified here which it would serve us all for these young men to set aside.

The feminine component of the human race has a rather distasteful role to play in this mythology. The "good" man has come to the realization that he is master of the universe and that it is his task to rule over all, including, unfortunately but inevitably, "bad" women. By the time we get to the following passage, a young woman seeking her place in the world may very well be looking for the rabbit hole.

When the child outgrows the popular edge of the mother's breast and turns to face the world of specialized adult action, it [sic] passes spiritually into the sphere of the father—who becomes, for his son, the sign of the future task, and for his daughter, of the future husband. Whether he knows it or not, and no matter what his position in society, the father is the initiating priest through whom the young being passes on into the larger world. And just as, formerly, the mother represented the "good" and "evil," so now does he, but with this complication—that there is a new element of rivalry in the picture: the son against the father for the mastery of the universe, and the daughter against the mother to *be* the mastered world. (136)

Our hero, now cleansed of his earthy stench, detached from the "popular edge of the mother's breast" (whatever that is) is free to announce that he and the Father are one. "I am," he announces, "'the way, the truth and the life; no one comes to the Father but by me. If you had known me, you would have known my Father also; henceforth you know him and have seen him'" (John 14: 6 - 7). This is what Campbell calls "Apotheosis." The hero has been transformed from a sniveling little suckling to a deity. A proper hierarchy has been established with the hero as master, at the top of the human heap, one step below God the Father, with whom he is one. Campbell believes this to be the resolution of opposites, which he mistakenly equates with the Tao.

Yang, the light active, masculine principle, and *Yin*, the dark, passive, and feminine, in their interaction underlie and constitute the whole world of forms ("the ten thousand things"). They proceed from and together make manifest *Tao*: the source and law of being. *Tao*: means "road," or "way." *Tao* is the way or course of nature, destiny, cosmic order; the Absolute made manifest. *Tao*: is therefore also "truth," "right conduct" [. . .]. *Tao*: underlies the cosmos. *Tao*: inhabits every created thing. (152)

The Tao is a symbol of the presence of paradox, the nonseparation of opposites and certainly not a symbol of the mastery of the masculine over the feminine.

Campbell finds it intolerable that the source of life should be the feminine. In the first place, the thought of such a thing is revolting—all that blood and darkness and floating

around in the belly of a bitch. Somehow, some way, he feels he must deny his mother, align himself with the father exclusively, and repress all knowledge of his birth. It is a betrayal of the life force, of that which gave him breath.

That father was himself the womb, the mother, of a second birth [italics mine].

This is the meaning of the image of the bisexual god. He [sic] is the mystery of the theme of initiation. We are taken from the mother, chewed into fragments and assimilated to the world-annihilating body of the ogre for whom all the precious forms and beings are only the courses of a feast; but the, miraculously reborn, we are more than we were. (162)

It is a mystery is how this journey got so far off. The father is not and never shall be the womb. (Zeus had similar delusions.) If I had any inclination to believe in womb envy, this section constitutes *prima facie* evidence. This is not the monomyth. It is the mommymyth.

Campbell finishes this chapter on apotheosis with a flourish. "The good news, which the World Redeemer brings and which so many have been glad to hear, zealous to preach, but reluctant, apparently, to demonstrate is that God is love, that He can be, and is to be loved, and that all, without exception are his children" (158). The emphasis here might be considered to be upon the word *his*. The "good news" then is that the mother has been demonized, labeled a slut, and stripped of "all, without exception" of her children. Daddy and son are deified and set atop a pyramid of all that matters, where they shall reign forever and ever. Can Campbell possibly imagine that this journey is the path of individuation for all of humanity? Is this demonization of women the act of a loving God? Does the path of truth consist of vilifying the other and establishing one's self as a supreme being? Far from being "good news," this is very sad news indeed.

This is the culturally sanctioned (and in some cases, religiously sanctified) process by which males are encouraged to project all their insecurities and self-loathing onto the other half of the human race, to vilify and demonize their mothers in a way that will affect their relationships with females for the rest of their lives. This is not heroism, individuation, maturation, or apotheosis. This is pathology.

"The Ultimate Boon" therefore, is the perpetuation of this point of view and it is the ultimate act of heroism to return to one's society and spread the "good news." Somehow, our hero has convinced himself that he is immortal by reason of his at-one-ment with the father and his disassociation with the flesh. "[T]he possibility of physical immortality charms the heart of man" (188). As Seneca said and Shakespeare quoted, "Lord, what fools these mortals be!" (Midsummer's Night Dream 3.2 115).

This twisted, murderous "boon" is what Campbell believes to be divine grace.

What the hero seeks through his intercourse with [the gods and goddesses] is therefore not finally themselves, but their grace, i.e., the power of their sustaining substance. This miraculous energy-substance and this alone is the Imperishable; the names and forms of the deities who everywhere embody, dispense, and represent it come and go. This is the miraculous energy of the thunderbolts of Zeus, Yahweh, and the Supreme Buddha, the fertility of the rain of Viracocha, the virtue announced by the bell rung in the Mass at the consecration, and the light of the ultimate illumination of the saint and sage. Its guardians dare release it only to the duly proven. (181-82)

The message of the journey toward maturity and enlightenment is actually that *all* of creation is endowed with celestial light. The divine spark is found in all creatures, in the beauty of nature, in the magnitude of an unknown cosmos. This is what Campbell referred to as the metaphysical function. It is to this end that this mythology was constructed.

To the contrary, the grace of the gods is available to all, and being "duly proven" means only that one has matured enough to recognize the gift that is freely offered. Hierarchies, immortality, mastery, and victory over are all puerile imaginings. "The boon bestowed on the worshiper is always scaled to his stature and to the nature of his dominant desire" writes Campbell. In this case it is puny indeed.

The boon is simply a symbol of life energy stepped down to the requirements of a certain specific case. The irony, of course, lies in the fact that, whereas the hero who has won the favor of the god may beg for the boon of perfect illumination, what he generally seeks are longer years to live, weapons with which to slay his neighbor, or the health of his child. (189)

What he is offered is divinity. What he asks for is dominion over, power to give and take life. "The basic problem is to enlarge the pupil of the eye," (our hero is not there yet) "so

that the *body* with its attendant personality will no longer obstruct the view. Immortality is then experienced as a present fact: "It is here! It is here!" (189). It is not here. What *is* here is the reality of human existence—birth followed by death—every time. What is the truth about the experience of living is that it encompasses a wide scope, often simultaneously. Life is suffering and joy, tragedy and comedy, and all the varieties of experiences that exist on the spectrum in between. The apotheosis will come when we are able to see all of life's experiences as faces of the divinities and to accept the ephemeral occupancy of our bodies, the certainty that we emerged from a womb and the inevitability of our deaths. In every divine moment, there is a gift and a wound.

Part 3: return and reintegration with society

Resistant to change, redolent of inflation, elevated to deity, basking in the revelation of his true nature as master of all things, our little boy/hero is understandably reluctant to return to the land of mere mortals. The "Refusal of the Return" is his next act.

When the hero quest has been accomplished, through penetration to the source, or through the grace of some male or female, human or animal, personification, the adventurer still must return with his life-transmuting trophy. The full round, the norm of the monomyth, requires that the hero shall now begin the labor of bringing the runes of wisdom, the Golden Fleece, or his sleeping princess, back into the kingdom of humanity, where the boon may redound to the renewing of the community, the nation, the planet, or the ten thousand worlds. (193)

Perhaps, like the Wizard of Oz, what really keeps him behind the curtain is the fear of being unmasked as a fake. The real boon is the knowledge that we don't know anything for sure and we never shall, that opposites are merely reflections of one another, partial views of incomprehensible wholes, imperfectly perceived by us and therefore irreconcilable. The boon is secured through surrender to the human condition. The boon is Dorothy's recognition that she never really left earth.

Destiny appears to have conspired again. Our little boy/hero finds himself whisked home. He may believe that the "Magic Flight" is the equivalent of a ticker tape parade. He thinks he is wearing a Super Bowl ring, that the masses are eager to kiss it and that he has

achieved a place in some Hall of Fame or another. As long as he sees himself as exalted, he still doesn't get it.

If the hero in his triumph wins the blessing of the goddess or the god and is then explicitly commissioned to return to the world with some elixir for the restoration of society, the final stage of his adventure is supported by all the powers of his supernatural patron. On the other hand, if the trophy has been attained against the opposition of its guardian, or if the hero's wish to return to the world has been resented by the gods or demons, then the last stage of the mythological round becomes a lively, often comical, pursuit. This flight may be complicated by marvels of magical obstruction and evasion. (196-97)

What Campbell does not see is that the "blessing of the goddess or the god" is available to all. These blessings are not earned; they are gifts of grace. The opposition that he has encountered are divine trials designed to humble and enlighten, to bring him to illumination. If he fails, if he still believes in his omnipotence, if he still is blinded by childish imaginings, I suppose there is an element of comedy. It is not of the "happily ever after" type, however. Here we have classic case of Brer Fox having learned nothing from Brer Rabbit.

Campbell's "Rescue from Without" occurs when someone or something has to go fetch our little boy/hero. "For the bliss of the deep abode is not lightly abandoned in favor of the self-scattering of the wakened state" (207). Then, surprisingly, Campbell gets back on track. The purpose of this journey is for these young, inexperienced human beings to leave behind the narcissism of infancy in order to live consciously. Upon the return the story assumes a larger dimension. This journey stops being about one individual whose destiny appears to be of little consequence, and becomes about the role that each of us plays in that great cosmic symphony.

This brings us to the final crisis of the round, to which the whole miraculous excursion has been but a prelude--that, namely of the paradoxical, supremely difficult threshold-crossing of the hero's return from the mystic realm into the land of common day. Whether rescued from without, driven from within, or gently carried along by the guiding divinities, he has yet to re-enter with his boon the long forgotten atmosphere where men who are fractions imagine themselves to be complete. He has yet to confront society with his ego-shattering, life-redeeming elixir and take the return blow of reasonable queries, hard resentment, and good people at a loss to comprehend. (216)

The hero finds himself at the "Crossing of the Return Threshold." It is time to return to the world where life is followed by death, where all the wombs are found in women and the phalluses belong to the men, where mothers and fathers are sometimes devoted, sometimes neglectful, and most of the time somewhere in between. This planet is an interconnected, interdependent living ecosystem. If he is still a little boy/hero, he will swagger about wearing his imaginary or real medals and bully those whom he considers his inferior. Frequently he will do this with the blessing of his society, his family, his culture, his nation. He will spend the rest of his life attacking his enemies, spreading his own particular brand of hate and imagining himself at-one with a loving god. He will never again hear the call, most probably, for his ears are sealed against all evidence which does not support his belief in his own infallibility. There is an element of sexism in my characterization of the unenlightened returning hero as a little boy/hero. The path that requires the denouncement of the feminine and alignment with the masculine, that claims omnipotence and immortality, is not a road frequented by women. There is, however, an Athena heroine who travels as his companion.

The adult/hero, however, returns as if from a dream. He or she is both humbled and exalted. He or she appears to be the same and yet is not. There is a quiet confidence, an enigmatic smile, a savoring of life's juicy ambiguities and complexities. The adult/hero is less judgmental, aware that love and fear, hatred and longing are two faces of the same coin.

Nevertheless--and here is a great key to the understanding of myth and symbol--the two kingdoms are actually one. The realm of the gods is a forgotten dimension of the world we know. And the exploration of that dimension, either willingly or unwillingly, is the whole sense of the deed of the hero. The values and distinctions that in normal life seem important disappear with the terrifying assimilation of the self into what formerly was only otherness. [. . .]

How teach again, however, what has been taught correctly and incorrectly learned a thousand thousand times, throughout the millenniums of mankind's prudent folly? That is the hero's ultimate difficult task. How render back into light-world language the speech-defying pronouncements of the dark? How represent on a two-dimensional surface a three-dimensional form, or in a three-dimensional image a multi-dimensional meaning? How translate in terms of "yes" and "no" revelations that shatter

into meaninglessness every attempt to define the pairs of opposites? How communicate to people who insist on the exclusive evidence of their senses the message of the all-generating void? (217-18)

Those whose lives remained narcissistic, those who insist on the resolution of opposites into black/white verities, those who maintain that the purpose of their lives is to defeat, vilify, rape and plunder will indeed be "at a loss to comprehend." Those who have yet to heed the call, who have not developed the ears to hear, nor the mouth to speak, they too will be unable to comprehend. In this sense it is like the treasure that turns to dust in the light of day. As it turns out, the journey was the thing. Life is an experiential training ground, and each individual must travel from birth to death essentially alone--or with the cast of characters that exist within us. The grownup hero may smile at the memories of those who tried to tell, at the times that he refused to believe a word, at the realization that the uninitiated will never believe until it happens to them. However, the stories we tell them, the myths we weave, the wisdom spoken but seemingly unheeded, will reside in the unconscious like a magic talisman, readily available when the occasion demands it.

The wisdom of the old man and the crone is that we each have to grow *and* decay. The traveling continues, we just choose the direction. Nothing can protect us from pain or from death. Our amulets are our powers, our internal resources that we come to trust. We would have never known had we not taken the trip and the only thing that we know for sure is that there are surely lots of things we don't even know we don't know.

This finished product is deemed the "Master of the 2 Worlds," who "has been blessed with a vision transcending the scope of normal human destiny, and amounting to a glimpse of the essential nature of the cosmos. Not his personal fate, but the fate of mankind, of life as a whole, the atom and all the solar systems, has been opened to him; and this in terms befitting his human understanding, that is to say, in terms of an anthropomorphic vision: the Cosmic Man" (234). There is a curious mixture here of hubris and humility. On the one hand, our hero sees himself as a part of a greater whole. His eye has been widened, and he comes to an awe-full grasp of the vast creation of which he is a

tiny part. As for the "fate of mankind," Campbell's reference is ambiguous. The little boy/hero went seeking immortality. If he thinks he has found it, he does not have a realistic grasp on the fate of any man—collectively or individually. Campbell's phrase regarding human understanding is a curious one—"an anthropomorphic vision--the Cosmic Man." The term *anthropomorphic* means either resembling the human form or projecting human form on to a nonhuman entity. It is the latter, I suppose, that he intends. Our hero, then, is presumed to see the cosmos as created in his own image, or carrying the likeness/traits of humans. I cannot tell if this is a microcosmic/macrocosmic conceit or a little boy/hero self-deification. However, another description of this level of mastery seems to capture accurately the gift that comes with completion of this journey.

The meaning is very clear; it is the meaning of all religious practice. The individual, through prolonged psychological disciplines, gives up completely all attachment to his personal limitations, idiosyncrasies, hopes and fears, no longer resists the self-annihilation that is prerequisite to rebirth in the realization of truth, and so becomes ripe, at last, for the great at-onement. His personal ambitions being totally dissolved, he no longer tries to live but willingly relaxes to whatever may come to pass in him; he becomes, that is to say, an anonymity. The Law lives in him with his unreserved consent. (236-37)

This detachment is a surrender to what is so, a willingness to relinquish "childish things" such as desires for omnipotence and immortality. It releases each of us from the bondage of an ego ruler. The ego becomes the willing servant to the Self. This is experienced as the "Freedom to Live." "Man in the world of action loses his centering in the principle of eternity if he is anxious for the outcome of his deeds, but resting them and their fruits on the knees of the Living God he is released by them, as by a sacrifice, from the bondages of the sea of death" (239). Who is it that can be delivered from the "bondages of the sea of death?" The same person who believed himself to be cured of his human stench. Is this journey for all of us or is it reserved for the special, the anointed, the male? Can someone make this journey on our behalf, thereby saving the rest of us from the discomfort of growing up? Must each and every one of us endure our own suffering, travel the path of individuation, lose our innocence, be wounded, find ways to heal, come to

grips with our mortality and accept or embrace the conditions of existence? Can we hire it done? We conclude still haunted by this ugly double-headed monster, the lust for immortality and power. "Powerful in this insight, calm and free in action, elated that through his hand should flow the grace [. . .] , the hero is the conscious vehicle of the terrible, wonderful Law, whether his work be that of butcher, jockey or king" (239). There is great power in this insight, but it is not of the kind which provides dominion over. It is not a gift particularly suited for enhancing one skills of butchering, riding, or ruling.

It is possible to labor on behalf of humanity, to converse with the gods, to suffer their wounds and receive their gifts. Any boons which may be discovered may be transformed into story and myth, into tales of the adventure and given as gifts to our fellow human beings. We can share what we think we see and what we believe to be true. However, even the most altruistic of gifts have unexpected consequences. Consider, for example, penicillin, atomic power, all types of technologies, modern science, and so on. There is no "heroic"—that is *perfect*—way to live. All we can do is the best we can do and hope that we contribute more than we take.

Not everyone gets goosebumps over the heroic journey. No one of us can redeem all of us. The dark side of this pretense of overcoming death is that the hero lives in a permanent state of inflation. Persecution awaits those who point out that the emperor may not be fully clothed. Those who fail to believe are heretics, justifiably consigned to the lash or the burning stake. The lust for control over a world that cannot be controlled, the hunger for righteousness in a situation where the only certainties are change and uncertainty—these two human longings may have driven us to madness, the lust for what we can not ever attain. This is a mythological construct that stunts creativity, stifles originality, demonizes whole sections of humanity, desacralizes nature, and produces murderous behavior.

Chapter 3

Northrop Frye's Archetypal Criticism, Theory of Myths

The "Theory of Myths" outlined in Anatomy of Criticism by Northrop Frye describes a literary structure that has functioned and continues to function powerfully in the Western mind for centuries, both consciously and unconsciously. The theory is presented as "a rational account of some of the structural principles of Western literature in the context of its Classical and Christian heritage" (133). This structure was not created by Frye, but rather is his description of a construct which he "discovers" in occidental literature. Frye states that his "structural principles of literature" are derived from archetypal criticism (134), and are related to the Jungian concept of the collective unconscious. Structurally his design is constructed of a circle divided into four sections which correlate the four seasons with four modes of literature--comedy, romance, tragedy and irony/satire. This design references Jung's use of the mandala and his affinity for quadrangular schema. Frye describes the cyclical movement of mythology as a spiral progression from the low to the high, evolving from the barbaric to the refined. Marie-Louise von Franz in her essay "The Process of Individuation" in Man and his Symbols (a volume she co-authored with Jung, among others) describes the mandala movement as such:

The mandala serves a conservative purpose--namely, to restore a previously existing order. But it also serves the creative purpose of giving expression and form to something that does not yet exist, something new and unique. The second aspect is perhaps even more important than the first, but does not contradict it. For, in most cases, what restores the old order simultaneously involves some element of new creation. In the new order the older patterns returns on a higher level. The process is that of the ascending spiral, which grows upward while simultaneously returning again and again to the same point. (225)

Von Franz describes quite accurately the intention of Frye's monomyth. Consisting of four sections composed of six smaller sections, it is designed exactly to suit this "conservative purpose" which is to allow for the inevitable passage from one generation to another without disturbing the established world order. Further, the purpose, as will be shown below, is to promote the concept of progressive evolution without allowing any

threat to a patriarchal perspective to take hold in the collective imagination. Indeed, each revolution, meaning each trip around the circle, is progressive because it strengthens the orthodox perspective by destroying more of its enemies, thus replacing revolution with evolution. The notion of transcending the barbarism of mankind's roots is common amongst thinkers who equate paganism, polytheism, and any other heretical ideas with primitivism. References of this sort may be found in Jung and Campbell, as well as others. In Frye's schema, the genres of comedy, romance, tragedy and irony/satire transform gradually, blending one into the other. Many works of literature, then, exist in a transitional space, rather than as pure examples of genre. There is in Frye a greater tolerance for ambivalence and for fluidity than is found in either Campbell or Neumann.

Frye has provided an inclusive catalogue of all types of writing which traditionally have been considered "literature." All other types of writing existing outside this container are, by definition, without literary merit. Writing which functions in the manner which I have referred to as heretical is banished from legitimacy. Frye's monomyth is, in fact, the mapping of the orthodox functions of literature, which, through his eyes, contains all that is, or all that should be allowed. In previous chapters we have examined psychological and sociocultural process which silence dissenting voices. In this section we will consider a literary structure that is designed to a similar end.

Theory of Archetypal Meaning: Domains of Imagery

Frye's "Theory of Archetypal Meaning" is composed of three domains of imagery--apocalyptic, demonic, and analogical. "[T]he two undisplaced worlds, the apocalyptic and the demonic, drawing heavily on the Bible, [are]the main source for undisplaced myth in our tradition" [140]. These two unchanging, immutable domains representing heaven and hell are presented as if they were reality rather than a metaphorical construct. Analogical imagery consists of three modes, romantic, high mimetic, and low mimetic.

In Frye's apocalyptic world, the divine world consists of One God, the human world of the society of *men* as represented by the One Man. The animal world is

comprised of sheep represented by One Lamb and the vegetable world of a garden with One Tree in it. The sole purpose of the mineral world is construction of the city of the chosen followers of the One God, containing the temple of worship to Him (141). Water, in an apocalyptic world, is associated with chaos and dissolution; it connects to that which is below (146). Fire, on the other hand, is associated with the spirit world, the domain of the angels, which is located midway between the human and the divine (145-46). This version of a heavenly order is one in which the hierarchy which privileges patriarchy is firmly established, now and forever. The human world, the animal world, the vegetable world, and the mineral world exist solely for the purpose of serving and worshipping the king, the One God, with whom the hero becomes inextricably identified. The hierarchy is divinely ordained. Any who might question its validity are irredeemable. "The conception of 'Christ' unites all these categories in identity: Christ is both the one God and the one Man, the Lamb of God, the tree of life, or vine of which we are the branches, the stone which the builders rejected, and the rebuilt temple which is identical with his risen body" (141-42). The apocalyptic world contains *all* that is desirable, civilized, heavenly and excludes all that is not.

Diametrically opposed to this heavenly bliss, Frye offers the demonic domain, a

"world that desire totally rejects: the world of the nightmare and the scapegoat, of bondage and pain and confusion; the world as it is before the human imagination begins to work on it and before any image of human desire, such as the city or the garden, has been solidly established; the world also of perverted or wasted work, ruins and catacombs, instruments of torture and monuments of folly. And just as apocalyptic imagery in poetry is closely associated with a religious heaven, so its dialectic opposite is closely linked with an existential hell [. . .]." (147)

This chaotic "existential hell" is the world without the organizing principle of the hierarchy imposed upon it. Like a boogie-man story designed to frighten a child, this collection of hair-raising images, of monsters run amuck, is designed to terrify any who might consider questioning the authority of orthodoxy. It is here that we find nature characterized as "menacing" (147). The diabolical pagan divinities are depicted as capricious and tyrannical, indifferent to the fate of mere mortals, interested only in their own selfish pursuits. These

gods (and possibly *goddesses*!) demand sacrifices from and of humans, doling out arbitrary punishments to those who displease them. These are cruel, irrational deities who use "instruments of torture" and demand "monuments of folly." Their nature is reflected in the animal world, a dark and dangerous collection of blood-thirsty predators--wolves, tigers, vultures, serpents, and dragons. All animals are beastly, threatening to devour humans. The vegetable world is either the "sinister forest" or the barren wasteland. Dark, ominous settings are described here, in which a mortal may lose the way and fall victim to all kinds of odious predators. Arid deserts, with no possibility of life-sustaining vegetation or shelter, represent a world untamed, hostile to civilization. When cities are encountered they are in ruins, crumbling into the forms from whence they came. Images of doom and immanent death prevail--lonely journeys into the labyrinth, dank dungeons and dark prisons. Human life has no inherent value, no place above minerals and animals. The power of water has Aphroditic associations, with the ominous, undrinkable sea, with the aura of spilled blood, with impending death and doom. The power of water to overwhelm, erase, absorb, or wash away is emphasized. Fire becomes a malignant force, destructive to humans and civilizations, associated with demons and hellish tortures. In these domains, the intolerable is fact--raw nature rules, and she is a formidable foe (147-50). Essentially this is the matriarchal domain, characterized as being so treacherous and blood-thirsty that all human values are threatened. That which Frye refers to as demonic imagery is an explicit depiction of the disastrous results if the One God (which in Frye's case is the Christ) fails to establish dominion over all. Despite differences regarding the practice of monotheism, our authors are unanimous on this issue. The Terrible Mother Earth poses a deadly threat to the hero, and frequently matricide is necessary. Erich Neumann writes:

It is very different when the son turns the tables upon the Terrible Mother and adopts her destructive attitude, directing it not against himself but against her. This process is represented mythologically in the fight with the dragon [. . . which] corresponds psychologically to the formation of the conscious, "higher ego" of the hero, and to the raising of the buried treasure, Knowledge. Nevertheless the ego is bound to feel its aggression as guilt, because killing, dismemberment, castration, and sacrifice remain

guilt even though they serve the necessary purpose of vanquishing such an enemy as the uroboros dragon. (123-24)

Campbell calls her the "Woman as Temptress" or the "bad mother."

The remembered image is not only benign, however; for the "bad" mother too—(1) the absent, unattainable mother, against whom aggressive fantasies are directed, and from whom a counter-aggression is feared; (2) the hampering, forbidding, punishing mother; (3) the mother who would hold to herself the growing child trying to push away; and finally (4) the desired but forbidden mother (Oedipus complex) whose presence is a lure to dangerous desire (castration complex)—persists in the hidden land of the adult's infant recollection and is sometimes even the greater force. (Hero With a Thousand Faces 111)

This section on demonic imagery is a veritable catalogue of paganistic symbols which has been "demonized" by in order to establish monotheism as orthodoxy. In her book, The Serpent and the Goddess, Mary Condren discusses the Goddess as serpent and describes the process by which the image was transformed into a symbol of evil. She writes, "Clearly the overthrow of the Serpent represented something fundamental and crucial to the foundation of patriarchal culture" (11). She continues:

To put it simply and briefly: the form of religion that the Serpent represented was a major threat to the new religion of Israel or, indeed, to the future of Western civilization. If Israel was to grow as a nation-state, with all the entailed political and military trappings, goddess religions would have to be overthrown. Allegiance would have to be to one god, Yahweh, and the central symbolism of the new religion would be based on Promise and History rather than on the Life and Cyclical Regeneration represented by the Serpent. (11)

According to Campbell and Neumann, the Goddess becomes a fire-breathing dragon, the archetypal threat to fair-haired little boy/heroes everywhere. This is the source of Neumann's dragon, with which, he insists, the hero must do battle repeatedly. The dragon must not only be conquered, but slain. Terrible Mother Earth becomes Satanic Seductress, Evil Betrayer, Devourer of Young Males. The voice of feminine experience, particularly of the female body, has become the voice most greatly to be feared and despised. She who would speak must be destroyed, for her sole intent is evil. This threat is usually sufficient to silence most mortal women.

The apocalyptic and the demonic are, Frye concludes, most appropriate for the mythic domains, which he distinguishes from the "metaphorical." This distinction suggests that he considers these two domains as representations of reality, rather than fantasy. The apocalyptic and the demonic are the *way things are*. Heaven and hell are to be accepted as places that actually exist. The romantic and the mimetic modes are imaginary constructs, stories of imagined worlds where it is appropriate to fantasize about what might be but never is. These stories are told *as if* they were true, but of course, they are not. Apocalyptic and demonic stories may contain metaphorical symbols, but they are absolute truth, and terrible things will befall anyone who fails to heed their lessons. They are didactic, intentionally functioning precisely as Campbell describes in his four functions. Frye writes:

Apocalyptic imagery is appropriate to the mythical mode, and the demonic imagery to the ironic mode in the late phase in which it returns to myth. In the other three modes these two structures operate dialectically, pulling the reader toward the metaphorical and mythical undisplaced core of the world. We should expect three intermediate structures of imagery, corresponding roughly to the romantic, high mimetic, and low mimetic modes. (151)

Analogical imagery is organized around the dualities of innocence and experience, consistently valenced toward orthodox conformity. In one sense, Frye's readers are losing innocence or ignorance as they "progress." They are being educated in the ways of this social order, instructed concerning proper behavior and located hierarchically. In another sense, however—and one not intended by Frye—these readers are losing innocence by being violated. Gradually and systematically, the option of refusal is being denied. An orthodoxy is posited, by Frye, as a given in literature and alternatives are not possible. "The relation of innocence and experience to apocalyptic and demonic imagery illustrates an aspect of displacement [. . .] in the direction of the moral. The two dialectical structures are, radically, the desirable and the undesirable" (155). The undesirable lies at the feminine end of the spectrum amongst the pagan images, in the lap of the Great Mother Nature, in a polytheistic, multi-faceted, uroboric world. The analogical imagery is systematically instructive regarding binarisms. Every discriminatory option is simplistically reduced to a duality with one side privileged over the other, resulting in a gradual refinement and the

establishment of assigned positions. This education is an initiatory process, and like any good initiation, it is designed to move the neophyte from ignorance to knowledge, or from innocence to experience. It indoctrinates the initiate into a culture of preordained choices and closes the door on unorthodox or heretical thinking. Life is perceived as extremely determined.

In Frye's mode of romance, the "heroes are brave, heroines beautiful, villains villainous, and the frustrations, ambiguities and embarrassments of ordinary life are made little of. Hence its imagery presents a human counterpart of the apocalyptic world which we may call the *analogy of innocence*" (151). Young readers or listeners need not be confused about the confusing complexities of adolescence and entry into the adult world. Here is a life map that will outline precisely what is good and right and what is not. Readers are reassured that there is absolutely no need for independent thought, only attention and obedience. In this world, chastity and virginity are honored because sexual energy is subordinated to cultural values. The divine is imagined as the Wisest of Old Men, ruling benevolently over the Edenic kingdom (151-53). The Old Man sends friendly guardian spirits to watch over his "good" children, to protect them from evil. Those who love and serve Him are gifted with magical powers. This is a magical garden where butterflies flit from flower to flower, unicorns make delightful visits, magic wands can grant wishes, and budding little maidens gather roses without thorns. Chaste virgins live in little cottages with rose gardens, usually with a widowed parent. They wind up in distant castles, having been whisked away from all demonic threats by handsome little boys/heroes/princes. Water is found in fountains and pools, reflecting the perfect face of young people who are looking for answers. What is mirrored is a world potentially perfect, with the underlying assumption that perfection equates with order. Fire is a circle of protection, keeping out the forces of chaos and evil. Idyllic and instructive, this heaven on earth, for all the creatures in it happily serve the Wise Old Man (inevitably white) in the Western Sky and keep His commandments.

Moving toward the more difficult domain of experience, straddling the world of romance (heaven on earth) and the world of the low mimetic (hell on earth), Frye describes the high mimetic mode, where love and form are the organizing ideas, and the emphasis is upon reason. Nature, as a negative life force, is a power to be controlled, contained, and organized appropriately. Love, by contrast a positive life force, is also controlled and channeled appropriately. The adolescent couple has been replaced by the King and his Queen, who rule as symbols of divine right and preordained order (153-54). They are idealized "human representatives of the divine and the spiritual world" (153). The King is divine—"I and the Father are One." The Queen is his subservient mate, endowed with the beauty and fidelity of the "Goddess," as Campbell would refer to her. Here is a world where evil threatens but the King, divinely virulent, is strong enough to defend and contain. Animals appear as eagles, lions, horses, falcons, peacocks, and swans. They are power animals. As long as the kingdom remains in order, they serve rather than threaten, just like the good Queen. The gardens about the castle are abundantly bountiful. The mineral world is reflected in grand architecture—castles, cathedrals, coliseums. Waters flow gently by in rivers which never flood or dry up, steadily supplying to quench the thirst and irrigate the fields of the peasants. Fire is found only in the eyes of the adoring Queen, in the sparkle of the crown jewels, in the glow of the fireplace which warms the hall and roasts the meat. Here is mythology as an airtight social container. Within, the hierarchy is established and maintained. Without, the Other is excluded. The walls of the castle are impregnable. No one may enter or leave, and all is right with the world.

By the time we descend to the low mimetic mode, the humans have become mere mortals. Their purpose is to work hard and serve the Lord. In this everyday world of human travail, good works and faith are what will sustain them (154-55). Here is a world analogous (metaphorically *like*) the experience of being alive. It "bears a relation to the demonic world corresponding to the relation of the romantic innocent world to the apocalyptic one" (154). The images are no longer fanciful, but rather mundane. The divine

is found in Virtue. Endless toil and good works testify to fidelity. These characters are ordinary human beings, but idealized as good or bad. They live amongst ordinary animals on ordinary farms. Their towns and cities are portrayed as lonely places where thieves and scoundrels prey on good Christian folk. The sea is a dangerous force, threatening to carry the fool with wanderlust into great depths of danger and a fiery furnace awaits those who succumb to temptation. This is a life map for the homebody, the provincial, the parochial, the bourgeois.

In each world there is a clear delineation of dualities. To say that one side is privileged over the other is too mild a distinction. One side is glorified, the other vilified. There is no ambiguity. Right action is delineated in an unmistakable fashion in order that the reader/listener need never experience the discomfort of uncertainty, the strain of discernment. Frye's "dialectical structures are, radically the desirable and the undesirable" (155) and the direction of morality is clearly outlined. Frye continues:

Civilization tends to try to make the desirable and the moral coincide. The student of comparative mythology occasionally turns up, in a primitive cult, a bit of uninhibited mythopoeia that makes him realize how completely all the higher religions have limited their apocalyptic visions to morally acceptable ones. A good deal of expurgation clearly lies behind the development of Jewish, Greek, and other mythologies; or, as Victorian students of myth used to say, a repulsive and grotesque barbarism has been purified by a growing ethical refinement. (156)

Frye does not go so far as to identify those religions which he would not classify as "higher," but the context suggests that any polytheistic construct would certainly be considered of a lower level. All Eastern religions would qualify and certainly any spiritual practice or theology which admitted to doubt. What Frye considers the commendable expurgation of unorthodox mythological material is actually the suppression of relating types of human experience which he finds objectionable. The "purification by a growing ethical refinement" is, in reality, dogmatic Christianity.

Theory of Archetypal Meaning: Theory of Mythos

Frye's domains of imagery are "the keys in which [the phases of mythos] are written" (158). The four categories of generic plot, which Frye calls "mythoi," comprise a

quaternity composed of two dualities. These are the Comedic (Spring), the Romantic (Summer), the Tragic (Autumn) and the Ironic or Satiric (Winter). Tragedy opposes comedy; romance opposes irony/satire. Narrative action moves from one domain to another in gradual progression. There are six phases of each mythos. Comedy blends with satire at one end and romance at the other. Romance blends with tragedy and comedy. Tragedy may be romantic or ironic, and Satire may be comedic or tragic (162). The imagery likely to occur in these fluid states is analogical, for the apocalyptic and the demonic belong in the domain of the immutable.

The main area of such movement obviously has to be the three intermediate fields [of imagery]. The apocalyptic and demonic worlds, being structures of pure metaphorical identity, suggest the eternally unchanging, and lend themselves very readily to being projected existentially as heaven and hell, where there is continuous life but no *process* of life. The analogies of innocence and experience represent the adaptation of myth to nature: they give us, not *the* city and *the* garden at the final goal of human vision, but the process of building and planting. The fundamental form of process is cyclical movement. (158)

The "two fundamental movements of narrative" (161) are cyclical, reflecting the world of nature and dialectical, suggesting upward movement into the apocalyptic. When the direction of the cycle is downward, the movement is tragic. When it is upward, it is comic. This necessitates a fixed orientation of the circle, with irony at the bottom. Frye further divides the schema horizontally, with the top half being the Romantic aspect (movement from Spring to Fall) and analogous to innocence. The bottom half, from Fall to Spring, is the domain of Realism, equated with experience. Dialectical movement Frye considers progressing toward the apocalyptic or the heavenly.

Mythos of Spring: Comedy. Frye enters this cycle through the gates of Spring, where Comedy provides the plot. In this world the old social style is represented by the reigning generation who, wrapped in out-of-date illusions, oppose the actions of the new generation. A young, handsome, virile hero (always a male) is determined to bring a new world order to the failing kingdom. Initially our young hero, usually in the pursuit of true love, is thwarted by a deluded father. The young man suffers a series of ordeals in much

the same manner as Campbell's hero has his trials and tribulations. The reader/listener is empathetic with the younger generation and condescending toward the hopelessly blind older generation (177). Eros eventually conquers all by removing obstructions and resolving conflict, thus giving way to a new world order as symbolized by the reign of the young (recently ascended) king and his prize, the virginal bride (163-81).

Frye refers to comedic resolution as being "inclusive," with the possible exception of a scapegoat who may be saddled with the demonic imagery and banished from a happy new society (163-66). This "inclusive society" is not, however, democratic but rigidly hierarchical. Comedic tension is provided by the disturbing threat of chaos as the older generation is replaced by the new, as the prince supplants his father. However, everyone is expected to breathe a sigh of contented relief once order is restored. Each and every one is certain of an appropriate place in society. "Comedy usually moves toward a happy ending, and the normal response of the audience to a happy ending is 'this should be,' which sounds like a moral judgment. So it is, except that it is not moral in the restricted sense, but social. Its opposite is not the villainous but the absurd [. . .] " (167). Such is the power of orthodoxy to convince even those disenfranchised by the structure that this is a happy ending. Anything otherwise would be "absurd." Not only is this a social world order, but it is political, for it is about the passing of power from the old white male to the young white male. The weight of moral authority and the threat of demonization is usually sufficient to silence peripheral, inferior beings. Those who resist are deemed insane, absurd, mad. If these lower creatures will not willingly submit to occupying the lowest rung of society, they must be ostracized.

Comedy stresses the illusory nature of life. Much of the plot revolves around deceptions and unmasking. There are many cases of mistaken identity, unknown parentage, disguises. Buffoons and rustic churls, intoxicated wanderers and self-deprecators careen about, often in and out of doors, behind trees, just around the bend. In Act III of Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream, Nick Bottom, weaver and amateur

thespian, returns from a night in the forest where he has been bewitched and transformed, given the head of an ass and seduced by Titania, Queen of the Fairies. Befuddled and confused upon waking, Bottom says

I have
had a most rare vision. I have had a dream,
past the wit of man to say what dream it was.
Man is but an ass if he go about to expound this
dream. Methought I was--there is no man
can tell what. Methought I was, and methought
I had--But man is but a patch'd fool if he
will offer to say what me thought I had. The
eye of man hath not hear, the ear of man hath
not seen, man's hand is not able to taste, his
tongue to conceive, not his heart to report what
my dream was. I will get Peter Quince to write a
ballet of this dream. It shall be call's "Bottom's
Dream," because it hath no bottom; and I will
sing it in the latter end of our play, before the Duke. (3. 1.207-21)

This confusion of dream and reality is not limited to the rude mechanicals. Rather it is a universal affliction, striking royals, fairies, and peasants alike. The pagan elements are portrayed in Shakespeare's comedies not as evil, but as ungodly. Puck, the mercurial fairy character, says: "And we fairies, that do run/ By the triple Hecate's team/ From the presence of the sun,/ Following darkness like a dream,/ Now are frolic" (5.1.390-94). Misses and near misses keep the suspense going until, in the end, all is well. The new order straightens everything out and places people where they really belong--in the nicest possible way, of course. Puck concludes the play with this speech containing the comedic leitmotifs.

If we shadows have offended,
Think but this, and all is mended--
That you have but slumb'ed here
While these visions did appear.
And this weak and idle theme,
No more yielding but a dream,
Gentles, do not reprehend.
If you pardon, we will mend.
And, as I am an honest Puck,
If we have unearned luck
Now to scape the serpent's tongue,
We will make amends ere long;
Else the Puck a liar call.
So, good night unto you all.

Give me your hands, if we be friends,
And Robin shall make amends. (5.1.430-45)

This is the drama of choice wherever the Moral Majority is encountered. While clearly applicable to British bedroom farces and Shakespearean comedies, it is doubtful that Frye is referring to his own culture when he writes, "Civilizations which stress the desirable rather than the real, and the religious as opposed to the scientific perspective, think of drama almost entirely in terms of comedy" (171). British humor has a long tradition of being able to laugh at itself, from Chaucer to Monty Python. Nevertheless, it was not the comedic sensibility of the British empire that provided the mythological map for imperialism. Britannia could never have "ruled the waves" without benefit of a scientific perspective, which was believed to be free from dreamlike illusions. For the British it was predestined by the jolly old world order that they should tame the wilds of nature and enslave the noble savage. Rudyard Kipling portrays this perspective where it is believed that the demonic forces of chaos are held at bay only by the will of the hero and the force of divine order. He aptly entitles it "The White Man's Burden."

Take up the White Man's burden
Send forth the best ye breed
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child. . . .

Take up the White Man's burden
Have done with childish days
The lightly proffered laurel,
The easy, ungrudged praise.
Comes now, to search your manhood
Through all the thankless years,
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,
The judgment of your peers. (903-04)

Frye's six phases of comedy range from the most ironic, where the "demonic world is never far away" (178) to the final stage of comedy where the comic society collapses (186). "The comic society has run the full course from infancy to death, and in its last

phase myths closely connected psychologically with a return to the womb are appropriate" (186).

If there is any place in this schema where the heretics may be allowed to exist, it is in the comedic phase--as jesters and buffoons such as Puck or Bottom. They must accept the position of outcast or Other, but are benignly tolerated. In fact, they are afforded a kind of begrudging respect, for they serve a useful function. As Others, they may speak the truth without deriving respect or authority from their wisdom. Death is not mandatory for heretics in the comedic world. It will get rougher for nonconformists as Frye's schema progresses, but those of such ilk who might be tempted in youth are given a chance to conform and avoid trouble later on. However, nowhere in this schema is there a place of honor or respect for them. The young buck who replaces the old buck conducts his revolution in the heroic mode and in compliance with the code of orthodoxy. He is not a true rebel offering new paradigms. He represents renewal, not replacement or restructuring. It is an embarrassing fact that the little boy/hero who discovers that he and "the Father are one" must one day come to the inevitable fate predestined from his birth by a lowly woman. He dies, despite the fact that he has been assured of immortality, imagines himself to have been rescued by a redeemer and sits on the right hand of God the Father, until such time that he ascends to the throne. The king is dead; long live the king. This is more smoke and mirrors from the man behind the curtain pretending to be a Wizard.

Mythos of Summer: Romance. As Summer follows Spring, quite naturally we wander into the world of Romance, a dreamlike domain where wishes come true and the hero is called to adventure. The complete form of the romantic plot is the successful quest, consisting of three stages--a perilous journey with preliminary minor adventures, a climactic struggle, and the final heroic triumph (Frye, 187). The young heir apparent has matured to the place that he fully represents the ruling social class. Faced with villainous threats to the world order, the little boy/hero is called to prove himself man enough to protect and defend--to act as container. There are only two main characters, the antagonist

(enemy) and the protagonist (our hero), a bad guy and a good guy. The more demonic the enemy, the more divine the hero (187). This is a black and white world with no shades of grey. "Hence the hero of romance is analogous to the mythical Messiah or deliverer who comes from an upper world, and his enemy is analogous to the demonic powers of a lower world" (187). Symbols of the antagonist are Winter, darkness, confusion, sterility, moribund life, old age. It is anticipated that the reader's empathy lies with the hero, whose symbols are Spring, dawn, order, fertility, vigor, youth (187-88). He is the rising Son/Sun God, the Solar event eclipsing all others. Through the magic of storytelling, this romantic fantasy allows ordinary mortals to lose themselves in the dream, to forget that any of them are dark, confused, or ambiguous, elderly, sterile, weak, or imperfect. The reader/listener may imagine himself (perhaps herself) starring as the White Knight in shining armor, despite the fact that circumstances of birth and the realities of existence are such that this can never be. For a few hours, the story allows the reader to think of himself *as if* he were the Sun God, entitled to the rewards that are the perquisites of the position. However, when the curtain comes down, most of the audience will leave with a sense of inferiority or shame. The departing viewers must acknowledge, if the truth be known, that the imagined commonality is pure fantasy, that most are prohibited from ever being real heroes and from ascending to the throne, according to this mythology.

"The central form of quest-romance is the dragon-killing theme. [. . .] A land ruled by a helpless old king is laid waste by a sea-monster, to whom one young person after another is offered to be devoured, until the lot falls on the king's daughter: at that point the hero arrives, kills the dragon, marries the daughter, and succeeds to the kingdom" (189). The dragon frequently has been the possessor of an ill-gotten treasure, which passes into the possession of the hero, thereby qualifying him to take possession of the princess. With one laudable murder of the villainous force of unbridled animal power, the hero gains wealth, power, and a bride. This plot makes considerable use of "demonic" imagery. Dragons, sea-monsters, boars, wolves, and all kinds of cruel animal faces of the demon

goddess are found along the labyrinthine journey to the dark, underworld womb of evil (belly of the whale, Trojan horse, caves, etc.). The Christian version of this tale stars Christ as hero, Satan/Eve as dragon, Adam as the impotent but lovable old king (the Judaic world order), and the Church as the bride (189). According to this version, the Son of the One God is freed from having actually to enter the labyrinth or touch anything feminine in order to redeem a sordid material world from the ugly clutches of blood-thirsty paganism. He is allowed to marry his own new world order, the Church. Union with the Goddess is metaphorical rather than literal. Actual intercourse with the repellent forces of nature is inappropriate for so pure a protagonist. Those mundane realities of life (which keep rearing their detested feminine head) are denied by casting a Virgin for a mother and an institution for a bride. The need for sustenance is transformed into sacred ritual, thus purifying what might otherwise carry an ugly connotation of earthiness. Food becomes "Host" from which the righteous derive parasitic redemption and eternal life, thereby dispensing with the need for matter and mater. What is imagined here is a fecund festive world, impregnated by a celibate Father/Son combination.

The quest-romance has analogies to both rituals and dreams, and the rituals examined by Frazer and the dreams examined by Jung show the remarkable similarity in form that we should expect of two symbolic structures analogous to the same thing. Translated into dream terms, the quest-romance is the search of the libido or desiring self for a fulfillment that will deliver it from the anxieties of reality but will contain that reality. The antagonists of the quest are often sinister figures, giants, ogres, witches and magicians, that clearly have a parental origin; and yet redeemed and emancipated paternal figures are involved too, as they are in the psychological quests of both Freud and Jung. Translated into ritual terms, the quest-romance is the victory of fertility over the waste land. Fertility means food and drink, bread and wine, body and blood, the union of male and female. The precious objects brought back from the quest, or seen or obtained as a result of it, sometimes combine the ritual and the psychological associations. The Holy Grail, for instance, is connected with Christian Eucharist symbolism; it is related to or descended from a miraculous food-provider like the cornucopia, and, like other cups and hollow vessels, it has female sexual affinities, its masculine counterpart being, we are told, the bleeding lance. The pairing of solid food and liquid refreshment recurs in the edible tree and the water of life in the Biblical apocalypse. (193-94)

The "female sexual affinity" is transformed into a "bleeding lance," thereby becoming an agent of death rather than birth. The sacred vessel, the cup and the cornucopia, with connotations of womb and feminine divinities, is plundered for inclusion in the symbolism of masculine trophies of battle. The Redeemer gobbles up the feminine aspects of divinity, as Zeus swallowed Metis, claiming that the wisdom she represented had become embodied within him.

Romance is not a subtle structure. The conclusion is foregone and the reader/listener is well aware of it. Female characters are either diversions, such as objects of pleasure or shrewish inhibitors (evil), or reminders of the protagonist's duty to the patriarchy (good). Romances sometimes feature wicked witches and smarmy magicians, both agents of the Dark Forces. Even the animal world is divided into good guys and bad guys--the serpent, the dragon, and the slimy toad versus the faithful horse, the hunting falcon, the gentle dove, and the friendly, helpful creatures of the woods.

The six phases of romance follow the chronology of the hero's life. There occurs a miraculous birth wherein the Father of the child is concealed and he is set out to die--afloat on the river, abandoned on the mountain top, left on the doorstep in a basket. His mother disappears, being either the victim of the Dark Forces or a wanton female in exile, a mere vessel for the incubation of the embryonic hero (198-99). Following this nativity we have the innocent youth of the hero, an idyllic time spent in the company of desirable, appropriate companions (199-200). The hero is called to the quest and thus follows the adventures and the inevitable triumph over evil. The Happy Society is established (200-01) followed by a period of Comprehended Experience. The hero and his bride sit atop the hierarchy, perfect in their love and entitled to dominion over all the kingdom (202). The last phase of Romance is the "Penseroso Phase" wherein the Wise Old Man may sit in his tower or around the fire imparting wisdom and recounting his triumphs (202-03).

Mythos of Autumn: Tragedy. As evening follows day, autumn follows summer. Tragedy comes to the golden world of the romantic hero. Having risen to the level of

oneness with the Father, the tragic hero must face his grim trial accompanied only by Divine Protection. "The tragic hero is very great compared with us, but there is something else, something on the side of him opposite the audience, compared to which he is small. This something else may be called God, gods, fate, accident, fortune, necessity, circumstance, or any combination of these, but whatever it is the tragic hero is our mediator with it" (207). The plot centers solely around the actions of one individual. He and he alone, in all of creation, stands in the face of tragedy, redeemer for us all. The hierarchy established here places the hero as the pinnacle of creation, the connection for the rest of humanity with the One God. The hero has become a Pope.

There are other characters in the tragedy, but they are generally flat, one-dimensional figures. They offer little by way of empathy or commonality. The hero's relation with them is one of either rescuer or punisher. The roles of comedy are reversed. There are wrathful gods or hypocritical villains who attempt to manipulate the hero to evil ends. The buffoon is replaced with "the suppliant, the character, often female, who presents a picture of unmitigated helplessness and destitution" (217). Perhaps we are expected to see ourselves in this "suppliant" role, although empathy requires a more sympathetic characterization generally. However, Frye writes that this character is the "source of pathos" (218) and that she is terrifying because she represents exile and excommunication. Society in the tragedy is a collective from which the hero must extricate himself. Love and society are irreconcilable opposites.

Frye describes two formulas of tragedy, which he says are contradictory, each having merit. In the Fatalistic Reduction theory, the omnipotence of external fate and the limitation of human effort are emphasized (208-09). "The tragic hero has normally had an extraordinary, often a nearly divine, destiny almost within his grasp, and the glory of that original vision never quite fades out of tragedy" (210). Despite superhuman efforts, paradise is lost. The second formula of tragedy is that the downfall of the hero is the result of the Violation Of Moral Law. The hero has a fatal flaw, or is guilty of a sin. "[I]t is true

that the great majority of tragic heroes do possess hybris [sic], a proud, passionate, obsessed or soaring mind which brings about a morally intelligible downfall" (210). Mere mortals, riddled with sin and well-aware of their inferiority when compared to the hero, are reduced to quivering masses of fear and pity. If this can happen to the God/Man, imagine what might be in store for ordinary mortals, for dark ones or female ones, or any guilty of those shameful imperfections. Tragedy impresses upon the reader/listener the essential need for a Savior, a Redeemer. The audience is manipulated to a state of fear and pity in order to engender gratitude for and loyalty to the established order.

The six phases of tragedy move from the romantic to the ironic (219-23). In the first phase, the central character has both character and innocence. He is of superior moral fiber and is dragged down by inferior creatures such as "calumniated women" (219). Frye's example for this phase of tragedy is the story of Actaeon (the hero), who was destroyed by the vicious actions of Artemis. When she discovered him spying on her and her nymphs as she bathed, she turned him into a stag, and he was devoured by his own hounds. Frye does not acknowledge Artemis's divine power to punish offending mortals, for according to this mythology, she would not be considered divine, nor would she have dominion over a male, mortal or otherwise. In the second phase, tragedy is the result of the youthful inexperience of the hero. The third brings successful completion of the hero's achievement (220). In the fourth phase, the Fall occurs and the hero crosses from innocence to experience. During the fifth phase, irony increases. Frye writes,

The ironic perspective in tragedy is attained by putting the characters in a state of lower freedom than the audience. For a Christian audience an Old Testament or pagan setting is ironic in this sense, as it shows its characters moving according to the conditions of a law, whether Jewish or natural from which the audience has been at least theoretically redeemed. (221)

The backbone of ironic tragedy, according to Frye, therefore, appears to be rejection of Others' laws (or other forms of orthodoxy). By the sixth phase, the hero is found in a world of shock and horror where he is imprisoned. He experiences a "demonic epiphany"

while being tortured and driven insane, presumably by either the Jews or the pagans, or by some metaphorical representation of them (223).

Mythos of Winter: Irony and Satire. These hellish images carry the action into the dark of winter. The action of this mythos is designed "to give form to the shifting ambiguities and complexities of unidealized existence" (223). Campbell and Frye consider the ultimate heroic tasks to be the restoration or introduction of order to chaos, the establishment of an unchanging world hierarchy, and the maintenance of a strong defense against the enemies of orthodoxy, both within and without.

Frye distinguishes satire from irony. Satire is more militant. The privileged ethic is clearly supported as the *only* acceptable morality. Dissenting points of view are satirized with the intention of making them appear absurd and grotesque (223). What is essential to the success of the satirist is the mode of attack, coupled with rapier-like wit and humor.

Attack without humor, or pure denunciation, forms one of the boundaries of satire. It is a very hazy boundary, because invective is one of the most readable forms of literary art, just as panegyric is one of the dullest. It is an established datum of literature that we like hearing people cursed and are bored with hearing them praised, and almost any denunciation, if vigorous enough, is followed by a reader with the kind of pleasure that soon breaks into a smile. To attack anything, writer and audience must agree on its undesirability, which, means that the content of a great deal of satire founded on national hatreds, snobbery, prejudice and personal pique goes out of date very quickly. (224)

Thus the hero is shown functioning in his--and society's--favorite role, the role of righteous killer. Frye accurately reports that in a patriarchal society there is greater entertainment value in vicious character assassinations than in praise of acts of kindness. For those who behave themselves, according to the code of the myth, virtue is its own reward and humility is a trait to be encouraged amongst the governed. On the other hand, the energy of the society and of the hero is well-directed and greatly applauded when aimed toward the destruction of those who threaten. Frye's discussion of satire is a prescription for scapegoating. Scapegoating has a twofold purpose. It punishes the deviate and provides a memorable lesson for observers. I think Frye is incorrect about the ephemeral nature of "national hatreds, snobbery, prejudice and personal pique." Such things take on a life of

their own, going on for centuries, hatreds feeding off hatreds, nurtured by mythologies which encourage their nurturance, resulting in tragedy. Shakespeare writes, in the prologue to The Tragedy of Romeo and Juliet,

Two households, both alike in dignity,
In fair Verona, where we lay our scene,
From ancient grudge break to new mutiny,
Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean,
From forth the fatal loins of these two foes
A pair of star-cross'd lovers take their life;
Whose misadventure's piteous overthrows
Doth with their death bury their parents' strife. (Prologue 1-8)

Irony is somewhat more moderate in tone. The content is less grotesque and the wit less vicious. Frye's point of view is presented more gently, but equally explicitly.

Humor, like attack, is founded on convention. The world of humor is a rigidly stylized world in which generous Scotchmen, obedient wives, beloved mothers-in-law, and professors with presence of mind are not permitted to exist. All humor demands agreement that certain things, such as a picture of a wife beating her husband in a comic strip, are conventionally funny. To introduce a comic strip in which a husband beats his wife would distress the reader, because it would mean learning a new convention. (Frye 225)

The humor of irony relies on conventionality--shared common beliefs in a socio-cultural value system. When a wife beats her husband, it is humorous because it is considered a patent absurdity. Wives, according to the mythology, are neither strong enough nor smart enough to be capable of doing battle with their husbands. Any female is so clearly outranked that the situation appears to be hilarious, rather like a kitten threatening its master, or the puppy growling at a stranger at the door. However, when the husband beats his wife, something different is going on, something which is not humorous and belongs in another mythos. In this case, the husband, if he is functioning heroically, as may be assumed, is operating as enforcer and is in the tragic mode. Of course, the fact that spousal abuse occurs in most societies and probably has since time immemorial is beside the point of the conventions. The point is to demonstrate who belongs in what place in the patriarchal order. It is funny or tragic or outrageous when such an order is disturbed. Always, always,

always, according to Frye, the original order will be restored, regardless of the mode. Resistance is futile.

Frye's discussion of satire and irony illustrate how literary genres may be used to intimidate and control. He clearly sees them as tools of orthodoxy, similarly to the way that Campbell views mythologies. However, as discussed in earlier chapters, irony and satire may be used as tools of heresy with equal effectiveness. The determining factor is the identity of the scapegoat. In Frye's construct it is always the Other, but in the context of heresy, it is always the privileged, often but not always a different kind of Other. Using the metaphor of mythology as cultural container, perhaps we might call them the Outside Others versus the Inside Others. In the heretical mode, the Inside Others that are attacked are those who appear to be higher on the hierarchical ladder than the author. In orthodoxy, this is reversed.

Thus the first three phases of the Mythos of Winter are satiric. In the phase of "Satire of the Low Norm" there is no displacement of the humorous society (226). In this world, the wisest of men prudently keep their own counsel. The common sense of the hero is in sharp contrast with the inflated posturings of the foolish. This is a conventional world, respectful of the wisdom of the ordinary folk, which Frye terms "church porch virtue" (227). The lovable eccentric is tolerated, providing there is no threat posed to society. The hero is frequently a small man, such as Popeye, Charlie Chaplin or Mickey Mouse, doing battle with a big bully (usually an Outside Other). The evil giant is antagonized by the audacity of the annoying little pest to the place that he is undone by his own fury. The giant's own power is redirected to his own downfall. Thus we are all instructed that heroism is available to even the weakest of men. In many cases, for example, this hero may even be desirous of the approval of women and therefore subjected to their dominance, as Popeye's devotion to Olive Oyl or Mickey's to Minnie. "The strength of the conventional person is not in the conventions but in his common-sense way of handling them" (229). Mental health--that is being of a conventional mind--allows even the most effeminate of

men to defend and protect. The persona of Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard, provides aphorisms exemplary of this type of hero. "He that lives upon hope will die fasting," "After three days men grow weary, of a wench, a guest, and weather rainy," "Little strokes/ Fell great oaks" and "There are three faithful friends--an old wife, and old dog, and ready money" (347).

The Quixotic Phase is exemplified by the picaresque novel. The hero is more assertive, a trickster who is often small but wiler than the low norm hero. Here we find the likes of Tom Sawyer, whose idea of good sense is not always conventional. In fact some of society's conventions are ridiculed as being overly inflated. The hero's refusal to conform to the nonsensical elements of society or to the overly zealous desires of the prudish to enforce conformity usually result in comedic escape scenes in which the hero easily outwits those encumbered by their own narrow thinking. The hero's ability to conceive of the unthinkable renders him superior. Frye's description of satire is as close to heresy as he would permit. There is an element of social criticism, but it is frequently mild and good-natured, almost affectionate in tone. Tom Sawyer is an appealing character. The reader/listener may empathize with his youthful aversion to convention without having to reject an overall benign attitude toward turn of the century American society. Twain's later novel, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn represents a departure from the literary constructs of Frye. It is a heretical novel.

Satire, according to Juvenal's useful if hackneyed formula, has an interest in anything men do. The philosopher, on the other hand, teaches a certain way or method of living; he stresses some things and despises others; what he recommends is carefully selected from the data of human life; he continually passes moral judgments on social behavior. His attitude is dogmatic; that of the satirist pragmatic. Hence satire may often represent the collision between a selection of standards from experience and the feeling that experience is bigger than any set of beliefs about it. The satirist demonstrates the infinite variety of what men do by showing the futility, not only of saying what they ought to do, but even of attempts to systematize or formulate a coherent scheme of what they do. (Frye 229)

The picaresque hero is, above all, a pragmatist. His expedient approach to the realities of the moment are contrasted with the idealistic philosophy of an imagined social structure.

The contrast of what some men might imagine to be possible versus the realities of the moment provide the tension for the humor. Americans particularly have a proclivity for low satire. Historically we have identified with the underdog, with the "tired, the poor, the huddled masses yearning to be free." The overly-sophisticated are frequent targets of derision, the absent-minded professor, the effete longhaired musician, the misguided Freudian psychologist, the stuffy plump socialite. Culturally we enjoy the defeat of the pretentious. However, we seem to have become a country characterized by just the sort of behavior we despise. The contrast of this idealized American persona versus the reality of our chauvinism toward the rest of the world has been satirized frequently in the latter half of the twentieth century by such films such as MASH and such novels as Catch-22.

Second phase satire shows literature assuming a special function of analysis, of breaking up the lumber of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious terrors, crank theories, pedantic dogmatism, oppressive fashions, and all other things that impede the free movement (not necessarily, of course, the progress) of society. Such satire is the completion of the logical process known as the *reductio ad absurdum*, which is not designed to hold one in perpetual captivity, but to bring one to the point at which one can escape from an incorrect procedure. (233)

In the third phase of satire, common sense is abandoned as the standard for heroic behavior. Here is questioned the reliability of experience. The world is perceived as ridiculous. It is unlikely that the assumptions of the past will hold true for the events of the present and the future (234-35). The hero is a genius, capable of perceiving the world in a way not apparent to the rest of us. In order to reveal to us that which we are incapable of seeing for ourselves, the hero may have to resort to the obscene, the shocking, the outrageous. Social conventions are stripped away in order to unmask the essentially animalistic nature of humanity, the universal realities of excretions and copulations. The atmosphere is savage, *macabre*. Mary Shelley's Frankenstein is an example, as are Edgar Allen Poe's short stories.

The fourth phase, Explicit Realism moves into irony as satire recedes. The realistic hero has the moral perspective of a man who has seen it all. He is, above everything else, human. The miseries of life must be endured, but are not really consequential (236-37).

By the fifth phase, he has become more fatalistic. The wheel of fate is beyond human control. Whatever happens, the hero is stoical, resigned to his destiny (237-38). In the sixth and final stage, we hit bottom. Existence is the madhouse in which we are imprisoned. This is the world of frenzied mobs who, crazed by bloodlust, commit atrocious crimes such as lynchings, gang rapes, mass destruction. Power is equated with sadism. Humanity's thin veneer of civility is easily stripped away by fear, lust and greed. The characters are stereotypical parodies--the deadly sex siren, the shrieking idiot, the naive romantic victim, the evil madman. The scenes take place in prisons, lonely towers, execution chambers. All who enter here are expected to abandon hope. Frye refers to the climax as an "demonic epiphany" (239) which carries the reader/listener so far down that anything else looks like up. This is the point at which tribulations become so omnipresent they lose their power to evoke fear. The hero can laugh in the face of threatening malevolence, because he has nothing left to lose. His willingness to surrender gives him the victory, the jubilation of the crucifixion. He has triumphed over evil, is no longer attached to worldly things, and has become transcendent or godlike. "But on the other side of this blasted world of repulsiveness and idiocy, a world without pity and without hope, satire begins again" (239).

These themes are remarkably familiar. The idealistic young hero/son has become the world weary old king/father. Innocence has evolved into experience. In the next phase of the cycle, he will be superseded by his own son, replaced by a fresh new hero whose vision of the possibilities for a perfect world lead him into comedy and romance. With a grandiloquent gesture, Frye explains how this brings us full circle, back into the rebirth of spring. "Tragedy and tragic irony take us into a hell of narrowing circles and culminate in some such vision of the source of all evil in a personal form. Tragedy can take us no farther; but if we persevere with the mythos of irony and satire, we shall pass a dead center, and finally see the gentlemanly Prince of Darkness bottom side up" (239).

Conclusion

Frye's *mythoi* are, to his mind, all-inclusive—at least with regard to the literature that he believes belongs to the canon of worthy texts. Nature exists to serve humanity, and every creature has its role to play in the fourfold drama of the hero from cradle to grave. Power, wealth, and position are allocated according to strict principles of order. The young prince, by divine right, is given all the resources of the kingdom, and much is expected of him. Frye's version, squarely based in implicit and explicit Christian theologisms, truly does make it apparent that no one enters the Kingdom of Heaven except those who serve the hero. The rest of humanity is like the proverbial camel, quite unlikely to pass through the eye of a needle. The problem with Frye's mythology is that it intentionally disenfranchises most of humanity and everything that is not human. He is clear that the intention of this mythology is "redemption," not only from natural law or the conditions of existence (from which Campbell seeks redemption), but also from conflicting mythologies such as Judaism or paganism. Here again is a monomythic hierarchy designed to subordinate whomever or whatever threatens the privilege of patriarchy, and only the Christian patriarchy at that. Frye's divisions are slightly different than those enumerated Campbell, but the design is essentially the same.

The four *mythoi* that we are dealing with, comedy, romance, tragedy, and irony, may now be seen as four aspects of a central unifying myth. *Agon* or conflict is the basis or archetypal theme of romance, the radical of romance being a sequence of marvelous adventures. *Pathos* or catastrophe, whether in triumph or in defeat, is the archetypal theme of tragedy. *Sparagmos*, or the sense that heroism and effective action are absent, disorganized or foredoomed to defeat, and that confusion and anarchy reign over the world, is the archetypal theme of irony and satire. *Anagnorisis*, or recognition of a newborn society rising in triumph around a still somewhat mysterious hero and his bride, is the archetypal theme of comedy. (192)

Frye has identified the movement of this journey as cyclical, but it also implies an image of ascending spirals, just as von Franz pointed out. Each time the hero completes a set of four challenges, humanity ascends to another, higher, rung on an elaborately "erected" scaffolding, the stairway to apocalyptic heaven. Mankind, according to Frye does not return to a state of acknowledged ignorance, or of the Zen-like Beginner's Mind, but is lifted up, exalted. Instead, there is an evolutionary thrust with a Darwinian twist to it.

Humanity progresses further and further from the origins of the species, both collectively and individually. The mythological realities of the past, such as paganism and pre-Christian monotheisms, are viewed as something to be transcended, primitive or experimental versions which have been refined to the perfection of Christianity. Biological realities, such as the evolution of the species or the birth of all from the female, are gradually but persistently denied. (It is useful to recall Frye's condescending statement regarding a proclivity toward comedy. "Civilizations which stress the desirable rather than the real, and the religious as opposed to the scientific perspective, think of drama almost entirely in terms of comedy" (171). Nevertheless, these realities remain, for it is universally true that all are born of woman and will as ashes and dust return to the Mother Nature. Whether or not some part of us is united in that apocalypse on high with the Great Father is not known to us, at least empirically.

The underlying motivations behind each of these mythoi are resistance to change, coupled with the illusion of progress and a denial of the biological realities of existence. A reconfiguration of the past is combined with a determination to preserve the present, or the perpetuation of "orthodoxy" as we have referred to it. Disruption of order, whether chaotic or gradually transformational, is disturbing. The tension in these plots depends upon the discomfort that accompanies disruption of order. The ego is the source of this discontent, or "fear and pity," as Aristotle calls it. The ego wants to be right, and it cannot be clearly right if there is no established order by which to assess truth. The ego is able to adapt to paradigmatic change and will if forced, but abhors the vacuum that occurs during transition. According to Frye's construct, the Old World Order is replaced by the New World Order, but the disturbing elements of change are ameliorated. The new king is very much like the old king. The forces of chaos never win in the end, and wisdom always prevails in one patriarchal form or another. Thus the reader/listener is reassured that there are immutable truths and that we can count on heroes to preserve them. Some things will never change, despite the cyclical processes that nature imposes. Generations come and go,

just as do the seasons, but the patriarchy remains. There will always be a strong, occidental hero at the helm, so similar to his predecessors and the Father that they appear to be, and claim that they are, one and the same. The king rules by divine right. Kipling writes in "Recessional," (would that it were receding).

God of our fathers, known of old,
 Lord of our far-flung battle line,
 Beneath whose awful Hand we hold
 Dominion over palm and pine—
 Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
 Lest we forget—let us forget! (903)

Fortunately, in the minds of some and unfortunately, in the minds of others—in reality a mixture—this mythology is no longer applicable in our world. It makes no allowance for the Other, insiders or outsiders, to become a functioning part of a larger society. It permits no melding of cultures. This mythology can tolerate no permeability or flux. It defines itself by containment and exclusion. Within, it maintains the patriarchal hierarchy. Without, it excludes, prohibits, denies admittance. It is an artificial barrier or mythological, in the sense that it exists only in the beliefs of humans. It can no longer contain cultures geographically, philosophically, psychologically, metaphysically.

Chapter 4

Mark Twain's Twins

Mark Twain's two novels of boyhood, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876) and Huckleberry Finn (1884), provide good examples of the distinction between an orthodox novel and an heretical one. Tom Sawyer is a rascal, scoundrel and mischief-maker. Nevertheless he is a white male, living in a Christian home, raised by a wholesome maternal figure, his Aunt Polly. He attends school and church, albeit unwillingly, and every effort is made to initiate him into society as a good citizen. He is loved by his family and valued by his community. He is an insider whose youth provides a temporary excuse for his irregular behavior. He is what Frye refers to as "picaresque." At one point Tom is about to receive a switching from Aunt Polly for illegal consumption of jam. He momentarily distracts her long enough to escape.

His Aunt Polly stood surprised a moment, and then broke into a gentle laugh.

"Hang the boy, can't I learn anything? Ain't he played me tricks enough like that for me to be looking out for him by this time? [. . .] He 'pears to know just how long he can torment me before I get my dander up, and he knows if he can make out to put me off for a minute or make me laugh, it's all down again and I can't hit him a lick. I ain't doing my duty by that boy, and that's the Lord's truth, goodness knows. Spare the rod and spile the child, as the Good Book says. I'm laying up sin and suffering for us both, I know." (Adventures of Tom Sawyer 2)

Tom's sins are those of an innocent, untamed but of good stock, not yet initiated into polite society. Eventually, however, as he matures, it is expected that he will become a good man, adopt suitable behavior, and assume his proper place.

Huckleberry Finn is the other side of the coin, however. When Twain originally introduces him in Tom Sawyer, he is an outsider. Despite the fact that he is a white male, he is a social outcast. He is growing wild in nature, not even possessing a proper Christian name. The worst part about Huck, from the orthodox point of view, is that he is a walking, grinning, unrepentant invitation to deviation.

Shortly Tom came upon the juvenile pariah of the village, Huckleberry Finn, son of the town drunkard. Huckleberry was cordially hated and dreaded by all the mothers of the town, because he was idle and lawless and

vulgar and bad—and because all their children admired him so, and delighted in his forbidden society, and wished they dared to be like him. Tom was like the rest of the respectable boys, in that he envied Huckleberry his gaudy outcast condition and was under strict orders not to play with him. So he played with him every time he got a chance.[. . .]

Huckleberry came and went, at his own free will. He slept on doorsteps in fine weather and in empty hogsheads in wet; he did not have to go to school or to church, or call any being master or obey anybody; he could go fishing or swimming when and where he chose, and stay as long as it suited him; nobody forbade him to fight; he could sit up as late as he pleased; he was always the first boy that went barefoot in the spring and the last to resume leather in the fall; he never had to wash, nor to put on clean clothes; he could swear wonderfully. In a word, everything that goes to make life precious that boy had. So thought every harassed, hampered, respectable boy on St. Petersburg. (42-43)

There is a slim hope for Huck, because he is white and male, but not much optimism since he shows little inclination toward becoming respectable. His only chance for inclusion would be complete repentance and reformation, which is highly unlikely.

One fine day, Tom decides that it would be an excellent idea to go and live on an island, along with Joe and Huck. The three of them could then become pirates. They disappear for several days and the town becomes convinced that they have drowned. When Tom discovers this, he sees it as an the perfect opportunity for a dramatic resurrection. They will plan their return to coincide with their own funerals. When the boys appear in the church, Tom and Joe are received as insiders, but Huck's status is different.

There was a rustle in the gallery, which nobody noticed; a moment later the church door creaked; the minister raised his streaming eyes above his handkerchief, and stood transfixed! First one and then another pair eyes followed the minister's, and then almost with one impulse the congregation rose and stared while the three dead boys come marching up the aisle, Tom in the lead, Joe next, and Huck, a ruin of drooping rags, sneaking sheepishly in the rear! They had been hid in the unused gallery listening to their own funeral sermon!

Aunt Polly, Mary, and the Harpers threw themselves upon their restored ones, smothered them with kisses and poured out thanksgivings, while poor Huck stood abashed and uncomfortable, not knowing exactly what to do or where to hide from so many unwelcoming eyes. He wavered, and started to slink away, but Tom seized him and said:

"Aunt Polly, it ain't fair. Somebody's got to be glad to see Huck."
(Adventures of Tom Sawyer 119)

Godless outsiders are not expected to rise from the dead. Aunt Polly's kindness leads her to embrace the heathen child and the possibility of Huck's admission into society is

introduced, but it is primarily Tom who receives lavish attention. "Tom got more cuffs and kisses that day—according to Aunt Polly's varying moods—than he had earned before in a year; and he hardly knew which expressed the most gratefulness to God and affection for himself" (120). This is proper treatment for a budding hero and Tom is well aware of his elevated status. "What a hero Tom was become, now! He did not go skipping and prancing, but moved with a dignified swagger as became a pirate who felt that the public eye was on him" (124).

Huck is dangerously close to becoming domesticated after he is adopted by the Widow Douglas. Her attentions are the result of his rescuing her from the villainous Injun Joe, who by reason of race is lower on the social ladder than he. His "heroic" action has earned him conditional admittance to the inner world. However, Huck does not particularly want to be included. Tom repeatedly convinces him to submit to the demands of the social order, to bring an end to his exile. Tom is essentially an advocate of orthodoxy, regardless of how roguish his youthful escapades. Tom is a picaresque hero. Huck, on the other hand, is a heretic. He rejects the values of the culture.

At the end of Tom Sawyer, Huck has disappeared after living for three weeks in the house of the Widow Douglas. Tom, who is knowledgeable about Huck's habits, finds him in an empty hogshead at the abandoned slaughterhouse. "He was unkempt, uncombed, and clad in the same old ruin of rags that had made him picturesque in the days when he was free and happy. Tom routed him out, told him the trouble he had been causing, and urged him to go home. Huck's face lost its tranquil content, and took a melancholy cast" (226-27). Huckleberry prefers life as an outsider, despite its lack of creature comforts. The imposition of order is not something he cares for.

"Don't talk about it, Tom. I've tried it, and it don't work; it don't work Tom. It ain't for me; I ain't used to it. The widder's good to me, and friendly; but I can't stand them ways. She makes me git up just at the same time every morning; she makes me wash, they comb me all to thunder; she won't let me sleep in the woodshed; I got to wear them blamed clothes that just smothers me, [. . .] I got to go to church and sweat and sweat—I hate them ornery sermons! I can't ketch a fly in there, I can't chaw. I got to wear shoes all Sunday. The widder eats by a bell; she goes to bed by a bell; she

gits up by a bell-everything's so awful reg'lar a body can't stand it."
(Adventures of Tom Sawyer 227)

However, by the last scene, the undeniable Tom has convinced poor Huckleberry to return to the torture of civilization. Huck promises that he will "stick to the widder till I rot" (230). With this gloomy prognostication, Twain ends this novel.

In Tom Sawyer, there is a considerable amount of respect for tales of heroism and for the conventions described by Frye. Tom is the imaginative source of mythological stories. At his instigation, the boys become robbers, pirates, clowns, and knights, taking blood oaths, pledging undying loyalty, and facing danger with stout heart and a wooden sword. But these are always characters of the heroic type, never villainous. They are consistently on the side of right and justice, and are well on their way to becoming men of heroic proportions—at least in their own minds. Tom hears what Campbell terms the "Call to Adventure" on a daily basis, and he seldom refuses. Twain writes that "[t]here comes a time in every rightly constructed boys life when he has a raging desire to go somewhere and dig for hidden treasure" (156). The villain, in this book, is a Outsider Other, a thoroughly evil, non-white, non-Christian murderer named Injun Joe, who has no redeeming social value whatsoever. The reader is relieved to discover that Injun Joe has died of starvation in the cave where he hid his ill-gotten gains. There is no moral ambiguity in this book, except regarding the emotional pain inflicted by careless young boys upon devoted but forgiving caretakers.

Eight years later, Twain wrote another comedic novel. However, this time the structure described by Frye is used ironically. The assumptions concerning an established divine order for an "inclusive society" are subtly undermined. Twain's view of his society has obviously shifted. He finds himself more empathetic with the likes of Huck than with Tom and he leads his readers subtly toward a similar transference of allegiance. His ever growing distaste for the institution of slavery, his suspicion of conventional morality and his dislike of pretense have escalated. This later book takes serious issue with the social order he had previously accepted as inevitable if unfortunate. Huckleberry Finn is

ambiguous and provocative, slyly laced with a morality that supersedes convention. The humor is less jovial and frequently damning. As if to lull us into complacency, it begins seamlessly where Tom Sawyer left off.

The Widow Douglas she took me for her son, and allowed she would civilize me; but it was rough living in the house all the time, considering how dismal regular and decent the widow was in all her ways; and so when I couldn't stand it no longer I lit out. I got into my old rags and my sugar-hogshead again, and was free and satisfied. But Tom Sawyer he hunted me up and said he was going to start a band of robbers, and I might join if I would go back to the widow and be respectable. So I went back.
(Adventures of Huckleberry Finn 3)

The story is the same as that related in the earlier book, but there is a significant shift. The reader is convinced of the veracity of Huck's statement in the opening paragraph that The Adventures of Tom Sawyer "was made by Mr. Mark Twain, and he told the truth, mainly" (3). He goes on to say, however, that he "never seen anybody but lied one time or another" (3). There is a great deal of information contained in these few lines. Twain has changed his point of view. He now speaks in the first person, from Huck's perspective. His earlier perspective, that of omniscient observer whose empathy was clearly with Tom, is not invalidated at this point, but he recognizes some "stretchers" in it. This is the voice of an older, more experienced writer with fewer illusions and many more suspicions. By the time we get to Huckleberry Finn, Twain's enthusiasm for an idyllic portrayal of rural American life, particularly in the slave states, has waned. Huck begins his novel by leaving the Widow Douglas's house and this time he won't be wooed back by Tom's imaginings. This is a wiser, more experienced boy, and he will be speaking for the author. Not only is he leaving, but before it is over, he will break many serious taboos. He will cross-dress, lie to authorities, steal, cheat, and presume that he was worthy of the fair Mary Jane. The most significant of his crimes will be his assistance to a fugitive slave. Huck will learn to love this black man, will trust him and treat him as an equal. Huck will learn to trust his own heart, to choose the dictates of his own conscience over the dictates of society. This, from the point of view of any orthodoxy, is a heinous crime punishable by banishment or death.

Huck has promised to remain with the Widow until he rots. Such is the state when we find him at the beginning of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, for he finds such a life "tiresome and lonesome" (5). Being an honorable young man, he intends to stick it out, regardless of how miserable he is in the duration. He is consistently instructed that he "must help other people, and do everything [he] could for other people, and look out for them all the time, and never think about [himself]" (12). Huck says, "I went out in the woods and turned it over in my mind a long time, but I couldn't see no advantage about it—except for the other people; so at last I reckoned I wouldn't worry about it any more, but just let it go" (12). Thus we get a glimpse of the sly little reptilian head of heresy and the dangerous proclivity of Huck to think for himself. Possibly this young man will not be as easily manipulated as before.

It is not an aversion to civilization that causes Huck to leave the widow's home, however. It is the right of the father to rule. Huck's pap appears in his room one night, thoroughly inebriated and determined to gain possession of the reward which Huck and Tom had acquired in the earlier novel. Pap is a completely despicable character. "His hair was long and tangled and greasy, and hung down, and you could see his eyes shining through like he was behind vines. [. . .] There warn't no color in his face, where his face showed; it was white; not like another man's white, but a white to make a body sick, a white to make a body's flesh crawl—a tree-toad white, a fish-belly white" (19). But white he is, and he rules by divine right, particularly when it comes to his son.

"Don't you give me none o' your lip," says he. "You've put on considerable many frills since I been away. I'll take you down a peg before I get done with you. You're educated, too, they say—can read and write. You think you're better'n your father, now, don't you, because he can't? I'll take it out of you. Who told you you could?"

"The widow. She told me."

"The widow, hey?—and who told the widow she could put in her shovel about a thing that ain't none of her business?"

"Nobody never told her."

"Well, I'll learn her how to meddle." (20)

The old king has come to assert his authority over the young prince, to claim him and his possessions as his own, to destroy those who would question his authority. Certainly he

feels that he is entitled to have a authority over a mere child and this kindly old woman, for he is a white male. Disreputable though he may be, the established world order gives him dominion over women, children, and all other racial groups.

Pap eventually kidnaps Huck and imprisons him, in an attempt to gain control of the ransom. One night, in a drunken rage, he almost kills Huck. The boy escapes and sets out on a raft in an attempt to save his own life. Eventually he meets up with Jim, a black man who has run away because he overheard plans to sell him. Huck is confronted with a moral dilemma.

Jim [. . .] was saying how the first thing he would do when he got to a free state he would go to saving up money and never spend a single cent, and when he got enough he would buy his wife, which was owned on a farm close to where Miss Watson lived; and then they would both work to buy the two children, and if their master wouldn't sell then, they'd get an Ab'litionist to go and steal them.

It most froze me to hear such talk. He wouldn't ever dared to talk such talk in his life before. Just see what a difference it made in him the minute he judged he was about free.[. . .] Thinks I, this is what comes of my not thinking. Here was this nigger, which I had as good as helped to run away, coming right out flat-footed and saying he would steal his children--children that belonged to a man I didn't even know; a man that hadn't ever done me no harm." (86)

Jim's desire to rescue his children from slavery is in sharp contrast to Pap's attitude toward his son. Huck finds nothing wrong with the latter, but is horrified by the former. Nevertheless, his transformation is imminent. As Huck is battling his conscience, convinced on the one hand that he must turn Jim in, but prompted by his heart to help the black man escape to freedom, two armed men seeking runaways came down the river. Huck tricks them into thinking that the sleeping form on his raft is his father, who is sick with smallpox. They make a hasty retreat. Huck seems to have made his choice. The dictates of his heart have won out over the laws of the land.

They went off and I got aboard the raft, feeling bad and low, because I knowed very well I had done wrong, and I see it warn't no use for me to try to learn to do right; a body that don't get *started* right when he's little ain't got no show--when the pinch comes there ain't nothing to back him up and keep him to his work, and so he gets beat. Then I thought a minute, and says to myself, hold on; s'pose you'd a done right and give Jim up, would you felt better than what you do now? No, says I, I'd feel just the same way I do now. Well, then, says I, what's the use you learning to right when it's

troublesome to do right and ain't no trouble to do wrong, and the wages is just the same? I was stuck. I couldn't answer that. So I reckoned I wouldn't bother no more about it, but after this always do whichever come handiest at the time. (89)

In this moment of epiphany, Huckleberry abandons the road of orthodoxy and becomes a thorough-going heretic. Twain has perhaps given us a mirror of the struggles of his own conscience and indicated the outcome. It is here, in the novel, that Jim and Huck miss the fork where the Ohio River joins the Mississippi, and with this mistake Jim would miss his chance to leave the slave states.

Jim and Huck have numerous adventures involving the thwarting of the powers that be and revealing the admirable qualities of their natures. They wind up at the home of Tom Sawyer's Aunt Sally, who is expecting a visit from her nephew. Huck poses as Tom, and when Tom arrives, he becomes his brother Sid. Jim winds up imprisoned in a shack, awaiting his return to slavery. Tom concocts all manner of typical drama for the three of them to play out involving the stealing of candles, sheets, shirts, tin plates, warming pans, flour, a grindstone, and case knives. They draw pictures of coffins, write anonymous letters, create rope ladders, dig a hole in the floor of the shack, put snakes and rats in with poor Jim, and generally concoct an absurd hodgepodge of romantic trappings for an imaginary drama starring none other than Tom Sawyer. Through it all, Jim is continuously patient and kind, declining to escape although he could if he were so inclined. However, Tom's ridiculous heroic posturing has some unexpected results. By the time Jim's escape is planned by Tom, the black man is pursued by a small army of armed men, intent on upholding the law and demonstrating their own heroic dimensions. In order to insure that the escape and capture would be sufficiently grandiose, Tom provides the captors with a "nonnamous letter."

Tom he went down the lightning-rod to spy around; and the nigger at the back door was asleep, and he stuck it [the letter] in the back of his neck and come back. This letter said:

Don't betray me, I wish to be your friend. There is a desprate gang of cutthroats from over in the Indian Territory going to steal your runaway nigger to-night, and they have been trying to scare you so as you will stay in the house and not bother them. I am one of the gang, but have got

religion and wish to quit it and lead an honest life again, and will betray the helish design. They will sneak down from northards, along the fence, at midnight exact, with a false key, and go in the nigger's cabin to get him. I am to be off a piece and blow a tin horn if I see any danger, but stead of that I will BA like a sheep soon as they get in and not blow at all; then whilst they are getting his chains loose, you slip there and lock them in, and can kill them at your leasure. Don't do anything but just the way I am telling you; if you do they will suspicion something and raise whoop-jamboreehoo. I do not wish any reward but to know that I have done the right thing.

UNKNOWN FRIEND. (258-

59)

The results are predictable. Gunfire results. Tom takes a bullet in the leg and Jim must stay with him while Huck goes for a doctor. Huck argues that Jim should escape, but Jim refuses.

"Well, den, dis the de way it look to me, Huck. Ef it woz *him* dat 'uz bein' sot free, en one er de boys wuz to git shot, would he say, 'Go on en save me, nemmine 'bout a doctor fr to save dis one'? Is dat like Mars Tom Sawyer? Would he say dat? You *bet* he wouldn't! Well, den is *Jim* gwyne to say it? No, sah—I doan' budge a step out'n dis place 'dout a doctor; not if it's forty year."

I knowed he was white inside, [. . .]. (264)

Tom is borne back to Aunt Sally on a mattress. He is surrounded by a large crowd, including the doctor who has treated him. Jim is also returned, in shackles. Tom Sawyer, being unconscious, was denied the pleasure of the moment. He would have savored the scene, for it contains all the elements of comedic resolution. There is a chorus of weeping women, a dying and resurrected king, an adoring audience. Order is restored.

She [Aunt Sally] flung herself at Tom, crying, and says:

"Oh, he's dead, he's dead, I know he's dead!"

And Tom he turned his head a little, and muttered something or other, which showed he warn't in his right mind; then she flung up her hands, and says:

"He's alive, thank God! And that's enough!" and she snatched a kiss of him, and flew for the house to get the bed ready, and scattering orders right and left at the niggers and everybody else, as fast as her tongue could go, every jump of the way. (272)

From another perspective, all is not right with the world. Unlike the resurrection from drowning in Tom Sawyer, this scene reveals the shadow side of such heroic antics. The author, in this case, is more aware of a tragic element, the mindless damage to "others"

when the hero indulges his dreams of self-aggrandizement and engages in theatrical heroics.

I followed the men to see what they was going to do with Jim;The men was very huffy, and some of them wanted to hang Jim for an example to all the other niggers around there, so they wouldn't be trying to run away like Jim done, and making such a raft of trouble, and keeping a whole family scared to death for days and night. But the others said, don't do it, it wouldn't answer at all; he ain't our nigger, and his owner would turn up and make us pay for him, sure. So that cooled them down a little, because the people that's always the most anxious for to hang a nigger that hain't done just right is always the very ones that ain't the most anxious to pay for him when they've got their satisfaction out of him. (272)

The person responsible for "making such a raft of trouble, and keeping a whole family scared to death for days and nights" is, of course, Tom Sawyer. As for Jim, who "hain't done just right," he has been the character whose actions have been consistently selfless, loving, and responsible. He is an authentic, grown-up hero. The army of crowing puerile conquerors plan a punishment for their dangerous prisoner in a manner worthy of Tom Sawyer himself. They envision heavy chains, snarling bulldogs, armed guards, and a bread and water diet for acquiescent Jim. At this moment the doctor reappears.

"Don't be no rougher on him than you're obleeged to, because he ain't a bad nigger. When I got to where I found the boy I see I couldn't cut the bullet out without some help, and he war't in no condition for me to leave to go and get help; and he got a little worse and a little worse, and after a long time he went out of his head, and wouldn't let me come a-nigh him any more, [. . .] and I see I couldn't do anything at all with him, so I says, I got to have *help* somehow; and the minute I says it out crawls this nigger from somewheres and says he'll help, and he done it, too, and done it very well. (273)

With this his third, unselfish act, Jim sacrifices his last chance for the freedom he has been seeking throughout the novel. He lays down his life for a friend, a friend whose predicament is his own doing. Here is a portrait of what Christianity might be were it devoid of pseudo-heroic pretense. "I never see a nigger that was a better nuss or faithfuler, and yet he was risking his freedom to do it" (273), says the doctor, who fully intends to make sure that Jim will be returned to his owner. "I tell you, gentlemen, a nigger like that is worth a thousand dollars--and kind treatment, too" (274). He is not, according to the patriarchal hierarchy, worthy of equality, however.

Tom eventually recovers consciousness and is delighted with the success of his elaborate plans. "' [. . .] wasn't it bully, Aunty!'" (276) he exclaims. Aunty, perhaps the voice of more mature judgment is less than thrilled. "' . . . So it was you, you little rascallions, that's been making all this trouble, and turned everybody's wits clean inside out and scared us all most to death. I've as good a notion as ever I had in my life to take it out o' you this very minute . . .'" (276). This feminine view seems to be more realistic, but unfortunately, she doesn't "take it out" of him or the culture. The truth is that she doesn't have the power. This very important feminine function has been repressed in this society, and no one is allowed to deny the little white boys their rights to abuse. As horrifying as Tom's sins are from one perspective, from the point of view of the patriarchy, they are merely amusing boyish antics (like drunken driving, impregnated teenage girls, and arrests for disorderly conduct following triumphant sports events). Tom, far from being remorseful, is quite proud of his accomplishments. He has proven his worth as a full-fledged hero in training. He feels sure that Jim has escaped, and therefore he can reveal a bit of pertinent information that he has been keeping to himself for self-serving reasons.

"*Him?*" says Aunt Sally; "the runaway nigger? 'Deed he hasn't. They've got him back, safe and sound, and he's in that cabin again, on bread and water, and loaded down with chains, till he's claimed or sold!"

Tom rose square up in bed, with his eyes hot, and his nostrils opening and shuttin like gills, and sings out to me:

"They hain't got no *right* to shut him up! *Shove!*--and don't you lose a minute. Turn him loose! hain't no slave; he's as free as any cretur that walks this earth! [. . .] and if somebody don't go, I'll go. I've knowed him all his life. [. . .] Old Miss Watson died two months ago, and she was ashamed she ever was going to sell him down the river, and said so; and she set him free in her will."

"Then what on earth did *you* want to set him free for, seeing he was already free?"

"Well, that *is* a question, I must say; and *just* like women! Why, I wanted the *adventure* of it [. . .]." (277)

When all the mistaken identities are sorted out and order is restored to the kingdom (as is the way with all good comedies), Huck observes that "Tom had gone and took all that trouble and bother to set a free nigger free! and I couldn't ever understand before, until

that minute and that talk, how he could help a body set a nigger free with his upbringing" (278). The significance here is that Tom set a *free* person free. In fact, our little boy hero did not and never would violate the code of the patriarchy. He used the black man, as surely as he was used to work the fields, and all for the sake of amusing Master Tom with an artificially contrived adventure. Tom felt free to enslave Jim for his own purposes, just as Miss Watson did, but without her pangs of conscious. He is utterly unrepentant, consistent with his "upbringing." Tom, despite all his disguises and masks, is revealed to be what he always has been—a manipulator for personal gain, a man behind the curtain pretending to be a wizard. Huck and Jim, despite their various pseudonyms and silly outfits, are loyal, loving souls whose morality comes from their hearts, not from their position in the social hierarchy or the legal order of their culture.

The novel ends when Jim reveals to Huck that he, like Tom, has been keeping a secret, but for somewhat different reasons. Huck's villainous pap, whose murderous greed and penchant for alcohol have posed a threat to Huck all his life, is dead. Jim found him stabbed to death on a house floating down the river earlier in the story. Twain doesn't tell us why Jim has waited so long to tell Huck, but it is doubtful that it was for personal gain. Huck is now free from the fathers, in many senses of the word. Unlike the ending of Tom Sawyer, this time he cannot be enticed back into the stranglehold of the patriarchy. Tom's temptations are seen for the dangerous shams that they are. The reward money which rests in the hands of Judge Thatcher looks like a trap to Huck. The kindly feminine creatures who promise to "sivilize" him, are in fact, as enslaved as Jim. All in all, Huck believes he will have none of it and accepts the role of outcast—a wiser, if lonelier, man.

Tom's most well now, and got his bullet around his neck on a watch-guard for a watch, and is always seeing what time it is, and so there ain't nothing more to write about, and I am rotten glad of it, backs if I'd 'a' knowed what a trouble it was to make a book I wouldn't a tackled it, and ain't a-going to no more. But I reckon I got to light out for the territory ahead of the rest, because Aunt Sally she's going to adopt me and sivilize me, and I can't stand it. I been there before. (281)

Chapter 5

C. G. Jung's God-image

This chapter will examine several father figures in the life of C. G. Jung and consider the way in which his concept of divinity was influenced by them. Jung carefully distinguishes between God and "God-image," a distinction based upon a Kantian philosophical perspective. The "God-image" is, like all empirical knowledge, according to Kant, created when human sensations are filtered through categories of knowing, resulting in perceptions. Jung's "God-image" is his perception of God. This perception was influenced not only by a priori categories of knowing, such as time and space, but by Jung's culture, religion, and historical circumstances. Additionally, his personal relationships with his mother and father and his relationship with Freud affected his image of divinity. The intention here is not to psychoanalyze Jung. Rather, we look at the "images" that he had, or the stories he tells about Kant, Freud, and his own parents. These stories influence the story, or image, that he describes as being his own image of God.

Immanuel Kant

A brief consideration of Kantian epistemology assists an analysis of Jung's application of the theory. Kant's most significant work on the subject of human knowing is found in his three Critiques. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he writes, "In this book I have chiefly aimed at completeness; and I venture to maintain that there ought not to be one single metaphysical problem that has not been solved here, or to the solution of which the key at least has not here been supplied" (17). The primary question addressed is the nature of pure reason. Will Durant summarizes his perception of the inquiry in this manner:

What is meant by this title? Critique is not precisely a criticism, but a critical analysis; Kant is not attacking "pure reason," except, at the end, to show its limitations; rather he hopes to show its possibility, and to exalt it above the impure knowledge which comes to us through the distorting channels of sense. For "pure" reason is to mean knowledge that does not come through our senses, but is independent of all sense experience; knowledge belonging to us by the inherent nature and structure of the mind. . . . Let us grant that absolute certainty of knowledge is impossible if all knowledge comes from sensation, from an independent external world which owes us no promise of regularity of behavior. But what if we have knowledge that is

independent of sense-experience, knowledge whose truth is certain to us even before experience—a priori? Then absolute truth, and absolute science, would become possible, would it not? Is there such absolute knowledge? This is the problem of the first *Critique*. (201)

Bertrand Russell interprets the question somewhat differently. He doesn't see the acceptance of a priori knowing as predicating the probability of "absolute science," but rather as suggestive of the possibility of intellectual propositions not based on experience:

The purpose of [*The Critique of Pure Reason*] is to prove that, although none of our knowledge can transcend experience, it is nevertheless in part a priori and not inferred inductively from experience. The part of our knowledge which is a priori embraces, according to him, not only logic, but much that cannot be included in logic or deduced from it. He separates two distinctions. [. . .] On the one hand there is the distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" propositions; on the other hand, the distinction between "a priori" and "empirical" propositions. Something must be said about each of these distinctions.

An "analytic" proposition is one in which the predicate is part of the subject; for instance "a tall man is a man," or "an equilateral triangle is a triangle." Such propositions follow from the law of contradiction; to maintain that a tall man is not a man would be self-contradictory. A "synthetic" proposition is one that is not analytic. All the propositions that we know only through experience are synthetic. We cannot, by a mere analysis of concepts, discover such truths as "Tuesday was a wet day" or "Napoleon was a great general." But Kant, unlike Leibniz and all other previous philosophers, will not admit the converse, that all synthetic propositions are only known through experience. This brings us to the second of the above distinctions.

An "empirical" proposition is one which we cannot know except by the help of sense-perception, either our own or that of someone else whose testimony we accept. The facts of history and geography are of this sort; so are the laws of science, whenever our knowledge of their truth depends on observational data. An "a priori" proposition, on the other hand, is one which, though it may be *elicited* by experience, is seen, when known, to have a basis other than experience. A child learning arithmetic may be helped by experiencing two marbles and two other marbles, and observing that altogether he is experiencing four marbles. But when he has grasped the general proposition "two and two are four" he no longer requires confirmation by instances; the proposition has a certainty which induction can never give to a general law. All propositions of pure mathematics are in this sense a priori. (706-07)

Russell goes on to point out that a question arises then regarding the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori.

According to Kant, the outer world causes only the matter of sensation, but our own mental apparatus orders this matter in space and time, and supplies the concepts by means of which we understand experience. Things in themselves, which are the causes of our sensations, are unknowable; they are not in space or time, they are not substances, nor can they be described

by any of those other general concepts which Kant calls "categories." Space and time are subjective, they are part of our apparatus of perception. But just because of this, we can be sure that whatever we experience will exhibit the characteristics dealt with by geometry and the science of time. If you always wore blue spectacles, you could be sure of seeing everything blue (this is not Kant's illustration). Similarly, since you always wear spatial spectacles in your mind, you are sure of always seeing everything in space. Thus geometry is a priori in the sense that it must be true of everything experienced, but we have no reason to suppose that anything analogous is true of things in themselves, which we do not experience. (707-08)

There is a striking similarity in the way that mythology functions and the operation of this "apparatus of perception" which Russell metaphorically refers to as "blue spectacles." Both organize experience, provide categories of interpretation/understanding and affect the selectivity of what we actually perceive from the myriad of sensations that occur in living. Russell continues to explain that Kant believes that

[. . .] these varied sensations come to us through varied channels of sense, through a thousand "afferent nerves" that pass from skin and eye and ear and tongue into the brain; what a medley of messengers they must be as they crowd into the chambers of the mind calling for attention. No wonder Plato spoke of the "rabble of the senses." And left to themselves, they remain rabble, a chaotic "manifold," pitifully impotent waiting to be ordered into meaning and purpose and power. [. . . T]here is a law-giver for this mob, a directing and coordination power that does not merely receive, but takes these atoms of sensation and moulds them into sense. [. . .]

Observe, first, that not all of the messages are accepted. Myriad forces play upon your body at this moment; a storm of stimuli beats down upon the nerve-endings which, amoebalike, you put forth to experience the external world: but not all that call are chosen; only those sensations are selected that can be moulded into perceptions suited to your present purpose, or that bring those imperious messages of danger which are always relevant. [. . .] Associations of sensations or ideas is not merely by contiguity in space or time, nor by similarity, nor by recency, frequency or intensity of experience; it is above all determined by the purpose of the mind. Sensations and thoughts are servants, they await our call, they do not come unless we need them. There is an agent of selection and direction that uses them and is their master. In addition to the sensations and the ideas there is the *mind*. (Durant 203-04).

In considering Jungian psychology as it relates to Kant's philosophy of knowing, several points need to be addressed. How are Kant's a priori truths related to Jungian archetypes? Both Jung and Kant seem to feel that these ways of organizing experience are part of the mind of all humanity, which has consequences regarding the subject of free will. For Jung, the process of making conscious the unconscious transforms the relationship and

creates the opportunity for choice. Kant's epistemology opens the door to this process of conscious knowing. Kant would contend that it is never possible for the human mind to think outside the a priori constructs. Nevertheless, contemporary thinkers do indeed attempt to think outside the containers of time and space. Mythologies such as those examined in earlier chapters are not a priori propositions of knowing but socio-cultural constructs designed for political and economic reasons. Nevertheless, these mythologies can function as transparently and unconsciously as Russell's blue spectacles.

One additional point needs to be included regarding Kantian philosophy. Morality must, according to Kant, be predicated upon the categorical imperative which states that the individual should "*Act only according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall become a general law.*" Or: *'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a general natural law'*" (Russell 711). If Jung's theories are grounded upon a Kantian philosophical base, it is appropriate to consider the moral ramifications of Jungian psychology in light of this categorical imperative.

Kant maintains [. . .] that we ought so to act as to treat every man as an end in himself. This may be regarded as an abstract form of the doctrine of the rights of man, and it is open to the same objections. If taken seriously, it would make it impossible to reach a decision whenever two people's interests conflict. . . . It is possible, however, to interpret Kant's principle as meaning, not that each man is an absolute end, but that all men should count equally in determining actions by which many are affected. So interpreted, the principle may be regarded as giving an ethical basis for democracy. (711-12)

Jung and Kant

Marilyn Nagy, in her book Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C. G. Jung writes,

The immediate background of Jung's epistemology lies in nineteenth-century reaction to the new sciences, and the materialistic and positivist philosophies which accompanied the upswing of scientific influence. A certain type of radically subjectivistic neo-Kantianism was much favored at the end of the century, particularly by religionists who hoped thus to defend religious truth from the reductionist conclusions of scientists. Jung's views were entirely similar to those expressed by the subjectivist interpreters of Kant. (265)

Jung felt that a new theory of knowledge began with Kant, which marked the "turning point for the modern psyche" (qtd. in Edinger New God Image 8), that there was a "threshold which separates two epochs [. . .] whose starting point is Kant" (qtd. in Edinger 3).

Kant's basic discovery is that of the a priori forms and categories. According to Kant, perceptions of outer reality are structured and ordered by means of innate, built-in forms of perception. These forms of perception are space and time. Space and time do not exist in the outer world. They are forms of perception that the human mind imposes on the flux of sensory data to order. Furthermore, our understanding of what we perceive, our ability to grasp and conceptualize what we perceive, is brought about by a number of innate categories of understanding—categories such as quantity, quality, cause and effect, and relation. His discovery, then is that the human mind, the human psyche, pours into sensory data the forms of perception and the categories of understanding which create our total view of the world. (6)

Edinger continues with his description of Kantian epistemology. "Then there is ultimate reality itself, the thing in itself, which is assumed to exist beyond the subjective sensations it sends out but which is totally unknowable. Ultimate reality, the thing in itself, is unknowable because the knower is imprisoned in the box of the categories of understanding and the forms of perceptions" (7).

For Kant, as well as for Jung, a priori categories of knowing are universal. However, is it not possible that given the subjective nature of knowing, all of us do not have the same experience of this ultimate reality? Might it be possible that a priori categories of knowing, if they exist at all, are not identical in each and every mind? Furthermore, might it be that other factors such as belief systems, expectations, or circumstances of individual existence color perceptions in such a way that they vary in the extreme? Finally, does the human mind control any or all of these factors which affect perception? If, as Jung suggests, our knowing changes as we become conscious of the process and of our own subjectivity, then perceptions vary as they transform. These perceptions are but fleeting moments, ephemeral combinations which might possibly never recur. Some the mind chooses to anoint as "correct" perceptions and will formulate future experiences in alignment with what is believed to be so. Such a perspective seems to contradict Durant's

suggestion that "absolute truth, and absolute science, would become possible" in the context of Kantian epistemology.

Edinger reiterates the warnings of Jung, which he says are essential for the understanding of Jungian psychology. "It is a very important formula: *do not identify with your subjective experience*. [. . .] To the extent one is contained in a metaphysical belief, one is identified with one's subjective experience, and one gives universal validity to an experience which is only individually valid" (New God Image 10). This caution seems equally applicable to mythologies—to theological, psychological, cultural, sociological and literary beliefs.

Kant distinguishes the terms *phenomenon* and *noumenon*. *Phenomenon* means appearance, phenomenal reality, the world of appearances (from *phanein*—to show, reveal). *Noumenon* is the thing in itself which is unknown, which is postulated to exist. The only reference to it is the mental construct that the mind creates for it. (From *nous*—mind). The world fantasy derives from *phanein* also. Fantasies are one's inner phenomena. They are what relate us to the unknown object, to the noumenon, which is postulated. The fantasy corresponds internally to the phenomenological object in the outer world. Any presumption to such absolute knowledge as metaphysics or knowledge of the thing in itself is just that, a presumption. It is a psychological sin, an inflation. (Edinger 7)

This distinction between the Ultimate Reality, the noumenon and the phenomenal reality, the phenomenon constituted the "threshold" which Jung describes as being marked by Kantian thinking. The way in which we think about our thinking, and the degree of validity which we assign to it, is supposedly forever altered by this humbling observation. We can never be certain about our perceptions and therefore, we can only hold "knowledge" as propositions that may be so.

Before Kant, in spite of the beginning efforts of Copernicus and Descartes and others, humanity had been identified with its subjective experience. After Kant, if one is able to see what he points out, one is no longer able to be identified with his subjective experience; one is now conscious of the subjectivity of the experience and therefore no longer can grant it metaphysical validity. All experience is subjective, psychological experience. (Edinger, New God Image 9)

On the basis of his acceptance of Kantian premises concerning the nature of knowing, Jung considers himself a Post-Kantian empiricist. His religious observations are grounded in phenomenal observations.

Although I have often been called a philosopher, I am an empiricist and adhere as such to the phenomenological standpoint. I trust that it does not conflict with the principles of scientific empiricism if one occasionally makes certain reflections which go beyond a mere accumulation and classification of experience. As a matter of fact I believe that experience is not even possible without reflection, because "experience" is a process of assimilation without which there could be no understanding. As this statement indicates, I approach psychological matters from a scientific and not from a philosophical standpoint. Inasmuch as religion has a very important psychological aspect, I deal with it from a purely empirical point of view, that is, I restrict myself to the observation of phenomena and I eschew any metaphysical or philosophical considerations. I do not deny the validity of these other considerations, but I cannot claim to be competent to apply them correctly. (Jung qtd. Edinger, New God Image 9)

In light of Jung's claims to empiricism, he makes a rather strange assertion regarding the nature of reality. In Memories, Dreams, Reflections, he relates a story about his travels to Nairobi. One day he journeyed by car to a game preserve to the Athi Plains. There he encountered large herds of animals, "gazelle, antelope, gnu, zebra, warthog" (255) grazing across the countryside. He deliberately separated himself from his companions in order to experience this view alone. "This was the stillness of the eternal beginning, the world as it had always been, in the state of non-being; for until then no one had been present to know that it was this world" (255).

There the cosmic meaning of consciousness became overwhelmingly clear to me. "What nature leaves imperfect, the art perfects," say the alchemists. Man, I, in an invisible act of creation put the stamp of perfection on the world by giving it objective existence. This act we usually ascribe to the Creator alone, without considering that in so doing we view life as a machine calculated down to the last detail, which along with the human psyche, runs on senselessly, obeying foreknown and predetermined rules. In such a cheerless clockwork fantasy there is no drama of man, world, and God; there is no "new day" leading to "new shores," but only the dreariness of calculated processes. My old Pueblo friend came to my mind. He thought that the *raison d'être* of his pueblo had been to help their father, the sun, to cross the sky each day. I had envied him for the fullness of meaning in that belief, and had been looking about without hope for a myth of our own. Now I knew what it was, and knew even more: that man is indispensable for the completion of creation, that, in fact, he himself is the second creator of the world, who alone has given to the world its objective existence--without which, unheard, unseen, silently eating, giving birth, dying, heads

nodding through hundreds of millions of years, it would have gone on in the profoundest night of non-being down to its unknown end. Human consciousness created *objective* [italics mine] existence and meaning, and man found his indispensable place in the great process of being. (255-56)

How is this assertion of the creative powers of man possible in the Kantian scheme?

Clearly Kant believes that the unknowable ultimate realities exist with or without the human witness. Jung seems to be referring to himself when he refers to the "second creator." Does he, in his own mind, represent all of humanity, in which case his assertion seems to mean that humanity's perceptions create reality? This argument is like the debate as to whether the noise of a falling tree in the forest is a noise if it is not heard by any human. One problem with this perspective is the assumption either that other creatures are incapable of perception (which we know to be false) or that their perceptions are totally inconsequential. If, as Jung tells us, "All experience is subjective, psychological experience" (Edinger, New God Image 9) and it is imperative to "*not identify with your subjective experience*" (10), how is it possible for human experience to be "indispensable for the completion of creation" and for Jung to consider "himself as the second creator of the world, who alone has given to the world its objective existence?" If all experience is subjective, then how can the world have an objective existence? Was the first creator of the world the unknowable Ultimate Reality of God, of which each of us has a personal but limited image? Does this act of creation occur for each individual who beholds awesome, unfamiliar scenes in nature? The image that Jung has of himself as creator is reiterated in his discussions of the God-image. Jung wrote, "Individuation and individual existence are indispensable for the transformation of God. Human consciousness is the only seeing eye of the Deity" (Edinger 75).

Jung's admiration of Kant is evidently quite sincere. Nevertheless, inconsistencies exist between the two philosophies. Jung is not rigorous in his application. His desire to assume heroic proportions compels him to resist such humility. The mythology of Christianity was operating in his psyche, urging him to identify with a patriarchal image of what he was striving to become. Nevertheless, it was important for him to establish a

scientific context for his psychological theories. The intellectual environment of his time placed supreme credibility on scientific methodology. As a physician, it would have been extremely detrimental for him to categorize his theories as theology or philosophy. He would have greatly undermined his effectiveness and authority. Further, the fallacies of modernisms had yet to be articulated. The intelligentsia believed in the myth of modernism and were blind to its inherent weaknesses. Nevertheless, the danger of accepting phenomenal perceptions as ultimate truths is clearly indicated by Kant. Paul Brockelman makes a comment which I think is more applicable to Jung than to Kant. "The British empiricists' appreciation of the power and significance of scientific knowledge is not itself a scientific hypothesis, but a human story and dream through which their actual philosophical explorations are worked out" (75).

Demaris Wehr points out that Jung's critics "all indict Jung for overstepping epistemological boundaries between theology and psychology" (77). He is criticized for "his use of Kant when it suits him to 'justify' his psychology philosophically and his disregard of the boundaries of philosophy on the whole" (77). Wehr protests the inauthentic credence that is given to scientific pretensions. After detailed argument, she concludes:

From a feminist perspective, both Jung's religious stance and his adherence to scientific principles of inquiry merit questioning because unconscious gender assumptions creep into both religion and science. Patriarchal religion has been accepted as transcendent and revealed, and thus as above human criticism. Patriarchal science has stood on the principle of empirical investigation, without scientists' awareness of the possibility of gender assumptions influencing the choice of data, the method of investigation, and the results. Because Jung's psychology partakes of the status of both religion and psychology, even though it suffers loss of credibility by being associated with both, his pronouncements about the nature of the "feminine" and woman can stand on practically unassailable grounds -- "sacred" on the one hand, and "empirical" on the other. (75)

I would contend that such "pronouncements" are neither sacred nor empirical. Possibility they are accurate reports of individual experience (Jung's) and reveal the filters of perceptions in operation.

Wehr is describing what she takes to be the double-edged sword of patriarchal orthodoxy. On the one hand, the claim to irrefutable truth that scientific methodologies ascribe to is inappropriately applied to nonempirical observations originating in reason or imagination, such as metaphysics and depth psychology. On the other hand, these observations are elevated to divine revelations through intellectual machinations designed to wrap metaphysical perceptions in the cloak of undeniable truth. The initial hypothesis is that it is the nature of divinity to be omniscient. (This presupposes the existence of divinity and the possibility of omniscience.) Secondly, divinity is correlated with the concept of Father. The Father is imagined in the image of the conceiver. The conceiver may then commingle the identity of his own biological father and the heavenly Father, thereby elevating himself to the position of successor. This facilitates the gentle slide into identification with divinity, the belief that the conceiver, or the hero as we have called him in other circumstances, is one with the Father/God. The hero becomes God, his word becomes law, those who express disagreement become inimical heretics, and he rules by divine right. It is clear that the concept of omniscience is critical to this process and that disagreement between father and son poses a difficult problem.

God and the God-image

Jung quite clearly states that his observations regarding the nature of God are, in fact, nothing more than his interpretation, his "empirical" conclusions based on personal perceptions. It is his intention to ground firmly his theology in Kantian understanding. Jung writes, "It would be a regrettable mistake if anybody should take my observations as a kind of proof of the existence of God. They prove only the existence of an archetypal God-image, which to my mind is the most we can assert about God psychologically" ("Psychology and Religion" 523). If Kantian criteria is applied, however, Jung's observations do not prove anything beyond the existence of a God-image in the mind of one perceiver. About his own perceptions, he believes himself to be objective and able to report his experience of God images objectively. Some absolute reality (unknowable) is

filtered through the perceptions of Jung, resulting in an image of God. The problem arises when he extrapolates this experience as shared by all humanity. This is what he is suggesting when he says that he is proving the "existence of an archetypal God-image." What appears to be the rigorous application of the scientific method is either a simple journalistic report of fantasies common to human experience or nothing more than a grandiose projection.

At other times, Jung seems to put his God-image observations in a much more modest context. In this quote from Edinger, he characterizes his assertions as strictly subjective:

My human limitation does not permit me to assert that I know God, hence I cannot but regard all assertions about God as relative because subjectively conditioned—and this out of respect for my brothers, whose other conceptions and beliefs have as much to justify them as mine. If I am a psychologist I shall try to take these differences seriously and to understand them. But under no circumstances shall I assume that if the other person doesn't share my opinion it is due to a deformity or lack of an organ. [. . .] Though I am sure of my subjective experience, I must impose on myself every conceivable restriction in interpreting it. I must guard against identifying with my subjective experience. I consider all such identifications as serious psychological mistakes. (Jung, qtd. in New God Image 9-10)

Wehr writes, "If we take Jung at his word and accept that every time he says 'God' he means an archetypal image in the psyche, we will (sic) have understood him" (86-87). It is clear that he means a perception, in Kantian terms. It is not clear whether he is insistent that this perception constitutes an archetypal image.

In the context of God as image, it is logical that God is revealed [or evolves] through the individuation of the psyches of those who believe they have experienced the God-image. In this sense, they are the "creators" of such subjective phenomenon. Insofar as we share perceptions, these images are altered by cultural interaction. This is one of the functions of mythology. However, those who do not participate in the collective may have images of equal validity, regardless of whether they are articulated or not. Jung wrote, "Individuation and individual existence are indispensable for the transformation of God. Human consciousness is the only seeing eye of the Deity" (Edinger, New God Image

75). This assertion disregards the question of the existence of absolute reality regardless of perception. Additionally, it assumes that the perceptions of human beings are the only perceptions which have validity.

Human beings *sometimes* create, in individual psyches, an image of God. Often the assumption is that the nature of this Divinity to some extent correlates to the human psyche. What is being sought is something greater than ourselves with whom we may identify. It is not surprising that we create a grandiose version of ourselves. Many adhere to an image of God that is purely good, which sometimes is accompanied by an oppositional image of evil. Jung's God-image contained his model of the human psyche, which included evil. Traditionally, or at least for many centuries, the majority of monotheists have preferred to perceive the Divinity as a masculine figure, generally wise and mature. He endorses our perceptions. He agrees with us about our own righteousness and He knows our deepest shame. He has powers of redemption. He embodies our values and places us (or our fathers, sons and husbands) at the peak of the hierarchy of the entire cosmos. He has been created in the image that we would like to imagine ourselves (or men) to be. He is to be loved and revered, just as we want to be loved and revered, just as we wanted to have a father that we could love and revere. For some, the God image is an image of the longed-for perfect father. This longing for the omnipotent, omniscient father with whom he could identify was present in Jung and influenced his perception of God as well as his personal relationships.

Kant has suggested that human knowledge consists of sensations which are filtered through a priori categories such as time and space. Perhaps this is so, although it seems that there are many other factors which affect perceptions beyond imposition of time and space constructs. Jung implies that his knowledge of the human psyche and his understanding of the God-image is created in this manner. As we shall see, there are other factors, which we shall call the mythological factors which affect these metaphysical and

psychological perceptions. They might be considered a priori categories of imagination, and may be supposed to function somewhat similarly.

Jung's Father-images

Father. In Memories, Dreams and Reflections, Jung recalls his childhood and his relationship with his father, whom Nagy describes as a "country parson [serving]. . . in small parishes along the Rhine near Basel" (11).

In the last years of his life Jung[. . .] chose to devote nearly eighty-five pages of his memories to the theme of his childhood religious dilemmas, to his philosophical readings as a young student, and to their connection with his experience of his father. He was able to write only four of the twelve chapters of the book from his own hand[. . .]. But of those four chapters, two were devoted to his father and to religion. In an earlier letter he had written to Pastor Walter Bernet that "it was the tragedy of my youth to see my father cracking up before my eyes on the problem of his faith and dying an early death." I believe that Jung quite literally took on as his own the unsolved problem of inner belief of his father and made the *reality of the psyche* the motive of his life. (Nagy 12)

Jung's portrait of him presents a man who was moody and irritable, who evidenced a "powerlessness" that disturbed his son. "Jung suffered as a child from the Pharasaic, stultified 'religion by the rules' that German-speaking Protestantism had become in those years. But it was his father whom he saw as the chief victim of a professionalized religious tradition, which he could not connect to meaningful, living experience" (11). When adolescent Carl wished to discuss theological issues such as the Trinity the father dodged his questions. Jung interpreted this as a preference for a religion based on faith rather than experience and knowledge. With a judgmental intolerance characteristic of youth, the son decided that his father was intellectually weak and spiritually fearful.

Later, when I was eighteen years old, I had many discussions with my father, always with the secret hope of being able to let him know about the miracle of grace, and thereby help to mitigate his pangs of conscience. I was convinced that if he fulfilled the will of God everything would turn out for the best. But our discussions invariably came to an unsatisfactory end. They irritated him, and saddened him. "Oh, nonsense," he was in the habit of saying, "you always want to think. One ought not to think, but believe." I would think, "No, one must experience and know," but I would say, "Give me this belief," whereupon he would shrug and turn resignedly away. (43)

This is the only version of this story available to us, one told by Jung in his later years as a report of an experience of his youth. Jung attributes his father's resistance to theological discussions with his son as resulting from intellectual shallowness and cowardice. He believes that for the older man, "blind faith" offered a less arduous religious path than the challenging one being pursued by his fervent, brilliant, young offspring.

It is important to remember how common it is for the young to imagine themselves superior to their elders. It is possible that the father was exactly as Jung describes, but there are other possibilities for the pastor's refusal to engage in such discussions with his son. One that suggests itself is that discussions with adolescents intoxicated with their own importance are most often a fruitless waste of time. Another possibility is the same reason that the cobbler's children have no shoes. Perhaps, at the end of a long demanding day spent addressing the spiritual needs of his parishioners, an exhausted pastor might prefer peace and quiet to Carl's passionate theological discussions--the point of which, it seems, might have been to instruct the father on the error of his ways. The father would not have been the first parent to invent an easy excuse to avoid conflict with a child.

Jung tells us that his God-image was the result of the "miracle of grace" which comes as the result of obedience to God's will. This was the "experience" which allowed him to "know."

[. . .] I heard many religious conversations, theological discussions, and sermons. Whenever I listened to them I had the feeling: "Yes, yes, that is all very well. But what about the secret? The secret is also the secret of grace. None of you know anything about that. You don't know that God wants to force me to do wrong, that He forces me to think abomination in order to experience His grace." Everything the others said was completely beside the point. I thought, "For Heaven's sake, there must be someone who knows something about it; somewhere there must be the truth." I rummaged through my father's library, reading whatever I could on God, the Trinity, spirit, consciousness. I devoured the books, but came away none the wiser. I always found myself thinking, "They don't know either." I even searched about in my father's Luther Bible. Unfortunately, the conventional "edifying" interpretation of Job prevented me from taking a deeper interest in this book. I would have found consolation in it, especially in chapter 9, verses 30 ff.: "Though I wash myself with snow water [. . .] yet shalt thou plunge me in the mire." (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 42)

Included here is the Biblical quote to which Jung refers.

If I wash myself with snow water, and make my hands never so clean;
 Yet shalt thou plunge me in the ditch, and mine own clothes shall abhor me. For *he* is not a man, as *I am*, *that* I should answer him, *and* we should come together in judgment.
 Neither is there any daysman betwixt us, *that* may lay his hand upon us both. Let him take his rod away from me, and let not his fear terrify me:
Then would I speak, and not fear him, but *it is* not so with me. (Job 9.30-35)

Jung's father's lessons on the nature of grace did not match with Jung's experiences which he termed grace. Therefore, he deduced that the pastor was deluded. ". . . [T]here arose in me profound doubts about everything my father said. When I heard him preaching about grace, I always thought of my own experience. What he said sounded stale and hollow, like a tale told by someone who knows it only by hearsay and cannot quite believe it himself" (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 43).

These passages are revealing, more about the personality of Jung than of his father. Jung had a concept of how God should be "imaged" and how grace should be experienced. Even more apparent is the fact that he had an idea of how his father should be, how he should construct the basis of his faith, what he should believe and preach. Jung is quite frustrated with his father's failure to perform correctly--correctly being in accordance with the mythology of the son. Whether it was true or not, Jung saw in his father the embodiment of a theological construct which he considered outdated--religion based on faith rather than reason. It was not "modern."

I did sometimes attempt to talk seriously to my father, but encountered an impatience and anxious defensiveness which puzzled me. Not until several years later did I come to understand that my poor father did not dare to think, because he was consumed by inward doubts. He was taking refuge from himself and therefore insisted on blind faith. He could not receive it as a grace because he wanted to "win it by struggle," forcing it to come with convulsive efforts. (73)

It is not surprising that the eighteen-year-old experienced his parent in this way. It is remarkable that the author writing his memoirs in his late seventies did not find humor in his own juvenile arrogance. Mark Twain wrote, "When I was a boy of fourteen, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But when I got to be

twenty-one, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in seven years" (Twain online). It is surprising not to find the same signs of maturation in Jung. Assuming that the theological differences between the generations were in fact significant, it is merely indicative that Jung and his father had different conceptions of God, different "God-images." If the point of the discussion were to establish who was right, then the debate would have been useful only in the context of orthodoxy. However, Jung the mature empiricist seems to ignore his own philosophy in this case. The God-image exists in the psyche of man as the result of experience and all experience is subjective. The father espouses a religion that has no room for doubt, that is based upon a "leap of faith." Jung insists on religion derived from experience, one that he can "know." Jung wants his fathers to be omniscient. Indeed many of us do. It would make life much simpler. One of the universal disappointments of maturation is to discover the fallibility of parents. Evidence of fallibility, for Jung, is the mortifying discovery that his father does not agree with him and is not open to persuasion.

I was seized with the most vehement pity for my father. All at once I understood the tragedy of his profession and his life. He was struggling with a death whose existence he could not admit. An abyss had opened between him and me, and I saw no possibility of ever bridging it, for it was infinite in extent. I could not plunge my dear and generous father, who in so many matters left me to myself and had never tyrannized over me, into that despair and sacrilege which were necessary for an experience of divine grace. Only God could do that. I had no right to; it would be inhuman. God is not human, I thought; that is His greatness, that nothing human impinges on Him. He is kind and terrible--both at once--and is therefore a great peril from which everyone naturally tries to save himself. People cling one-sidedly to His love and goodness, for fear they will fall victim to the tempter and destroyer. (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 55-56)

The theme of the disappointing father, the idol with feet of clay, will repeat itself in Jung's life in his relationship with Freud. The youthful disillusioned son, true to the heroic pattern, imagines himself tragically alienated from his society and is forced to go out and seek his own grail. "I now found myself cut off from the Church and from my father's and everybody else's faith. Insofar as they all represented the Christian religion, I was an outsider" (56).

Robert Smith's The Wounded Jung: Effects of Jung's Relationships on his Life and Work states that "[. . .] Jung's interest in the healing of the psyche was unmistakably rooted in the conflicts with a troubled father and a mentally ill mother in his own childhood" (1). He feels that "[f]or Jung the central figure of his formative experience was indeed the mother" (16), but his observations concerning Jung's father are similar to those outlined in this discussion.

Jung's father was a man whose primary frustration was that Christian symbols no longer mediated psychic power. Jung found his father's concealed religious despair a source of frustration and consternation. His father had lost the innocence of childlike faith and nonetheless tenaciously held to Christian doctrine. Belief was for him a shallow anchor, not a rock or ground of sustenance or renewal. (32)

Perhaps Jung's father did not want to give up his innocence. From a feminist perspective, the "heroic" journey, at least as it is described by Campbell, is an elaborate scheme contrived to avoid the necessity of growing up, of accepting life's realities and of relinquishing the narcissism of childhood. It is possible, however, that none of this applies to Pastor Jung. After all, we only have his son's decades-old memories upon which to base our assessment.

Smith feels that Jung held Christianity responsible for the unhappiness he experienced in his home growing up. This is another function of myth; one not identified in chapter 1. Nevertheless, it is a quite common one—myth as a form of brainwashing, myth as scapegoat.

Apparently Jung was to hold Christian institutionalism to some extent responsible for the fate that had befallen his father. Having to be the protector of Christian doctrine was for the elder Jung an onerous task. Johan Paul Jung lost hope and was frequently depressed, for he could not face his doubts, which remained largely unconscious. For this Carl was to blame the moribund and sterile nature of Christian religion as he had experienced it. Hence we have one of the reasons for his profound ambivalence toward Christianity throughout his life. (39)

These "doubts" are those same doubts addressed by many religious mythologies. They might have included doubts about eternal life when experiential evidence seems to indicate that all living things must eventually die. Patriarchal angst might be the result of doubts that

certain kinds of male humans can ascend to a place of oneness with the Father/God which would entitle them to dominion over all lesser creatures. Indeed, in the mind of the Pastor Jung, as well as in the mind of his son, it might have been doubtful that the "certainties" of the past centuries were going to hold true and that the Christian mythology was going to be able to deliver on the promise of life-everlasting. Whether we can trust the memories of C. G. on the subject of the father's mind, as they are filtered through the son's dreams and reflections, is debatable. However, his observations are revealing about the perceptions and concerns of his own childhood. It is upon this basis that Smith concludes, "[t]hus, one of Jung's lifelong tasks became to breathe new life into the dry bones of Christian imagery" (40).

As we have seen, Jung idealized Kant, and saw him as an intellectual forefather. Edinger tells us that in a lecture given in medical school, Jung referred to Kant as "the greatest of all sages ever born on German soil" (qtd. in Edinger, New God Image 8). Jung stressed the similarities in the philosophical perspectives, but ignored or glossed over the differences. Kant, being dead, offered no resistance to being remodeled to conform to Jung's image of him.

The image of the "kind and terrible" God foreshadows the concept of divinity that Jung describes in Answer to Job. It also is a reflection of the human psyche as he perceived it, consisting of opposites. Jung spent a lifetime searching for a father/God-image with whom he could be one--a God created in his (Jung's) own image, consistent with his own theories of psychology. If Jungian psychology includes a "God-image" which accurately describes the mind of God, then by extension, the Jungian schema of the human psyche derives credibility. Paternal omniscience would, therefore, constitute evidence of the infallibility of the son, who shares this common image.

Freud. In Myths and Mysteries of Same Sex Love, Christine Downing discusses the friendship of Jung and Freud from 1907 through 1912. Due to the age difference, Freud being almost twenty years older, the relationship was more a father-son relationship

than one between colleagues. However, Downing also characterizes the relationship as "homoerotic" (24). She writes, "Part of what [. . .] attracts Jung to Freud is that he finds him embodying the imago of the powerful father as his own father could not; but part of what makes him resistant to Freud is his fear of the homosexual current of his own feelings that are stirred up in their relationship" (95). Downing makes a strong case for a "homoerotic" component in the relationship. However, the father-son dimension is the focus of this discussion. "In finding Freud [. . .], he for a time felt he had discovered a true father" (99).

After a year of correspondence, Jung was introduced to Freud in March of 1907. Downing describes this first meeting as quite warm, stating that Freud told Jung "that he already regard[ed] him as his own successor in the exciting, far-reaching, beautiful work of psychoanalysis" (25). There was a certain reticence on Freud's part, however, which Downing attributes to a failed relationship with Wilhelm Fliess. "Almost from the beginning the theme of death intrudes on this friendship. Freud is in his fifties and often conscious of his own mortality; he often also accuses Jung of harboring death wishes against him" (25). This seems to be a rather strong apprehension to bring to a budding friendship. Perhaps Freud's fixation on the Oedipal drama was the source of this strange fantasy. If he designates Jung as his heir apparent from the friendship's inception, then perhaps he considered it inevitable that the younger man should desire the death of the father figure in order to accelerate succession.

On Jung's part there was unbridled enthusiasm, adoration bordering on hero worship. He requested a photograph of Freud, which was supplied. Freud's accompanying note implies a fawning attitude on the part of the younger man. "'But please, don't make too much of me. I am too human to deserve it'" (qtd. in Downing 25). Jung, however, rather than toning it down a bit, writes: "My veneration for you has something of the character of a 'religious' crush. Though it does not really bother me, I still feel it is disgusting and ridiculous because of its undeniable erotic undertone. [. . .] I think I owe

you this explanation. I would rather not have said it" (25). When Freud made no answer within a few days, Jung wrote again, "I am suffering the agonies of a patient in analysis, riddling myself with every conceivable fear about the possible consequences of my confession" (26). These confessions are more of the nature of fan mail than scholastic exchange. It is clear that from the outset, Jung had a rather unrealistic image of Freud.

Smith cites Jung's ambivalent feelings toward father figures as contributing to the tone of the friendship, but points to the same erotic note identified by Downing. He writes,

The father-son complex that emerged between Freud and Jung was a significant determining factor for the relationship, more than any other single element. It profoundly stirred and exhilarated both men from the start. [. . .] Freud's reputation was already secure. He was fifty years of age, whereas Jung was a relative neophyte of thirty-one. Their relationship expressed a numinous quality accompanied by dual feelings, tinged by a certain eroticism. It appears to have been characterized by a love-hate ambivalence in which temporarily one factor or the other was ever overemphasized, projected, or repressed. On Jung's part, repressed anger toward "the father" was a significant element. (44)

In another exchange of correspondence several months later, Freud writes about his theory about the interconnection of paranoia and homosexuality. Freud refers to his relationship with Fliess and asserts that this was a case of affection turned to paranoia (in Fliess). Jung takes this as a cautionary reference to their own developing friendship and writes back:

The undeserved gift of your friendship is one of the high points in my life which I cannot celebrate with big words. This reference to Fliess--surely not accidental--and your relationship with him impels me to ask you to let me enjoy your friendship not as one between equals but as that of father and son. This distance appears to me fitting and natural. Moreover it alone, it seems to me, strikes a note that would prevent misunderstanding and enable two hard-headed people to exist alongside one another in an easy and unrestrained relationship. (Smith 26)

In March of 1909, Jung visited Freud at his home in Vienna. Jung was curious about Freud's views on parapsychology, a subject which fascinated Jung personally. Freud summarily dismissed the subject as foolishness, much to Jung's aggravation.

While Freud was going on this way, I had a curious sensation. It was as if my diaphragm were made of iron and were becoming red-hot--a glowing vault. And at that moment there was such a loud report in the bookcase, which stood right next to us, that we both started up in alarm, fearing the

thing was going to topple over on us. I said to Freud: "There, that is an example of a so-called exteriorization phenomenon."

"Oh come," he exclaimed. "That is sheer bosh." (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 155)

Piqued, Jung replied that the Professor was mistaken. As proof of his assertion, he offered Freud a promise that the supernatural phenomenon would repeat itself. He writes, "Sure enough, no sooner had I said the words than the same detonation went off in the bookcase" (155). Freud did not receive contradictions gladly. Jung writes that "this incident aroused his mistrust of me, and I had the feeling that I had done something against him" (156). Indeed the incident did have an impact on Freud's estimation of his anointed heir. In a letter to Jung dated April 16, 1909, he writes

It is remarkable that on the same evening that I formally adopted you as an eldest son, anointing you as my successor and crown prince—*in partibus infidelium*—that then and there you should have divested me of my paternal dignity, and that the divesting seems to have given you as much pleasure as investing your person gave me. Now I am afraid that I must fall back again into the role of father toward you in giving you my views on poltergeist phenomena. I must do this because these things are different from what you would like to think. (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 361)

According to Freudian mythology, "crown princes" are not supposed to contradict the king. According to Jungian mythology, the dottering old king is expected to embrace enthusiastically the fresh, insightful observations of the young prince. The scenario is straight out of Frye's description of the comedic phase in the archetypal cycle. The older generation resists giving way to the younger. Jung was incensed to be told by the reigning king that his insights into the subject of parapsychology were the equivalent of "Bottom's Dream," and that his insistence was the equivalent to wearing an ass's head. Unfortunately, the two psychologists departed from the plot. Instead of moving into comedic resolution, they drifted further apart until the final break was irreparable.

Smith suggests another reason for Freud's insistence that Jung adhere strictly to Freudian psychology/orthodoxy. He cites a correspondence that occurred between Karl Abraham and Freud during the period in which Jung was closely associated with Freud.

The Freud-Abraham correspondence helps us to understand more clearly one of the reasons for Freud's attraction to Jung: expediency. Simply

stated, Jung was a gentile and possessed a persuasive manner. He could serve as an apostle to the bourgeois Swiss and others of the wider gentile world in a period when a rapid expansion of psychoanalytic teaching was to be desired. (51)

In one of the letters to Abraham, Freud wrote, "Our Aryan comrades are really completely indispensable to us, otherwise psychoanalysis would succumb to anti-Semitism" (qtd. in Smith 52). Perhaps Freud intended to make use of Jung and saw no reason not to do so in an anti-Semitic environment that impeded his intellectual successes. His insistence upon Jung's conformity might have reflected his desire to protect his "creation," his "mythology," if you will, against any revisions by young upstarts. The old king is defending his kingdom and Jung is his messenger/soldier. Jung is expected to serve with unquestioning loyalty, to infiltrate the bulwarks of the enemy and never deviate from his task. Jung, in this scenario, would have been seen as a disciple, but never a colleague. Smith writes:

In [an] early letter Freud writes: "Don't sacrifice anything essential for the sake of pedagogic tact and affability and don't deviate so far from me when you are really so close to me for if you do we may one day be played off against one another." Freud's request is ridiculous when closely analyzed. Nonetheless Jung "dutifully" complies. In a follow-up letter Jung says, "I shall never abandon any portion of your theory that is essential to me, as I am far too committed to it." I am struck by Jung's phrase "essential to me," which suggests his adherence only to those of Freud's ideas he found useful to himself. This indicates that even at this early phase of their relationship, Jung's compliance may not have been as complete as it would seem at first glance. Again we can see that key words like *trust*, *sacrifice*, *deviation*, and *commitment* indicate that Freud expects Jung to be a "true believer" [. . .] and that Jung willingly obliges. (46)

If Jung obliges it is only temporarily—or perhaps the discontent was already present, lying dormant until a propitious moment for germination. In Freud's mind, Jung may or may not have ever been imagined as successor. The price of admission to the Freudian kingdom is clearly sworn fealty. This is the very price that Jung felt his father had paid in order to remain a Christian. "To a large degree, each man's conception of the world is dependent upon and limited by his own experience and place in it. Freud's view of a monotheistic patriarchalism in secularized form and Jung's heterodox religiosity in quest of inner certainty reflect their originators to an uncommon degree" (Smith 58). If mythologies live

us, rather than suggest modalities of living to us, then we can blame them for the ill-fated destiny of this relationship. However, I confess that this is not an opinion with which I concur.

There is a racism in Freud's letters to Abraham that might lead us to interpret Freud's fatherly overtures toward Jung as manipulation. It would help explain his effrontery at Jung's brashness. Each religion seems to put itself at the top of the hierarchy. Freud may have considered Jung to be an "other" by reason of his being a gentile.

Both Freud and Jung were invited to lecture at Clark University in Massachusetts. In late summer of 1909, they embarked upon a voyage across the Atlantic. During the crossing, the two men engaged in mutual dream analysis. Freud interpreted one of Jung's dreams as a death wish directed toward the older man. Jung felt that this was a misinterpretation. Rather, he felt that it was "an exploration of the archetypal depths of the unconscious" (Downing 27). Jung's interpretation is inflationary. He felt that the dream was revelatory of his own deep psychological insights and should have been afforded respect. Freud interprets the dream as neurotic, but also as directed toward himself. Both interpretations appear to be egotistical and shallow. When it was time to interpret one of Freud's dreams, the conflict was exacerbated.

Freud had a dream [. . .]. I interpreted it as best I could, but added that a great deal more could be said about it if he would supply me with some additional details about his private life. Freud's response to these words was a curious look—a look of the utmost suspicion. Then he said, "But I cannot risk my authority!" At that moment he lost it altogether. That sentence burned itself into my memory; and in it the end of our relationship was already foreshadowed. Freud was placing personal authority above truth. (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 158)

Like Freud, I have my suspicions. Jung seems to have been intent on collecting evidence to use against the older man. This dream interpretation had turned into a competition which Jung was determined to win. It is not surprising that Freud refused to provide additional ammunition.

On the other hand, Freud's pomposity contributed to the standoff. Once again I am reminded of the balloonist in the Wizard of Oz who, when revealed by Toto who draws

back the concealing draperies, causes the Wizard puppet to say, "Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain." Jung, like Dorothy, was discovering that wizards, kings, idols, and fathers are *all* mere mortals, regardless of how elaborately concocted and defended the persona.

The relationship continued under the pretext of an intellectual friendship. The battle continued, however, with Freud insisting on a father-son style while Jung jockeyed for the position of brilliant young colleague, soon to eclipse the professor. The tension is clear in Jung's memory of a conversation that took place in 1910.

I can still recall vividly how Freud said to me, "My dear Jung, promise me never to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see, we must make a dogma of it, and unshakable bulwark." He said that to me with great emotion, in the tone of a father saying, "And promise me this one thing my dear son: that you will go to church every Sunday." In some astonishment I asked him, "A bulwark—against what?" To which he replied, "Against the black tide of mud"—and here he hesitated for a moment, then added—"of occultism." First of all, it was the words "bulwark" and "dogma" that alarmed me; for a dogma, that is to say, an indisputable confession of faith, is set up only the aim is to suppress doubts once and for all. But that no longer has anything to do with scientific judgment; only with a personal power drive.

This was the thing that struck at the heart of our friendship. I knew that I would never be able to accept such an attitude. (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 150)

This passage evokes memories of earlier disagreements in Jung's life. "But our discussions invariably came to an unsatisfactory end. They irritated him, and saddened him. 'Oh, nonsense,' he was in the habit of saying, 'you always want to think. One ought not to think, but believe.' I would think, 'No, one must experience and know,' but I would say, 'Give me this belief,' whereupon he would shrug and turn resignedly away" (43). Jung's attitude toward his father's religion predicated on faith is transferred to Freud's obsession with sexuality. "One thing was clear: Freud, who had always made much of his irreligiosity, had now constructed a dogma; or rather, in the place of a jealous God whom he had lost, he had substituted another compelling image, that of sexuality" (151). In both men Jung perceived a mindless adherence to an orthodoxy that resisted being subjected to his own "scientific" or "empirical" criteria of evaluation. In each case, Jung saw himself as

a clear-sighted scientist and the older figure as dogmatic, blinded by prejudice. Recall the sad superiority of Jung when he writes of his father, "I was seized with the most vehement pity for my father. All at once I understood the tragedy of his profession and his life"

(Memories, Dreams, Reflections 55). The tone is the same when he writes of Freud:

There was one characteristic of his that preoccupied me above all: his bitterness. It had struck me at our first encounter, but it remained inexplicable to me until I was able to see it in connection with his attitude toward sexuality. Although, for Freud, sexuality was undoubtedly a *numinosum*, his terminology and theory seemed to define it exclusively as a biological function. (152)

Jung grew increasingly critical of Freud, but took pains to conceal it. It is doubtful that he was successful, for Freud was suspicious of him from the beginning. In Jung's own mind, he had already surpassed Freud. His tone is condescending:

Freud never asked himself why he was compelled to talk continually of sex, why this idea had taken such possession of him. He remained unaware that his "monotony of interpretation" expressed a flight from himself, or from that other side of him which might perhaps be called mystical. So long as he refused to acknowledge that side, he could never be reconciled with himself. He was blind toward the paradox and ambiguity of the contents of the unconscious, and did not know that everything which arises out of the unconscious has a top and a bottom, an inside and an outside. (152-53)

What Jung fails to see is that "paradox and ambiguity" are not inherent in dualities, particularly when those dualities are valenced as positive and negative. Jung is unable to value the insights that contradict those of his own and insists on refutation. Downing writes, "By 1912 Jung acknowledges that he is the colder of the two. He clearly wants to assert his own viewpoint, wants more approbation and agreement from Freud than he believes he gets--and more independence" (27-28). He wants more than agreement, however. He wants concession.

Jung had a dream about the impending break with Freud:

I had a dream which presaged the forthcoming break with Freud. One of the most significant had its scene in a mountainous region on the Swiss-Austrian border. It was toward evening, and I saw an elderly man in the uniform of an Imperial Austrian customs official. He walked past, somewhat stooped, without paying any attention to me. His expression was peevish, rather melancholic and vexed. There were other persons present, and someone informed me that the old man was not really there, but was the

ghost of a customs official who had died years ago. "He is one of those who still couldn't die properly." That was the first part of the dream.

I set about analyzing this dream. In connection with the "customs" I at once thought of the world "censorship." In connection with "border" I thought of the border between consciousness and the unconsciousness on the one hand, and between Freud's views and mine on the other. The extremely rigorous customs examination at the border seemed to me an allusion to analysis. At a border suitcases are opened and examined for contraband. In the course of this examination, unconscious assumptions are discovered. As for the old customs official, his work had obviously brought him so little that was pleasurable and satisfactory that he took a sour view of the world. I could not refuse to see the analogy with Freud.

At that time Freud had lost much of his authority for me. But he still meant to me a superior personality, upon whom I projected the father, and at the time of the dream this projection was still far from eliminated. (163)

The problem seems to be that Jung appears to have difficulty respecting anyone he doesn't idolize. If Freud is not really a *wizard*, an infallible seer and omniscient deity, then he is a fraud and loses all authority. Had Dorothy been so foolishly dogmatic, she would still be in Oz. Jung's desire to identify with omniscience and perfection blinds and cripples him intellectually.

Could that be the death-wish which Freud had insinuated I felt toward him? I could find no part of myself that normally might have had such a wish, for I wanted at all costs to be able to work with Freud, and, in a frankly egotistic manner, to partake of his wealth of experience. His friendship meant a great deal to me. I had no reason for wishing him dead. But it was possible that the dream could be regarded as a corrective, as a compensation or antidote for my conscious high opinion and admiration. Therefore the dream recommended a rather more critical attitude toward Freud. I was distinctly shocked by it, although the final sentence of the dream seemed to me an allusion to Freud's potential immortality. (164)

This so-called death wish may in fact be seen as Jung's juvenile insistence on the dualism of perfection or condemnation. If Freud failed the test of infallibility, which, of course, was inevitable, then he would be judged harshly and put to death metaphorically. It is unfortunate that he didn't have the temerity to cuff the ears of the young upstart. He fainted instead.

The dream may have recommended a more realistic attitude, rather than a more critical one, or the relationship would end the same way that it had with his father--estranged. Jung would find himself in self-righteous exile, a prisoner of his own rigidity. As far as the "allusion to Freud's potential immortality," no one has such potential. Some

may be remembered, but all must die. This is more wishful thinking by a young man who wished to piggy-back onto an immortal hero, a God-image.

Jung is deaf to Freud's repeated warnings that all humans are neurotic—that is, imperfect. Jung doesn't want this to be so and vehemently denies it. He wants to be able to perfect himself in order to achieve immortality. He wants a God-image that may be held as perfection and will provide a mythological map leading to such achievement. This is the basis of his psychology and his description of the process of individuation. He is determined to find the Father of his monotheistic religious tradition and to make of himself the designated heir apparent.

Freud had a neurosis, no doubt diagnosable and one with highly troublesome symptoms, as I had discovered on our voyage to America. Of course he had taught me that everybody is somewhat neurotic, and that we must practice tolerance. But I was not at all inclined to content myself with that; rather, I wanted to know how one could escape having a neurosis. Apparently neither Freud nor his disciples could understand what it meant for the theory and practice of psychoanalysis if not even the master could deal with his own neurosis. When, then, Freud announced his intention of identifying theory and method and making them into some kind of dogma, I could no longer collaborate with him; there remained no choice for me but to withdraw. (167)

They met in Munich in November of 1912. Once again Freud's suspicions that Jung harbored "parricidal wishes" (Downing 28) disrupted the meeting. Freud fainted yet again. This bizarre reaction is either evidence to the ubiquitous presence of "hysteria" in both men and women, or it is testimony to the overwhelming power of the Oedipal myth to simulate the death of the father even when the attack is purely psychological.

For Jung this fainting spell made it evident that their relationship had all along been based on fantasy. As he wrote Freud immediately after his return from Munich: "I am glad we were able to meet in Munich, as this was the first time I have really understood you. I realized how different I am from you. [. . .] I am most distressed that I did not gain this insight much earlier. It could have spared you so many disappointments." In retrospect, as we shall see, Jung will come to view these years of closeness to Freud as time spent in "cloud-cuckoo land." (Downing 28)

As the relationship deteriorated, Jung's anger and suppressed resentment became more apparent.

He [Jung] accused Freud of sniffing out the symptomatic actions in his vicinity, reducing others to the level of sons and daughters while he remained "on the top as the father, sitting pretty." The picture of Freud in a superior position would seem to evoke a childhood memory. We can see quite clearly Jung's ambivalence toward his own father, a weak and vacillating man. His anger over what he perceives to be Freud's superior position in their relationship reflects to some degree the dependence of his childhood. (Smith 59)

Jung seems to imagine Freud's metaphorical posterior dropping deprecating turds on his beloved disciples. As we shall see in our discussion of Answer to Job, Freud was to become equated with Yahweh in the mind of Jung. In this same letter, he continues:

You see, my dear Professor, so long as you hand out this stuff I don't give a damn for my symptomatic actions; they shrink to nothing in comparison with the formidable beam in my brother Freud's eye. I am not in the least neurotic—touch wood! I have submitted *lege artis et tout humblement* to analysis and am much the better for it. You know, of course, how far a patient gets with self-analysis: *not* out of his neurosis—just like you. (qtd in Downing 103).

Freud's answer attempted to maintain for himself a shred of dignity. He graciously refrained from counter-attack, but declined to take further abuse.

It is a convention among us analysts that none of us need feel ashamed of his own bit of neurosis. But one who while behaving abnormally keeps shouting that he is normal gives ground for the suspicion that he lacks insight into his illness. Accordingly, I propose that we abandon our personal relations entirely [. . . by which] you have everything to gain, in view of the remark you recently made in Munich to the effect that an intimate relationship with a man inhibited your scientific freedom. I therefore say, take your full freedom and spare me your supposed "tokens of friendship." (103)

Smith tell us that "Freud's bitterness over this challenge to his authority never disappeared. Binswanger later asked Freud how it had come about that his oldest and most talented disciples, Jung and Adler, had broken with him. Freud gave the illuminating reply: 'Precisely because they too wanted to be popes'" (Smith 60-61).

History repeated itself. The father-son ties were irrevocable severed, and Jung was left alone in his triumphant arrogance. It did not bring the satisfaction that he might have anticipated. "In his early years Jung had found the Christian myth unacceptable. Upon his break with Freud, the psychoanalytic myth also became untenable, so that for a time his psyche was without an explanatory paradigm of meaning [. . .]" (Smith 64). Jung was

once again a mythless man in a mythless world. Downing writes, "The end of the relationship plunges Jung into the long period of psychic disintegration and discovery that he describes as his 'Confrontation with the Unconscious' in his autobiography" (103). Jung finds himself in a similar situation to one described earlier regarding his rejection of his father. "My sense of union with the Church and with the human world, so far as I knew it, was shattered. I had, so it seemed to me, suffered the greatest defeat of my life" (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 56) and "[. . .] I now found myself cut off from the Church and from my father's and everybody else's faith. Insofar as they all represented the Christian religion, I was an outsider" (56).

It was such an unnecessary loss. Had Freud been less threatened and more skillful at handling the insecurities of Jung, the story might have turned out differently. Had Jung been less competitive, less eager to prove himself, had he been less insistent in his projection on to Freud a rather puerile image of the perfect father, the course of history might have been different. The obstacle to fruitful collaboration was stubborn self-righteousness on the part of both. It is speculation as to what intellectual riches might have manifested as the result of an enduring friendship between the two. Freud's deep understanding of the wisdom of the Oedipal myth might have shed some light on Jung's lifelong struggle with the father-image. Jung might have come to some deeper appreciation of sexuality. Freud's singular fixation on sexuality and on one myth might have been broadened and deepened by Jung's acceptance of shadow and continued explorations of the complexities of the unconscious. Freud might have been able to expand his archetypal awareness to encompass the richness of mythology. However, both of them barricaded themselves behind a wall of egotism--what Freud considered his "authority" and what Jung considered to be his superiority. We are all the poorer for what was sacrificed on the alter of egotism.

The God-image

Job. Answer to Job was written by C. G. Jung in 1951. He was seventy-six, had lived through two World Wars, witnessed the deterioration of Germany, the rise of Nazism, the persecution of the Jews, dropping of the atom bombs. In Job he continues to grapple with his own personal demons, as well as the evil he perceived in the world. The influence of the unresolved conflicts with Jung's father and his religion, with Freud and his psychology (his religion) and with the Judeo-Christian God are easily discernible. Jung simply could not reconcile these intertwined issues with his science and his psychology. The Book of Job is a parable which spoke to Jung. He identified with Job's sufferings and Answer to Job is his interpretation of the theology embodied within it. The preface states "[T]he history of this book can hardly be told in a few words. I have been occupied with its central problem for years. Many different sources nourished the stream of its thoughts, until one day—after long reflection—the time was ripe to put them into words" (519).

Wayne Rollins writes:

He had hesitated for many years to undertake the book, knowing its publication would cause fierce controversy. [. . .] Jung proceeded, however, because of his compulsion to "write down from the heart everything that had formed an indelible part of his life for decades." Answer to Job is a reprise of the great themes and problems with which Jung had wrestled from the beginning. As Answer to Job speaks of Job's expecting "help from God against God," it also reveals Jung expecting help from the Bible (and psychology) against the Bible as misunderstood by the Biblicistic piety and rationalistic biblical criticism that Jung had so profoundly opposed.

[Job . . .] provided a parabolic analogue and antidote to the tragic route his father's life had assumed. Jung intimates this in his autobiography, speaking of his father: "He had to quarrel with somebody, so he did it with his family and himself. Why didn't he do it with God, the dark author of all created things, who alone was responsible for the sufferings of the world? God would assuredly have sent him by way of an answer one of these magical, infinitely profound dreams which He had sent to me even without being asked, and which had sealed my fate." (20-21)

The fundamental premise of Job is that God (Jung's image of God) consists of oppositional energies, a theological schema bearing a striking similarity to Jung's conception of the human psyche. God, therefore, is both good and evil, for he is one whole consisting of all that is. Goodness cannot have existence without evil.

"Psychological experience shows that whatever we call 'good' is balanced by an equally substantial 'bad' or 'evil'" (520). Jung is revealing his own dualistic method of thinking, which determines his perception of God. Dualism is the "blue spectacles" through which he views everything. That he perceives life in this manner indicates nothing about the nature of reality. Rather it is informative regarding the way in which information is received and processed in some human minds. It is invalid to extrapolate any claim to universality. He reiterates, "The book does not pretend to be anything but the voice or question of a single individual [. . .]" (521). Nevertheless, he often has difficulty containing his proclivity for evangelism. The good pastor's son has an enthusiasm for spreading what he considers to be the true gospel.

Jung, in seeking to determine the image of God held by medieval natural philosophers, concludes that they conceived of a "complexio oppositorum" which "recalled again the story of Job" (520). "Job who expected help from God against God. This most peculiar fact presupposes a similar conception of the opposites in God" (520). "Later Christianity, however, is dualistic, inasmuch as it splits off one half of the opposites, personified in Satan, and he is eternal in his state of damnation. [. . .] If Christianity claims to be a monotheism, it becomes unavoidable to assume the opposites as being contained in God" (520). This statement makes the assumption that monotheism is compelled to be rationally consistent. This is not, and has never been the case. Consistency is a rare if not nonexistent characteristic of mythologies, particularly religious mythologies. Their collective nature precludes consistency, but does support the evolving process of various minds attempting to provide such. Just as quickly as one theologian knits up one sleeve of the tattered garment, another is busily unraveling at the hem.

In his "Prefatory Notes," Jung addresses the issue of empirical reality. Clearly he wishes to remain consistent with his Kantian foundation and to avoid conflict with the scientific community. He maintains that there are such things as "psychic truths" which "can neither be explained nor proved nor contested in any physical way." Such truths "need

no proof" (522). "Religious statements are of this type. They refer without exception to things that cannot be established as physical facts. If they did not do this, they would inevitable fall into the category of the natural sciences. Taken as referring to anything physical, they make no sense whatever, and science would dismiss them as non-experienceable" (522). The psyche is real, according to Jung, and therefore images which exist in the psyche are real. However, to leap from "reality" to "truth" exceeds the boundaries of Kantian thinking. By what criteria might we determine the truthfulness of the "non-experienceable?" There is none, contends Jung, and none is needed. "The fact that religious statements frequently conflict with the observed physical phenomena proves that in contrast to physical perception the spirit is autonomous, and that psychic experience is to a certain extent independent of physical data" (522). One might contend, however, that if psychic truths exist independently of physical data, then they live exclusively in the psyche. Therefore they are neither truth or falsehood, but products of the imagination. In the case of religious thinking, they are often constructed around a vision of how the imaginer thinks the world ought to be. He or she sometimes constructs "psychic" images out of wishful thinking. Situations and behaviors that seem to support his or her view of how the world should be are considered "good." Any which seem to threaten this schema are consequently "bad." Morality, therefore, has nothing to do with empirical truths. Sometimes these psychic concepts are consistent with the thinking of a larger collective. Upon occasion some bright idea passes from the individual into group thinking.

Of particular interest, as we examine Jung's Answer to Job, are the revelations contained in the "psychic truths" concerning the nature of the mind that constructed them. "After all, we can imagine God as an eternally flowing current of vital energy that endlessly changes shape just as easily as we can imagine him as an eternally unmoved, unchangeable essence" (523). Indeed, we can and have imagined God however we wish--as female, male or both, as animal, plant and mineral, as one and the many. We have choices about what we incorporate. Even those these images which may seem to spring from the depth of

the unconscious are mere images, aspects of our own psyches imperfectly perceived, as are *all* perceptions. If such things as Jung calls archetypes exist, they are known to us only as images. Their "absolute reality," if they have one at all, inevitably eludes us. Jung writes, "It is, in fact, impossible to demonstrate God's reality to oneself except by using images which have arisen spontaneously or are sanctified by tradition [. . .]" (526). It is, in fact, impossible to demonstrate God's reality, except as an image in the minds of human beings. Further, it is possible to endow any image with divinity. Jung's example of God in energy is as good an example as any.

"The Book of Job is a landmark in the long historical development of a divine drama" (526). Thus it is that Jung begins. The portrait of Yahweh contained in this book of the Bible is "contradictory," an "amoral" character who is "eaten up with rage and jealousy" (527). "Insight existed along with obtuseness, loving-kindness along with cruelty, creative power along with destructiveness" (527). Jung's interest, he tells us, is not with the image of God which existed in the minds of the writers of the Old Testament. Rather he is concerned "with the way in which a modern man with a Christian education and background comes to terms with the divine darkness which is unveiled in the Book of Job, and what effect it has on him" (527). We are correct in assuming that Jung refers to himself for, in the very next sentence he switches to the first person. "I shall not give a cool and carefully considered exegesis that tries to be fair to every detail, but a purely subjective reaction. In this way I hope to act as a voice for many who feel the same way as I do, and to give expression to the shattering emotion which the unvarnished spectacle of divine savagery and ruthlessness produces in us" (527). This "unvarnished spectacle" has greater dimensions than just the tribulations of Job. Considering the historical context of Jung's writing, it may be assumed to refer to the atrocities of modern world as well. "The Book of Job," he writes, "serves as paradigm for a certain experience of God which has a special significance for us today" (527).

Job is a man completely faithful to God who finds himself in the position of being persecuted by God through no fault of his own. "[H]e has to admit that no one except Yahweh himself is doing him injustice and violence. He cannot deny that he is up against a God who does not care a rap for any moral opinion and does not recognize any form of ethics as binding" (531). Yahweh is, according to Jung, "too unconscious to be moral. Morality presupposes consciousness" (534). The more Jung rails against this Old Testament God, the more it seems that he is speaking from personal experience. "The character thus revealed fits a personality who can only convince himself that he exists through his relation to an object. Such dependence on the object is absolute when the subject is totally lacking in self-reflection and therefore has no insight into himself" (534). This dogmatic Hebraic tyrant, insistent on absolute unassailable authority, unable to "deal with his own neurosis" is reminiscent of another portrait. Perhaps Jung was putting the face of Freud on the image of Yahweh. Smith concurs,

In Answer to Job Jung deals with scriptural materials in a rather idiosyncratic manner. He makes no bones about the fact that the work grew directly out of his own subjective experience. Jung focuses on Yahweh as the First Cause of all that is. By the same token, Answer to Job extends rather than withdraws projections upon the "cosmic father." Much more than the scriptural text, Jung's late work reflects both conscious and unconscious anger toward divine tyranny. Nonetheless, Jung engages in an extended revitalization of the symbolic process. His main focus is the image of God rather than Job.

In particular, Jung concentrates on Yahweh's tyrannical stance toward Job. Identifying psychologically with Job, he both explains the situation from the victim's viewpoint and projects his feelings upon Yahweh. (131).

The resentment that Jung felt toward his fallen idols, those glorified heroes who always turned out to be mere mortals, flavors his discussion. He hungers for a divine image that can contain all that is, that "everything in its totality" (Answer to Job 534) for within this container he can locate himself. Having failed to find his idol in the flesh, at seventy-six he is finally doing battle with the Judeo-Christian God. He struggles mightily to conceive of a God who would provide the omniscient figure he could never locate in life.

It appears to be the search for an image of omniscience that drives Jung. Over and over he refers to God's omniscience, to his failure to consult it, to his forgetfulness

regarding its presence. "Yahweh regrets having created human beings, although in his omniscience he must have known all along what would happen to them [. . .] the Omniscient looks into all hearts [. . .]" (535). Nowhere does Jung tell us why he is so committed to this unknowable concept. Certainly it exists nowhere in the physical realm and cannot be known empirically. Therefore, it must be one of those psychic concepts, but even the imagining of it is elusive. The best Jung can do is give us an "Omniscient" who forgets to use his abilities and misuses his powers. "Yahweh is convinced of Job's faithfulness and constancy and could moreover have assured himself beyond all doubt on this point had he taken counsel with his own omniscience" (538). Why would an omniscient being have need of constant approval and praise? Yet, Jung writes:

Loudly as his power resounds through the universe, the basis of its existence is correspondingly slender, for it needs conscious reflection in order to exist in reality. Existence is only real when it is conscious to somebody. That is why the Creator needs conscious man even though, from sheer unconsciousness, he would like to prevent him from becoming conscious. (535)

What a peculiar construct this is for an omnipotent, all-knowing God. How can he be both omniscient and unconscious simultaneously? There follows a description of God's temper tantrums should his people fail to be one hundred percent approving and attentive. Here again, Jung seems to be speaking from personal experience.

[. . .] Yahweh needs the acclamation of a small group of people. One can imagine what would happen if this assembly suddenly decided to stop the applause: there would be a state of high excitation, with outbursts of blind destructive rage, then a withdrawal into hellish loneliness and the torture of non-existence, followed by a gradual reawakening of an unutterable longing for something which would make him conscious of himself. (535)

Are we speaking of the pastor's flock or of Freud's disciples? "From the human point of view Yahweh's behavior is so revolting that one has to ask oneself whether there is not a deeper motive hidden behind it" (538). Jung feels that Yahweh knows, deep in his omniscient heart, that Job is a finer creature than he himself. "Could a suspicion have grown up in God that man possesses an infinitely small yet more concentrated light than

he, Yahweh, possesses? A jealousy of that kind might perhaps explain his behaviour" (538). Is this the story of Yahweh and Job, or of Freud and Jung?

The problem with imagining that human beings are created in the image of the divine is that it cuts both ways. Whatever qualities are imagined to exist in the Divinity must be acceptable to our image of ourselves. This is the dilemma of all theologians. Jung, in order to be consistent with his own psychological theories, includes the shadow in his concept of God. These dark aspects, however, must not encompass such sordid aspects of human nature that he feels civilized man has "outgrown," left behind in his more "primitive" beginnings. The problem with the gods of the pagans is that they were too--well, *human*. They included behaviors that simply could no longer be tolerated in polite society and therefore must be eliminated from the Divine concept. The God of the Old Testament has some major flaws, which will be corrected by the coming of Christ, but at least he was an improvement over the pagan gods with their unsavory behavior.

The powerful personality of Yahweh [. . .] had immunized him against the influence that for several centuries had been undermining the authority of the pagan gods. It was precisely the details of their mythological biography that had become their nemesis, for with his growing capacity for judgment many had found these stories more and more incomprehensible and indecent. Yahweh, however, had no origin and no past except his creation of the world, with which all history began, and his relation to that part of mankind whose forefather Adam he had fashioned in his own image as the Anthropos, the original man, by what appears to have been a special act of creation. One can only suppose that the other human beings who must also have existed at that time had been formed previously on the divine potter's wheel along with the various kinds of beasts and cattle--those human beings, namely, from whom Cain and Seth chose their wives. If one does not approve of this conjecture, then the only other possibility that remains is the far more scandalous one that they incestuously married their sisters [. . .]. (536)

The prudishness of this passage is amusing, for it must be remembered that he is writing about metaphorical stories, mythologies which carry religious teachings. It is somewhat a source of embarrassment that the authors of the Old Testament did not address the dicey issue of where the wives of Cain and Seth came from. Surely this oversight can be tidily corrected by imagining some pre-existing women produced for the purpose of propagation. Jung's problem with Yahweh is that he is so undignified--tyrannical, pompous, vulgar,

and old-fashioned. He is not nearly as refined as his son, as we shall see. He is, however, an improvement over the utterly revolting ancestors, the pagan gods. There is a puritanical unwillingness to accept the realities of origins, to rewrite the stories and leave out or modify the parts that are embarrassing. Jung combines what he considers a "modern" scientific attitude with a stuffy aversion to anything too unseemly. These renovations of the God-image do not constitute "graven images" for they are psychological, rather than morphological images. "Job realizes God's inner antinomy, and in the light of this realization his knowledge attains a divine numinosity. The possibility of this development lies, one must suppose, in man's 'godlikeness,' which one should certainly not look for in human morphology. Yahweh himself had guarded against this error by expressly forbidding the making of images" (540). The Jungian God-image is, therefore, not blasphemous, but rather a helpful refinement, along the lines of something in the consciousness of the blameless Job. "It would be a regrettable mistake if anybody should take my observations as a kind of proof of the existence of God. They prove only the existence of an archetypal God-image, which to my mind is the most we can assert about God psychologically" ("Psychology and Religion" 523). This type of making of images is the only way that any human being can know God, according to this theory. We cannot comprehend the absolute reality of the Divine. Let us make no mistake, however. What Jung includes in his God-image is, like Job's "divine numinosity," a reflection of what he finds in himself, seen through what he thinks he finds in the Biblical narrative.

Satan, in this story, is also a son of God. He is the dispossessed aspect of the Divine that Jung will ultimately include in his fourth quadrant of the God-image. It is one of Yahweh's great failings that he is duped by Satan into persecuting Job. The injustice of it outrages Jung. Had Yahweh simply been conscious enough to consult his own omniscience, he would have curtailed Satan and exalted Job. Job is without sin. "The only thing he can be blamed for is his incurable optimism in believing that he can appeal to divine justice" (541). It is Yahweh who is to blame for everything. "God does not want to

be just; he merely flaunts might over right. Job could not get that into his head, because he looked upon God as a moral being. He had never doubted God's might, but had hoped for right as well" (541). Job is right. God is wrong. Satan has crept in and alienated God from his "good" son. What kind of God would defecate on his own church/son/pastor/heir/successor? What kind of paragon of wisdom would refuse to acknowledge when the son is right about things? Surely the old man would see, if he would just stop consorting with his own evilness, that the brilliant young son is telling him the absolute truth. "[I]t is Yahweh himself who darkens his own counsel and who has no insight" (541). Don't blame Job/Jung. He tried to tell you all along. "He [Yahweh] turns the tables on Job and blames him for what he himself does: man is not permitted to have an opinion about him, and, in particular, is to have no insight which he himself does not possess" (541). The son is not allowed to question the authority of the patriarch, which is a real impediment to progress, from a Jungian standpoint. Yahweh stubbornly refuses to acknowledge his own failure. "He must have realized that, in accepting this bet [with Satan] he had done everything possible to drive his faithful servant to disloyalty" (542). Might we suppose that Jung had waited all those years for an apology from Freud? It was, from Jung's point of view, an "extremely uncomfortable fact that Yahweh had let himself be bamboozled by Satan" (542). This is a dance not with the real father or with the real Freud but with the image that Jung projected on them, and subsequently reprojected on the God of the Book of Job.

Yahweh is surpassed in consciousness by Job, not through any lack but because he has a "fear of becoming conscious" (545). The effect of this is that Job is afforded a view of the dark side of God. "The new factor is something that has never occurred before in the history of the world, the unheard-of fact that, without knowing it or wanting it, a mortal man is raised by his moral behavior above the stars in heaven, from which position of advantage he can behold the back of Yahweh [. . .]" (545). Jung and Job, by virtue of greater consciousness achieved through suffering and experience, are able to see something

of God which is not readily apparent to most. Working from a binaristic logic, this moves them to a state of superiority. The son has surpassed the father (as Frye told us would inevitably occur). Yahweh stubbornly refuses to concede. "Truly, Yahweh can do all things and permit himself all things without batting an eyelid. With brazen countenance he can project his shadow side and remain unconscious at man's expense" (546). This flawed divinity is reduced to something a bit lower than human. He is revealed to be an animal. "Yahweh is not human but, in certain respects, less than human. [. . .] Unconsciousness has an animal nature" (547). Yahweh, that relic of the Old Testament, the God of the Jews, is demoted, shuttled to the lower domains of the hierarchy, somewhere between animals and plants. Like the pagan gods, he is hopelessly out-of-date, a primitive embarrassment pointing to an earlier, less enlightened time when man was foolish enough to worship such a creature. "Like all old gods Yahweh has his animal symbolism with its unmistakable borrowings from the much older theriomorphic gods [. . .]" (547).

Jung cannot cease his attack on the poor dying God. For pages and pages he continues to rant against the injustice and blindness of this abusive tyrant. "At one moment Yahweh behaves as irrationally as a cataclysm; the next moment he wants to be loved, honoured, worshipped, and praised as just. He reacts irritably to every word that has the faintest suggestion of criticism, while he himself does not care a straw for his own moral code if his actions happen to run counter to its statutes" (549). This is a totally untrustworthy creature. He is such a failure that "man, in spite of his impotence, is set up as a judge over God himself" (549)—a legend in his own mind. Having promoted himself and Job to the position of judge over God, Jung pronounces him guilty. All this exists in the fantasy of imagination. This is a God who fails to conform to the moral standards that Jung believes he should. Jung puts these words in the mouth of Yahweh, "'This is I, the creator of all the ungovernable, ruthless forces of Nature, which are not subject to any ethical laws. I, too, am an amoral force of Nature, a purely phenomenal personality that cannot see its own back'" (549). Jung is outraged that God and nature should be exempt

from the moral laws devised by humanity. This vendetta has gone beyond his unresolved quarrels with Freud. It has expanded into a general fury at all of creation and the creator as well. The world is simply *not* the way it should be, and something must be done about it. Clearly the amoral God must be demoted and a new God raised up who will support law and order and the orthodoxy of Western, Christian, Protestant, white culture.

Jung does not seem to understand that the attempt to impose a human moral system on the world is the source of great difficulty. It is prompted by the desires of humanity to control, rule, manipulate, surpass, and so on. Regardless of how fervent or persevering the attempts, however, they are doomed to ineffectuality. There may be many deaths and widespread destruction, but nature remains amoral. This condition of existence has aggravated beyond endurance many more individuals than Jung. Despite all attempts to impose order, nature remains chaotic. Chaos continues to be amoral. Nature does in fact have a multiplicity of sides—not just front and back. Whatever side is viewed, there is no inherent evil or goodness in it. Without moral judgment there is neither evil nor good. For Jung, Yahweh's amorality is immoral, and he wants it stopped. He gives us his verdict: "The drama has been consummated for all eternity: Yahweh's dual nature has been revealed[. . .]" (550).

Job's understanding of the dual nature of God changes everything, according to Jung. If everyone else now recognizes his "back," then he is forced to recognize it himself. From this change Jung goes on to discuss the concept of brothers, the good one and the evil one. Cain is "Satan in miniature" (557) and Abel "is dearer to God" (557). From this discovery of Job's regarding the nature of Yahweh, dualism is foisted upon us "for all eternity" (550). "It is clear that this unavoidable dualism refused, then as later, to fit smoothly into the concept of monotheism, because it points to a metaphysical disunity. This split, as we know from history, had to be patched up again and again through the centuries, concealed and denied" (558). It does not occur to Jung that the reason that there is so much difficulty making it fit is because it is simplistic thinking and fundamentally

false. What Jung sees as the gift of Job is in fact a delusion. Rather than attempting to perceive what is being received by the senses, Jung is suggesting that dualism be imposed upon all conceptions. It is one thing to be oblivious to the blue spectacles and quite another to insist that everyone wear them. The Wizard of Oz created the Emerald City by requiring that all who entered wear green spectacles. Perhaps we might call these of Jung's bifocals.

Throughout Answer to Job, there is an eerie sense that Jung is treating this story as fact. He loses sight of the allegorical nature because he identifies so closely with Job. In his mind, the characters actually did live out this drama, for the personae are but masks of the people he knew and the events of his life. This was true not only of his relationships with father figures, but of the women in his life as well.

It nevertheless remains a *strange fact* [italics mine] that the original man who was created in the image of God had, according to tradition, two wives, just like his heavenly prototype. Just as Yahweh is legitimately united with his wife Israel, but has a feminine pneuma as his intimate playmate from all eternity, so Adam first had Lilith (the daughter or emanation of Satan) to wife, as a Satanic correspondence to Sophia. Eve then would correspond to the people of Israel. (559)

This perpetual dichotomy of the good woman and the evil woman is a particularly damaging mythical scourge on humanity. Perhaps Jung made this distinction between Emma Jung and Toni Wolff, or perhaps he saw some of both in each. Whichever was the case, the virgin/whore duality makes yet another appearance in the mythology and seems to have affected the behaviour of real people.

[. . .]It is clear from the historical development that Yahweh had lost sight of his pleromatic co-existence with Sophia since the days of the Creation. Her place was taken by the covenant with the chosen people, who were thus forced into the feminine role. At that time the people consisted of a patriarchal society in which women were only of secondary importance. God's marriage with Israel was therefore an essentially masculine affair [. . .]. The inferiority of women was a settled fact. Woman was regarded as less perfect than man, as Eve's weakness for the blandishments of the serpent amply proved. *Perfection* is a masculine desideratum, while woman inclines by nature to *completeness*. And it is a fact that, even today, a man can stand a relative state of perfection much better and for a longer period than a woman, while as a rule it does not agree with women and may even be dangerous for them. If a woman strives for perfection she forgets the complementary role of completeness, which, though imperfect by itself, forms the necessary counterpart to perfection. For, just as completeness is

always imperfect, so perfection is always incomplete, and therefore represents a final state which is hopelessly sterile. (561)

These "facts" border on the nonsensical. The distinction between perfection and completeness seems quite strange until we ascertain what Jung is trying to establish here. It has been possible for males to attain and maintain the improbable distinction of a "relative state of perfection" (an oxymoron is there ever were one) providing they can allocate their less savory aspects (their "back" sides) to the domain of the feminine. According to this schema, women, by reason of their natural, historically established inferiority may find a useful role for themselves in this complementary quarter embodying the dark, the evil, the disgusting, the repellent. For them to do otherwise is a sin against nature and actually constitutes significant danger. The nature of this danger is not identified here. Historically, however, it has taken the form of abuse by indignant fathers and husbands, somewhat along the lines described by Jung regarding Yahweh—"jealous and mistrustful like any other husband" (562). The illusion of perfection in the male has been authorized archetypally by Western theology and further perverted into a sacred charge to be carried by the feminine vessel. She is expected to remain permanently pregnant with reverence for mankind.

Having conceded that Yahweh falls short of perfection, it is necessary to try again. The Son of God is therefore slated to appear—a new and improved model of the Godhead. His feminine aspect poses somewhat of a dilemma, for she must not be sordid; no lingering odor of Lilith may be wafting about. Her dark femininity must be of the purest kind. "Thus Mary, the virgin, is chosen as the pure vessel for the coming birth of God. Her independence of the male is emphasized by her virginity as the *sine qua non* of the process" (564). This neatly solves the problem of being born of sin and avoids the heretofore required step of rejecting the Terrible Mother once her true nature is revealed. Mary gets to stay virginal through labor and delivery. "Mary is elevated to the status of a goddess and consequently loses something of her humanity: she will not conceive her child in sin, like all other mothers [and fathers?], and therefore he also will never be a human being, but a

god" (565). Unlike mortals, Mary and her child Jesus are afforded miraculous lives. He can be perfect and she may complement that perfection by remaining virginal. According to Jung, this maneuver "queers the pitch for a genuine Incarnation of God. [. . .] Both mother and son are not real human beings at all, but gods" (565). For Jung, with his dualistic mode of thinking, it appears to be an either/or proposition. "This arrangement, though it had the effect of exalting Mary's personality in the masculine sense by bringing it closer to the perfection of Christ, was at the same time injurious to the feminine principle of imperfection or completeness, since this was reduced by the perfectionizing tendency to the little bit of imperfection that still distinguishes Mary from Christ" (565). This "little bit of imperfection," it is assumed, has something to do with her anatomy.

If God is present in all things, Jung asks, why would this incarnation be necessary? "One would like to say that Christ had to appear in order to deliver mankind from evil. But when one considers that evil was originally slipped into the scheme of things by Satan, and still is, then it would seem simpler if Yahweh would, for once, call this 'practical joker' severely to account, get rid of his pernicious influence, and thus eliminate the root of all evil" (568). (Perhaps the problem is that Lilith "abandoned" the little devil when he was growing up.) There is an even greater purpose for the birth of Christ, the improvement of God himself. "One should make clear to oneself what it means when God becomes man. It means nothing less than a world-shaking transformation" (568). The advent of Christ is a second creation, an evolutionary move toward perfection as manifest in human form. "At the time of Creation he revealed himself in Nature; now he wants to be more specific and become man" (569). There is an unspoken distinction here between nature and humanity. It is unclear whether Jung holds that this move means God has evacuated nature and relocated to mankind (never womankind). Perhaps the God in nature was too closely aligned with the pagan gods.

What, then, is the real reason for the Incarnation as an historical event?
[. . .] Yahweh evidently has a disinclination to take his absolute knowledge
into account as a counterbalance to the dynamism of omnipotence.[. . .]

That is because he never consults his omniscience. We can only explain this on the assumption that Yahweh was so fascinated by his successive acts of creation, so taken up with them, that he forgot about his omniscience altogether. (570)

This most unholy failure of omniscience is the source of Yahweh's ignorance of Satan's behavior and the abominable treatment of poor Job. However, there is marked improvement. "It is only the careful and farsighted preparations for Christ's birth which show us that omniscience has begun to have a noticeable effect on Yahweh's actions. A certain philanthropic and universalistic tendency makes itself felt" (571). Yahweh is finally becoming the kind of God that Jung wants him to be. He is beginning to conform to the "image" of what a real God should be like--perfect and unfailingly omniscient. Job, by reason of his being "morally higher than Yahweh" (572) has opened the doors for new possibilities. Yahweh's acknowledgment "that the man Job is morally superior to him and that therefore he has to catch up and become human himself" (572-73) marks the beginning of a revolution of such magnitude that it constitutes a whole new creation. Jung would probably have been willing to perform such a service for Freud had the old man not been so stubborn. "To sum up: the immediate cause of the Incarnation lies in Job's elevation, and its purpose is the differentiation of Yahweh's consciousness" (573-74).

Jung has strayed a long way from his assertion that the gods exist as images in the psyche. He handles this drama as if he were required to make some sense of hard historical data. He struggles to make the story fit his own personal interpretation, which is pretty much what all humans do with mythologies. However, I have the feeling he has lost his way in the "metaphorist" (meta-forest). I am reminded of an expression of the Sixties which seems to cover my perception of these passages. Jung seems to be "smoking his own dope." He has anticipated these objections to his references to "facts."

In view of these portentous impossibilities, it has been assumed, perhaps as the result of a growing impatience with the difficult factual material, that Christ was nothing but a myth, in this case no more than a fiction. But myth is not fiction: it consists of facts that are continually repeated and can be observed over and over again. It is something that happens to man, and men have mythical fates as much as the Greek heroes do. The fact that the life of Christ is largely myth does absolutely nothing to disprove its factual truth--

quite the contrary. I would even go so far as to say that the mythical character of a life is just what expresses its universal human validity. It is perfectly possible, psychologically, for the unconscious or an archetype to take complete possession of a man and to determine his fate down to the smallest detail. (577)

Jung is stating quite clearly that these archetypes live for him in his psyche. The mistreatment of Job and the perfection of Christ live for him in a factual way—as images which "determine his fate."

What is the nature of this new version of the patriarchal God? Lest we jump to the conclusion that Christ represents a universal love which holds all of creation to be divine, Jung establishes quite quickly the boundaries between the Innies and the Outies. The purpose of mythology, as Campbell suggests and Jung reinforces, is to keep some people out—or at least in their place.

Christ's love of mankind is, however, limited to a not inconsiderable degree by a certain predestinarian tendency which sometimes causes him to withhold his salutary message from those who do not belong to the elect. If one takes the doctrine of predestination literally, it is difficult to see how it can be fitted into the framework of the Christian message. But taken psychologically, as a means of achieving a definite effect, it can readily be understood that these allusions to predestination give one a feeling of distinction. If one knows this one has been singled out by divine choice and intention from the beginning of the world, then one feels lifted beyond the transitoriness and meaninglessness of ordinary human existence and transported to a new state of dignity and importance, like the one who has a part in the divine world drama. (575-76)

This is as clear an expression of the "back" side of Jung as I can imagine.

The desire to exalt ourselves above and beyond others, to establish an inflated perception of ourselves as "fact" may well be the reason for the creation of mythologies, for literature, drama, psychology, and religion. "There can be no doubt that man's importance is enormously enhanced if God himself deigns to become one" (579)—in his own mind, at least. Perhaps our mythologies have no greater purpose than to convince our puny selves that we are special, "beyond transitoriness." Such transformation is, however, beyond the power of myth. Ephemeral creatures we remain, nonetheless. Our role in the divine drama is no more consequential than that of other creatures. These distinctions of

importance and superiority, of perfection versus completion, are human imaginings—not divine predestination. Perhaps this sort of self-delusion makes life more bearable for some, but it does not alter the conditions of existence.

The birth and death of Christ has somewhat redeemed Yahweh, but not entirely. Although perfection is possible for the son, the father is not so fortunate. "One must admit that it would be contrary to all reasonable expectations to suppose that a God who, for all his lavish generosity, had been subject to intermittent but devastating fits of rage ever since time began could suddenly become the epitome of everything good" (580). Of course not. Just because we accepted that virgin birth story doesn't mean we will believe in miraculous transformations. "[. . .] Christ's victory over his brother Satan [. . .] is not really and truly won" (581). We should expect a "final and mighty manifestation of Satan" which, Jung tells us, "will be put into operation by the figure of the Antichrist after the preordained thousand years are over the term allotted by astrology to the reign of Christ" (581). This story is taking on nightmarish qualities. However, there's a happy ending coming, sort of.

The continuing direct operation of the Holy Ghost on those who are called to be God's children implies, in fact, a broadening process of incarnation. Christ, the son begotten by God, is the first-born who is succeeded by an ever-increasing number of younger brothers and sisters. These are, however, neither begotten by the Holy Ghost nor born of a virgin. This may be prejudicial to their metaphysical status, but their merely human birth will in no sense endanger their prospects of a future position of honour at the heavenly court, nor will it diminish their capacity to perform miracles. Their lowly origin (possibly from the mammals) does not prevent them from entering into a close kinship with God as their father and Christ as their brother. In a metaphorical sense, indeed, it is actually a "kinship by blood," since they have received their share of the blood and flesh of Christ, which means more than mere adoption. These profound changes in man's status are the direct result of Christ's work of redemption. (584).

Is Jung referring to archetypal images, characters in the mythological drama, or real "mammals" predestined to be the "elect"? The transubstantiation miraculously to circumvent the unfortunate aspects of adoption is incomprehensible.

The dual nature of Yahweh is ever present. He is to be both feared and loved. This is Jung's perception of the divine in his late seventies and was from his first imaginings of a God who would defecate on his own church and on the pastor who ministered there. The

ambiguity that Jung expresses toward Yahweh is the ambiguity that he felt toward all those things he felt to be "numinous" in life. Jung's struggles with the Book of Job, while maddening to a contemporary feminist, are also quite poignant, for Jung seeks to make sense of an insane world where the deity is irreverent and world order seems to be a mirage.

Since the apocalypse we now know again that God is not only to be loved, but also to be feared. He fills us with evil as well as with good, otherwise he would not need to be feared; and because he wants to become man, the uniting of his antinomy must take place in man. This involves man in a new responsibility. He can no longer wriggle out of it on the plea of his littleness and nothingness, for the dark God has slipped the atom bomb and chemical weapons into his hands and given him the power to empty out the apocalyptic vials of wrath on his fellow creatures. Since he has been granted an almost godlike power, he can no longer remain blind and unconscious. He must know something of God's nature and of metaphysical processes if he is to understand himself and thereby achieve gnosis of the Divine. (638-39)

It is difficult to conceive of an explanation as to why Jung, with his vast understanding of human behavior, would cling so tenaciously to this equating of the Self with the Judeo-Christian concept, structured by patriarchy for specific self-serving socio-economic motives. The moral implications of Christianity troubled him all his life. He seems to feel that the very mythologies to which Western civilization clings are in fact the source of their pathologies—a sickening religious orthodoxy rather than a healing one. This being so, why would he wish to claim this tradition as the contents of his own and the universal, collective unconscious? Why would this empiricist fail to notice that his religious schema leaves out so much of his world? Wayne Rollins, in an essay on "Psychology, Hermeneutics, and the Bible" offers a plausible explanation. "Jung's life and work attest to dependence on, investment in, and commitment to the Bible, its world-picture and world-view, its archetypal images and symbols, and its interpretation in the modern world to a degree unparalleled in the life and work of any twentieth-century psychologist" (13). Jung's discomfort with the Bible is entangled with his unresolved issues concerning his father. "It was the tragedy of my youth," Jung writes, 'to see my father cracking up before

my eyes on the problem of his faith and dying an early death" (Rollins 16). In Answer to Job, Jung attempts what might be recognized as a kind of Freudian talking cure. This is all good and wholesome, but he should have burned the manuscript. "His father's death marked the beginning of a project for Jung, vindicating his father's life, his father's religion, and his father's commitment to the Bible, albeit from a "psychological" perspective[. . .]" (18).

Answer to Job. . . poured out of him as though it came from an underground spring. Commentators have noted that this work, as indeed much of his creative writing, resulted from an activation of his own unconscious processes. It was begun in the Spring of 1951, when he was experiencing a debilitating illness. When the book was completed, his illness was over. To Aniela Jaffé in July 1951 he wrote: "If there is anything like the spirit seizing one by the scruff of the neck, it was the way this book came into being." (Smith 131)

This description of the material is characteristic of that which Wehr discusses as being regarded as "transcendent and revealed." Such revelations of God which are purported to be directly received by a chosen one are, according to the mythology, exempt from examination or resistance. They may occur during periods of divine illness, disorientation, confusions, and nightmarish hallucinations, but they are elevated to the status of revelations. Like the ten commandments, we are expected to accept them as coming from an unassailable authority. Jung is asking why his father did not avail himself of the same methodology for the reconciliation of doubt and the establishment of authority. Jung fails to dignify his father's religious doubts and suffering. Rather he feels that his father should have resolved these issues expediently. These are the very issues which Jung himself is unable to resolve satisfactorily, without having to fall back on the fail-safe method of crediting revelation. Jung seems to be taking the position that The Father and he are one and that He spoke to Jung. Therefore, what Jung says is what He says, and that which Jung speaks is the Word of God.

Jungian quaternity. In 1996 Edward F. Edinger published The New God-Image. He introduces his discussion as follows:

We are right on the verge of witnessing the birth of a new God-image as a result of Jung's work. It is an idea Jung developed most explicitly in his book Answer to Job. "[. . .]he development of the God-image is not just a cultural process but is also an evolutionary process, something which has a biological substrate." [. . .]he God-image is a living entity, a living process that moves, that unfolds, that develops and undergoes transformations." (xiii)

This "new God-image" was also articulated quite clearly in one of Jung's lectures.

"Originally written in English and delivered in 1937, at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, as the fifteenth series of 'Lectures on Religion in the Light of Science and Philosophy' under the auspices of the Dwight Harrington Terry Foundation"

("Psychology and Religion" 469). In this lecture Jung argues that the Trinity is an imperfect representation of God. "The use of the comparative method shows without a doubt that the quaternity is a more or less direct representation of the God who is manifest in his creation" (523). Jung's predilection for fours has more to do with the habits of his mind than with the absolute reality of the divine. He is unable to think except in terms of time, space, and binarisms—his "categories of knowing." Had we not examined closely Answer to Job, we might have anticipated a schema comprised of a pair of pairs. However, what we are given is three plus one. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are joined by one large lump of disgusting evil. "*The feminine, the devil and matter have been left out* [italics mine]" (Edinger, New God Image 92).

I cannot refrain from calling attention to the interesting fact that whereas the central Christian symbolism is a Trinity, the formula presented by the unconscious is a quaternity. In reality the orthodox Christian formula is not quite complete, because the dogmatic aspect of the evil principle is absent from the Trinity and leads a more or less awkward existence on its own as the devil. ("Psychology and Religion" 524)

Jung modestly defers credit for this startling revelation. "The inclusion of the devil in the quaternity is by no means a modern speculation[. . .]" (524). We are assured by numerous examples from the sixteenth-century writings of Gerard Dorn that this dark quarter of God's nature has existed for centuries. Nevertheless, "modern" thinking has refined the concept by incorporating the feminine and the material world in the domain of the repressed and pronounced it diabolical.

[T]he quaternity as produced by the modern psyche points directly not only to the God within, but to the identity of God and man. Contrary to the dogma, there are not three, but four aspects. It could easily be inferred that the fourth represents the devil. Though we have the logion "I and the Father are one: who seeth me seeth the Father," it would be considered blasphemy or madness to stress Christ's dogmatic humanity to such a degree that man could identify himself with Christ and his *homoousia*. But this is precisely what seems to be meant by the natural symbol. From an orthodox standpoint, therefore, the natural quaternity could be declared a *diabolica fraus*, and the chief proof of this would be its assimilation of the fourth aspect which represents the reprehensible part of the Christian cosmos. (526)

Jung blithely continues:

[The Trinity] is of exclusively masculine character. The unconscious, however, transforms it into a quaternity, which is at the same time a unity, just as the three persons of the Trinity are one and the same God. The natural philosophers of antiquity represented the Trinity, so far as it was *imaginata in natura*, as the three *asomata*, or "spirits," also called "volatilia," namely water, air, and fire. The fourth constituent, on the other hand, was *to somaton*, the earth or the body. They symbolized the latter by the Virgin. In this way they added the feminine element to their physical Trinity, thereby producing the quaternity or *circulus quadratus*, whose symbol was the hermaphroditic *rebis*, the *filius sapientiae*. The natural philosophers of the Middle Ages undoubtedly meant earth and woman by the fourth element. The principle of evil was not openly mentioned, but it appears in the poisonous quality of the *prima materia* and in other allusions. The quaternity in modern dreams is a creation of the unconscious. [. . . T]he unconscious is often personified by the anima, a feminine figure. Apparently the symbol of the quaternity issues from her. She would be the matrix of the quaternity, a *Theotokos* or *Mater Dei*, just as the earth was understood to be the Mother of God. But since woman, as well as evil, is excluded from the Deity in the dogma of the trinity, the element of evil would form part of the religious symbol is the latter should be a quaternity. It needs no particular effort of imagination to guess the far-reaching spiritual consequences of such a development. (527-28).

Notice how cleverly poor deposed Freud gets amalgamated into the God-image as part of this fourth quadrant. Jung can have his cake and eat it too, so to speak. "Sexuality is of the greatest importance as the expression of the chthonic spirit. That spirit is the 'other face of God,' the dark side of the God-image" (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 168). Mother gets included as well, the "Terrible Mother" who abandons and engages in lascivious practices which sully the near-perfect father. For purposes of exposition, I drag up one of Jung's earliest memories.

I was suffering, so my mother told me afterward, from general eczema. Dim intimations of trouble in my parents' marriage hovered around me. My illness, in 1878, must have been connected with a temporary separation of my parents. My mother spent several months in a hospital in Basel, and presumably her illness had something to do with the difficulty in the marriage. An aunt of mine, who was a spinster and some twenty years older than my mother, took care of me. I was deeply troubled by my mother's being away. From then on, I always felt mistrustful when the word "love" was spoken. The feeling I associated with "woman" was for a long time that of innate unreliability. "Father," on the other hand, meant reliability and—powerlessness. That is the handicap I started off with. Later, these early impressions were revised: I have trusted men friends and been disappointed by them and I have mistrusted women and was not disappointed. (8)

Ambiguity is the mark of this last statement. Possibly Jung would have been quite disappointed to discover a trustworthy female. It would not have changed his mind, however. The perfectibility of the male is an established "fact." The superiority of the male human being over the female is established primarily by the control of the patriarchy, by the historical context and by the insistence by men that it is so. It is unknowable to what extent the women who have lived in patriarchies have accepted this premise. However, Jung refuses to see this as the effect of his subjective experience on his perceptions.

Let us examine this emerging "new God-Image" described by Jung, proselytized by Edinger. The Christian aeon is mythically imagined as a trinity. It originates with God the Father/Yahweh, an unconscious, abusive slob of a God who fails to consult his omniscience and ends up causing a lot of trouble. Poor Job has to suffer greatly before Yahweh sobers up enough to notice that He has behaved badly. Job shows Yahweh the way out of total unconsciousness. (Remember who Job is?) Yahweh offers us Jesus by way of restitution and we have the second leg of this three-legged stool. Jesus is All Good. Jung discovers the Unconscious, which is really the Holy Spirit, and presto, we have our Trinity. The third aspect of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, offers "restitution of the original oneness of the unconscious on the level of consciousness" (Edinger, New God Image 59). It is only through the grace of human assistance (and only the most individuated humans) that God progresses from monster to Savior. Freud thought he had discovered the

Holy Spirit, but it turns out to be sex--the devil and Mary, the Jewish mother. There we have our tidy foursome.

[. . . T]he Father by descending from the cosmic immensity became the least by incarnating himself within the narrow bounds of the human soul [. . .]. Doubtless the presence of the Holy Spirit enlarges human nature by divine attributes. Human nature is the divine vessel and as such the union of the Three. This results in a kind of quaternity which always signifies totality, while the triad is rather a process, but never the natural division of the circle, the natural symbol of wholeness. The quaternity as union of the Three seems to be aimed at by the Assumption of Mary. This dogma adds the feminine element to the masculine Trinity, the terrestrial element (virgo terra!) to the spiritual, and thus sinful man to the Godhead. (Jung qtd. in Edinger, 102)

Edinger comments, that Jung "[. . .] is referring to the dogma of the Assumption of Mary into heaven [. . .] which he thinks is such a major event for our collective psychology. The result is that the Trinity has had a fourth personage added to it--namely, Mary.

Symbolically she brings the attributes of matter, flesh, and humanity--sinful humanity" (102).

Edinger synthesizes Jung's historical stages of Western God-image--animism to matriarchy to hierarchical polytheism to tribal monotheism to universal monotheism to the discovery of psyche and the process of individuation (xv). "These stages form an historical sequence. At the same time, these historical stages are also layers of the collective unconscious" (xv). Later Edinger provides four historical stages of Western religion, each having a psychological equivalent. Antiquity (superstition, omen) was followed by the appearance of ancient Judaism (covenant, law), followed by Christianity (love, faith and loyalty) (35-36). The fourth phase, the "New God-image" is "experience."

The superstitious phase will refer to an openness to the unconscious on the part of a weak and undeveloped ego. It is something one would find in childhood, the apotropaic [acts] [to ward off evil] of childhood. . . . The legal phase corresponds to a condition in which the ego relates to the transpersonal authority with great emphasis on rules and precepts, maybe even compulsive preoccupation with correct behavior, even to the extreme of informing on those who violate the rules. Law (and rule) is the operative term. For those for whom the ego-Self relation is largely determined by love or faith, a feeling of an attachment to an ideal, a principle or a beloved model of some kind will dominate. Then there is the fourth phase, the psychological phase, in which there is a living experience of the psyche and

its transpersonal center, which in a certain sense involves a return to number one. (38-39)

Jung says that "Individuation is only for the few" (qtd. in Edinger, New God Image 59). Even if Jung intends this statement to apply to conscious individuation (for everyone undergoes an unconscious process of individuation), this is the psychological equivalent of the "elect." Edinger implies that outside of Job, Jung, and himself, very few will make the cut.

Edinger characterizes belief systems, specifically those of analysts, as "boats" which "keep one afloat on the sea of the collective unconscious" (10). "These belief systems are based on one's subjective experience; we have no other basis for them. Either they derive from past experience taken over from someone else--which is still our subjective experience--or from our own individual experience" (10). This discussion has been a speculation regarding the nature of the vessel which has ferried Jung to the point that he would believe that the God-image is a quaternity composed of the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost and a conglomeration of matter, evil and femininity.

Edinger's description of the state of the world reveals his filters, his "blue spectacles." They bear a marked resemblance to Jung's. "The modern world is in a state of desperate darkness. It is visible to us. We do not have to be very perceptive to look about us to see that warring opposites are tearing the world apart. They are exposing the world to an onslaught of darkness" (61). Yet Edinger is arguing for the perpetuation of this concept of "warring opposites," as if there were no alternative points of view. Who are they to which he refers? Notice that it is not "we" who are engaged in this destruction, but "they"--the Other, the unindividuated, the unelected. In a world of warring opposites, it is important that "they" be on the side of wrong, for "we" certainly can not entertain the idea that we might be in that domain. "We" are jostling for possession of the throne of righteousness. In order to maintain occupancy, one must identify the "other," the "they," as demonic and sinister. The throne of righteousness is available only to the most "individuated" among us--a short list. The entire Jungian panoply of Jungian saints may

consist of Jung, Job and, most recently, Edinger. There are, however, many aspirants. There are other varieties of zealots who ascribe to different criteria, as we have seen in earlier chapters. In reality, anyone who persists in dualistic thinking perpetuates conflict, and that includes Jung, Edinger, and the rest of "us." It is a hard habit to break. The illusion that there are absolute opposites, good and evil, inevitably leaves "us" fighting "them" over toy trophies we have endowed with the qualities of the Holy Grail through the power of myth. The philosophy of opposites leads not out of destruction, but into it. It elevates controversy to the level of Divine Right versus Diabolical Wrong. It does not eliminate war; it justifies it. The glory of victory is sweetened by the assurance that God was truly on our side. This is a religious mythology that kills.

Furthermore, God is "dimly conscious" and the world was created by a purposeful agent who "is almost blind" (Edinger 77). What Jung fails to acknowledge, it seems, is that this blind purposeful agent is a psychological construct created in the minds of a group of human beings who mistakenly identify themselves as creators of the great All There Is. This constitutes a blindness of colossal proportions. Just as Jung did, these human containers of a God-image begin to imagine that they *really are the creator*. Jung distinguishes the God-image from the Divine, but he falls down the fundamentalist rabbit hole nonetheless. Edinger identifies two statements that he believes are the basic principles of the "New God-Image" articulated by Jung, most particularly in Answer to Job. Edinger writes, "The two statements are these. *The creator sees himself through the eyes of man's consciousness, and consciousness is a second world-creator*" (89-90).

I would contend that mankind *is* the creator of the consciousness to which he refers, although I doubt that any image is universal. (Whether or not the females included in mankind were equally responsible for this creation is a separate topic. Probably some did, but perhaps not all.) Secondly, this "second world" is a psychic construct, having nothing to do with the world as it exists, except as our perception of it is colored by our archetypes, expectations, paradigms or what have you. A "God-image" is a personification

of the numinous, patched together over centuries, modified to fit changing historical agendas (political, economic, social and psychological), favoring certain points of view and tailored to consistency with the accepted paradigms of the moment. This "God-image" has nothing to do with Divinity and everything to do with humanity. It can be a mishmash of Big Brother, Fairy Godmother, Santa Claus, Angry God, Guardian Angel, Angry Avenger, and a Flaming Sword. It is whatever we imagine it to be and it is imaginary. We imagine ourselves to be the center of our universe and therefore our "God" complies by obligingly creating us in His own image and vice versa. Some people grow out of it. Some don't. The best that might be said is about this "God-image" is that it is not universal, for if it were, there would be no possibility for imagining or perceiving anything else. Forced compliance with orthodoxy, i.e. agreement with some imagined "God-image" has generated an abundance of human behavior which I would consider evil, but which various favored orthodoxies would not. We can easily locate the Bad, the Evil, in "God." His creators put it there and proceed to cram their beliefs down the throats of the heretics. The bottom line, for Jung, concerns suffering. He is personally seeking an answer to a confusing world following a abominable war. Looking to blame, he comes to the bizarre conclusion that "Man's suffering does not derive from his sins but from the maker of his imperfections, the paradoxical God" (Jung qtd. in Edinger, New God Image 115). Man's suffering derives from his own limited perceptions, from his own blindness which allows him to imagine a "God-image" that is anthropocentric, sexist, racist, skewed in every way imaginable. Our suffering is of our own making, just as is our "God-image." We suffer when the world does not appear to us as we wish for it to, when we judge it to be lacking, evil, wrong or hurtful.

Logical quaternity, a modest proposal. Logic seems to have been abandoned regarding the construction of this quaternity as described by Jung and Edinger. Working within the odious binarisms, the obvious quaternity would be Holy Spirit as undifferentiated feminine, in the same way that Yahweh originally meant whole masculine.

The fourth component would be woman as daughter, in the same way that Christ was son. If Yahweh is imagined to represent the dark and light of masculine divinity, the Holy Spirit could carry the equivalent for the feminine. The one and the many.

MALE		FEMALE	
male	female	female	male

Was Jung was so blinded by patriarchal tradition that this possibility escaped him, or did he find the idea of feminine deity personally so repugnant that he felt compelled to demonize all of womankind? The Jungian quaternity is a schema which is inconsistent theology.

DIVINE	HUMAN
Father	Son (sinless)
Holy Spirit	Mary (sinful)

It is important to consider why Mary, as emblem of sinful humanity, would be conceived of as virginal. It seems that a different kind of figure might more appropriately carry this archetypal image, for _implies purity. As pairs of opposites, these don't really work. How does Holy Spirit oppose Mary? Is Holy Spirit some sort of transformed Yahweh, by way of Job and Jesus? This whole system seems theologically contrived for the sole purpose of supporting Jung's archetypal theories. Moreover, it is difficult to see how this might serve the human race, the planet Earth and all the creatures who share it with us. To say that it "privileges" one element of a binarism, is putting it altogether too mildly. It justifies, skews, aggrandizes, and rationalizes on the part of one side and disempowers, demonizes, vilifies, ostracizes, and damns the other.

If we are able to imagine a God, why not imagine the most useful divine entity or entities possible? For those who insist upon dualities, there are other, less pejorative constructs. Suppose that the quaternity were based on the separation of spirit and matter, or spirit and soul. In this schema, we could have growing up and growing down. Growing up, ascension toward spirit, might be imagined as masculine, whereas growing down, descension into soul, might be feminine. Matter might be conceived of as divine made flesh, both feminine and masculine.

SOUL

Mother/Father God/dess (poly, matriarchal)

Woman (woman/man)

SPIRIT

Holy Spirit (mono, patriarchal)

Man (man/woman)

This, I think, more accurately reflects current trends in spiritual thinking. I am more inclined to endorse this construct rather than accept several more millennia of equating women, plants, animals, and matter with evil.

Conclusion

Review of Chapters

In this cross-disciplinary amble, I have attempted an exploration of the manner in which story-telling affects our lives. In order to gain a variety of perspectives, I have focused on the work of a mythologist, a literary critic, and a depth psychologist.

Initially I examined Joseph Campbell's descriptions of what he considers to be the four functions of mythology. These describe some of the ways in which myths can strengthen a sociocultural set of beliefs through initiation and/or indoctrination. Campbell's view of mythology is that it describes "the way, the truth, and the light" and provides guidance for right and proper behavior. Myth establishes and maintains order. It separates the sacred from the profane. It establishes an immutable hierarchy. This I have termed the power of orthodoxy. If myths have the power to confirm and sustain, as Campbell suggests, then it is possible that they also have the power to deny and undermine. I provided examples of stories which function contrary to orthodoxy, stories which are cosmologically disorienting, sociologically revolutionary, psychologically disturbing and metaphysically mystifying. These I consider to be heretical stories. Myths are more powerful than even Campbell was able (or perhaps willing) to acknowledge. The actions we take and the stories we tell, both to ourselves and to others, affect the way in which we live our lives, individually and collectively.

This analysis opens up new areas of inquiry. The heretical schema I have outlined is merely a mirroring of Campbell's identified four functions. Thus my additions have the rather unfortunate drawback of being dualistic. One of the characteristics of dualisms is that they are always over-simplifications. Therefore, although myths may frequently function in just these eight ways, it is probable that they function in other ways as well. Mythologies are mercurial, elusive, fluid creations which defy bottling and labeling of their contents.

In the second chapter I considered Campbell's best-known mythological formula--his monomyth. "[. . . T]here's one mythology in the world," he wrote, which "has been

inflected in various cultures in terms of their historical and social circumstances and needs and particular ethic systems [. . .]" (Hero's Journey 127). This chapter examines the ramifications of this singular view and points out that there are human experiences which are not contained in this *one* mythological scheme.

William Doty describes the structure of the monomyth as "an expansion of the fundamental tripartite narrative pattern of our culture's literature: problem/savior/resolution [. . .]" ("From the Traditional Monomythic Hero" 341). Campbell labels these parts the separation, the trials, and the return. I look at each of these three phases identify some problematic elements, and consider it as a moral and psychological guide for contemporary living.

Chapter 3 contains a discussion of Northrop Frye's theory of myth, a model which he terms "archetypal criticism" and which is loosely based upon a Jungian quaternity. Frye's fourfold model is an expanded version of the monomyth, containing many of the same elements described by Campbell. Frye's model purports to circumscribe Western literature, particularly literature written in the English language. His careful outline of patriarchal orthodoxy is quite helpful in determining what kinds of human experiences and voices have been repressed, banished or vilified as being unfit for inclusion in the body of "literature" (as opposed to mere writing).

In the fourth chapter I applied these literary distinctions to Mark Twain's twin brother novels--The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. The two novels mirror one another, the former being the voice of a type of nineteenth century American conservatism (which included slavery) and the later novel, Huck Finn, being the vehicle for social criticism, particularly of slavery. The later novel I label heretical. Once again I find myself working in a dualistic model despite my aversion to it. Nonetheless, the contrast is sufficiently enlightening to warrant the discussion. I would point out that most of Twain's novels are a mixture. He is not always so easily categorized, which is to his credit.

In chapter 5 I looked at C. G. Jung's "story" about his image of God. I tried to identify some (and by no means all) of the intellectual, psychological, and spiritual factors which affected his internal image of the divine. I considered his interest in Kant and discussed how I perceive Jung to have understood Kant. I speculated that Jung might have felt Kant to be an intellectual father figure, one whom he admired, honored and consciously emulated. I looked at the two chapters of Memories, Dreams and Reflections, which deal with Jung's childhood and his relationship with his parents. I focused on his memories of his father and pointed out that it is important to remember that the stories we tell about our childhood are stories, not reality. Therefore it is Jung's remembered and imagined father that I tried to understand as influencing his conceptual God-image. I also considered Jung's relationship with his mentor, Freud, with whom he had an irreconcilable disagreement. This friendship and its subsequent destruction had an impact on what might be called the Jungian religious understanding. Finally I looked at one of Jung's stories about the God-image, The Answer to Job.

In Campbell's stories of heroes, in Frye's comedies, tragedies, romances and satires, in Jung's story of Yahweh and Job—in all of these I have found common elements. I would not go so far as to say that they are all the same mythology. I am not prone to such simplistic thinking. However, they operate in a similar modality. They are all patriarchal. They are all somewhat orthodox, although that is a strange appellation to apply to Answer to Job. It is orthodoxy in the sense that it supports a hierarchical, Western structure. It is doubtful that it would be considered orthodox Christian theology. The similarities or differences of these works are of less interest, however, than the fundamental world view that is carried by the mythology. In each case I found what I considered to be problematic areas which raise moral issues.

Inherent Flaws

Many critics, particularly the feminists, have provided an analysis of the fallacies in this construct. The most frequently identified flaw in this patriarchal container of cultural

myth is its assumption that a hierarchy exists in the universe. At the very peak, on the borderline between human and divine, are Western, white males, who organize themselves into a hierarchy of the elite through competition. It has been clearly demonstrated that the intention of this orthodoxy goes beyond androcentrism, for it excludes many males as well. Jim, Huck's companion on the raft, is the wrong color. Huck himself is insufficiently civilized and a bastard to boot. Homosexual men are also considered inappropriate for the winners' circle. Despite Campbell's claim that the monomyth is "a general pattern for men and women" (Hero With a Thousand Faces 121), it is in fact a feudal construct.

Beyond exclusion from power and control, one can detect a virulent streak of misogyny. Women are associated with treachery, sin, evil, and demons—at least in the minds of Jung, Edinger, Campbell, and Frye. Robin Morgan writes that in the eyes of Campbell's hero, woman "is merely another stage enroute to his goal of finding and becoming the father, and thereby attaining the state of death which he perceives as regenerative to his people" (qtd. in Doty, "From the Traditional Monomythic Hero" 343). Actually, this is not the most serious expression of hatred for women. The hero turns on his own mother and casts her as a terrible, castrating witch whom he must slay in the metaphorical form of dragon. This dragon image may, in the course of his lifetime, be projected upon innumerable "feminine" characters—teachers, wives, daughters, dates, waitresses, secretaries, elderly ladies, and females of any sort. This renunciation of the feminine holds to the theory that there are irreconcilable differences between the sexes, that the masculine must dominate the feminine. The white male should rule by divine right.

This is a mythology which disenfranchises the majority of humanity. It is firmly occidental in focus and places most in the large arena of "other." It is a formula which perpetuates war and violence, for such is the only manner in which it can maintain such an unjust order.

In the larger schema, that of all of creation, this mythology places mankind at the pinnacle. Humanity, which is rightly governed by the "chosen," is above all else in the

universe. The analysis of anthropocentrism has been done again and again. These scholars point out that the myth of modernism has resulted in the desacralization of nature and brought us to the brink of ecological disaster. This is a religion which does not consider nature to be holy, but merely one more thing to be tamed.

One might recall Jung's story of his journey into Nairobi, told in Memories, Dreams and Reflections. He encountered the great herds of animals grazing near the rivers. "This was the stillness of the eternal beginning, the world as it had always been, in the state of non-being; for until then no one had been present to know that it was this world" (255). Jung separates himself from his companions and imagines himself quite alone. "There I was now, the first human being to recognize that this was the world, but who did not know that in this moment he had first really created it" (255). He says that the "cosmic meaning of consciousness became overwhelmingly clear" (255) and that "Man, I, in an invisible act of creation put the stamp of perfection on the world by giving it objective existence" (255).

My old Pueblo friend came to my mind. He thought that the raison d'être of his pueblo had been to help their father, the sun, to cross the sky each day. I envied him for the fullness of meaning in that belief, and had been looking about without hope for a myth of our own. Now I knew what it was, and knew even more: that man is indispensable for the completion of creation; that, in fact, he himself is the second creator of the world, who alone has given to the world its objective existence—without which unheard, unseen, silently eating, giving birth, dying, heads nodding through hundreds of millions of years, it would have gone on in the profoundest night of non-being down to its unknown end. Human consciousness created objective existence and meaning, and man found his indispensable place in the great process of being. (255-56)

In this reminiscence Jung's unconscious, anthropocentric assumptions can be seen. This world has no meaning outside of its existence in his own consciousness. The reason for all being, from Jung's perspective, seems to be to function as images in his conscious and unconscious. He seems to have missed the point of his Pueblo friend, who saw himself as the servant of the sun and the earth. Or perhaps he did not miss the point, but merely considered it quaintly unenlightened. The Pueblo man did not imagine himself as creator,

nor did he see himself as having dominion over the sun. This would have seemed patently absurd to him, and so it is.

Doty's critique of the monomyth is that it is essentially an adolescent fantasy. Therefore, it is scarcely appropriate as a model to which we all might aspire. This is a journey designed exclusively for a young male in a Western society and one which has not seemed to be particularly attractive to any race other than the Caucasian.

Surely we need to challenge as well the dependence of our culture upon what are overwhelmingly *adolescent* hero materials. Campbell notes that the traditional hero path he charts with such verve and insight is a model for *the adolescent*, [...]. One wonders then if the traditional hero model so widely celebrated in America isn't something that is no longer appropriate for adults. How can it be that so much of our mass entertainment (with its Cowboy or Vice Squad or Sylvester Stallone) apparently is fixated at a teenage level of development? Campbell proposed that the hero "evolves as the culture evolves," but unfortunately he did not show us what he meant by that remark, nor did he develop adequately the monomyth of the evolved heroine. ("From the Traditional Monomythic Hero" 352)

In answer to Doty's question as to why we are still "fixated" upon the teenage model, one might answer that it offers glorification of prolonging childhood. To be an adult means that one has recognized and accepted the realities of existence—which includes mortality. Furthermore, for the male it means he must acknowledge that the feminine exists and that she is unconditionally an equal partner in the creation of all life. To be an adult (male or female) is to recognize those aspects of life that the patriarchy has found distasteful and to come to understand that what has placed them in shadow is our fear. This is further example of confusing metaphor with literal reality. Good and evil are values created in the mind of humanity, and it is human beings who assign these judgments to various phenomenon.

Doty's assessment of the monomyth as essentially adolescent is an insightful observation. However, from the point of view of the archetypal mother, "heroic" behavior does not call to mind the behavior of a teenager as much as it does the actions of a toddler. It reflects the childish imaginings of how the world should be reorganized to suit the desires of a petulant two-year-old who is threatening tantrums of as great as possible

proportion. For the infantile tyrant, there is no knowing or understanding beyond the desires and needs of self. For the infant, there are no boundaries of behavior. He or she merely does the loudest, most annoying thing he or she can devise until the desired is attained. "Love" is what is experienced when desires are met. "Hatred" is for obstacles and delays. A child of this age cannot comprehend that all the world is not subject to his or her will. It is incomprehensible that every thing and every one will not obey upon command. However, since the infant's perception of reality and the actual conditions of life are very different, hatred is the predominant ethos. This uncooperative world becomes personified as dragon. The holy mission, (wholly self-centered, that is) becomes the quest--the getting even, the triumphant slaughter of the evil force that has thwarted the divine will of the egocentric center of all that is.

Doty identifies this model as the hero as avenger. The "other" against whom the heroic violence is directed is, as often as not, the community in which the hero lives, for eventually this hero comes to see that mommy is not the only demon that needs slaying.

But the John Rambo or Rocky avenger-hero familiar to quite recent American entertainments seems to operate in a manner antithetical to the achievements of the monomythic hero of tradition. These contemporary figures are not out to get a boon that restores or heals or completes the wounded or incomplete community, but are more likely to settle a personal or national score. In contrast to the classical hero who restores *communitas*, this sort of hero breaks with society rather than representing or healing it. (Doty, "From the Traditional Monomythic Hero" 339)

The headlines offer innumerable examples of hero as avenger and terrorist, an extremely problematic maturation model. Perhaps one of the best-known occurred on April 19, 1995 at 9:02 in the morning when a massive explosion demolished the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. One hundred sixty-eight men, women, and children were killed. A day care center on the bottom floor was totally destroyed. Over five hundred people were injured, some quite severely. The damage covered several city blocks. On June 6, 1997 Timothy McVeigh was found guilty on eleven counts of mass murder and conspiracy in the truck bombing of the Murrah building. What mythology might exist in the mind of a young American male--born in a middle-class suburban family,

an honor student, adequately provided for in terms of physical needs—that would lead him to take the lives of 168 people he did not know by blowing up a federal building in a town where he had never lived? Words and images and thoughts that we can never know passed through the mind of Timothy McVeigh to create his "story," the story that told him the bombing was a heroic act which would "save" America from its decline. We do know that McVeigh read a book called "The Turner Diaries," which served as the model for his crime. Howard Pankratz, of the Denver Post, gives this plot synopsis.

The goal of the revolutionaries in "The Turner Diaries" is the creation of an "Aryan" or white world. [. . .]

In the novel, a stolen truck loaded with a deadly mixture of heating oil and ammonium nitrate fertilizer is driven into the basement of FBI headquarters at 9:15 a.m. in Washington and detonated. About 700 people are killed. In Oklahoma City, prosecutors say, a Ryder truck loaded with bombs made of ammonium nitrate and racing fuel exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah building at 9:02 a.m.

This is, however, not the only act of terrorism described in the novel. There are several others. Pankratz quotes the hero, Turner: "'There is no way we can destroy the System without hurting many thousands of innocent people--no way. [. . .] It is a cancer too deeply rooted in our flesh. And if we don't destroy the System before it destroys us--if we don't cut this cancer out of our living flesh--our whole race will die.'"

Robin Morgan, in her book, The Demon Lover, discusses Campbell's monomyth and identifies the terrorist underbelly. She writes: "The terrorist has been the subliminal idol of an androcentric cultural heritage from prebiblical times to the present" (24). Further, "[t]he terrorist mystique is twin brother to the manhood mystique, and the mythic father of both is the hero. The terrorist has charisma *because* he is the technological-age manifestation of the hero" (54). She goes on to describe graphically the experience of imagining oneself as hero/avenger. The idea of having power over the life or death of others is "addictively heady" (61), bringing our hero to the point that he is so taken with this image of himself that he values it above all else. "Valorous, abnegating his own selfhood, and severed from that of others, disconnected from a living logic and the pathos of emotional commitments, recognizing only the redeeming ecstasy of a tragic death, *the*

hero already lives as a dead man now. As a dead man he is fearless, because as a dead man he is unconquerable by any life force" (63). To put it another way, he has become an immortal, a god. He and the Father are one and his will, will be done.

Morgan includes a discussion of the research of Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller whose work, "Profile of a Terrorist" is "a sociological profile of a terrorist, based on a compilation and analysis of published data involving over 350 individual terrorist cadres and leaders [. . .]" (63). She summarizes their findings:

So. The profile emerges. It is primarily of someone male, young, of "good" family, educated and cultured and skilled, showing precocity and accomplishment, uprooted and experientially mobile due to a period of upheaval, enflamed by the situation, and possessed by the suffering of his people. He is idealistic, brave, and self-disciplined, yet can find no way out of guilt, grief, and impotence until he encounters his mentor/leader/god. He then is made ready to follow a road of self-abnegation. He breaks all other human ties. He is aware of the risks, but his obsession to save or avenge his cause, together with his having contracted a love of his tragic fate, seal his doom. He takes up the gun.

Or the scepter. Or the staff. Or the tablets of law. Or the cross. (67)

This is our familiar hero, viewed from yet another perspective. Morgan looks with feminine eyes, but rather than that of mother, she views as lover. A gruesome view it is. "Plainly put, because she [any female] represents life, she is the ultimate destroyer of what values most—death" (70). Morgan "demonizes" her lover and comes to the conclusion that "[t]he transcendence offered by life-affirming acts of love, birth, care for self and others and the planet, apparently cannot compete with the transcendence offered by vengeance [. . .]" (72).

Perhaps of supreme consequence, this orthodox approach to maintaining order in the world conspires to deprive mankind of one of its most precious divine gift—free will.

The Search for Alternatives

In "'From the Traditional Monomythic Hero" to the Contemporary Polymythic Hero/ine" Doty suggests that a new model of heroism is emerging. He writes, "I seek to elucidate how the good ole masculine monomyth has begun to give way before polymythic hero/ine patterns in our culture" (339). He begins by recognizing the longing we all have

for a model that illuminates the path of a life worth living. Many of us hear a call for the heroic but at this point we don't quite know what it is--only what it is not. Such are the fruits of deconstructionism. Doty quotes Phyllis Chesler:

Never have we needed a Hero more. [. . .]

A hero. A hero who is not put out to die at his Father's command. A hero who does not abandon his Mother. A hero who does not become his own Father, or an impersonal or dictatorial "Father" to other men. A hero who is not killed by his brothers and then worshiped (sic) afterward. A hero such as we've never known: in whose name youth is cannibalized and broken; a hero in whose name war is never declared, countries are never colonized, people are never enslaved, and women are never raped; a hero in whose time poverty, illiteracy, loneliness and conformity are unheard-of. (337)

To this the archetypal mother or the female as lover might add, a hero who for whom life has value, who sees it as a sacred gift and honors the mother and father who gave it; a hero who sees his or her children as the miracles that they are and the other parent as co-creator. We could use a hero who recognizes that humanity is merely one of the creatures who live in this ecosystem.

It is a mythological fantasy of contemporary dreamers that an archetypal role model might emerge which we could all clasp to psyche's bosom and trust to lead us into a higher way of being than we have been before. Doty says that he is "pressing toward reconsideration of the traditional hero patterns, which have come to seem dysfunctional not only because they have been commercialized and trivialized, but because they carry outrageously sexist values and assumptions about masculine superiority that religious and mythological systems simply replicate" (339). They have not only "come to seem dysfunctional" but are and have been so from their very inception.

James Hillman, in his essay, "On Mythical Certitude" speaks of the same search for verities to which we can cling. "This notion of a solid and singular truth, of a truth that eludes relativism and refuses metaphor, still governs the idea we have of certitude" (225). "The mind puts on certitude by considering itself not engaged in myth at all, but to have emerged from fable to fact, pierced myth through and left its expired corpse behind" (226). In the imagination of the monomythic hero, this is the point at which he becomes one with

the divine Father and transcends his own mortality. He has been redeemed. "In establishing the need for certitude, these ideologies by the same token confirm this need as an archetypal component of existence. Whether we actually have certitude or not, we want it and imagine it--and psyche will invent ideologies to satisfy this need" (227).

Roger Woolger proposes a lunar hero, as opposed to a solar hero, which is what he terms the monomythic model we have been considering. He writes: "Lunar heroic figures like Ishtar/Inanna and Persephone, in their entirely passive and unassertive descents into the underworld, are [. . .] the cultural compensations for the overly hybristic drive of the solar, conquering heroes" (qtd. in Doty, "From the Traditional Monomythic Hero" 358-59).

And Woolger hinted suggestively that "the whole range of 'dying gods' (Tammuz, Attis, Adonis, Osiris, Dionysus, Christ)" who classical psychology treats as insufficiently differentiated from the Mothers, might more properly "be seen as a *superior* stage of psycho-spiritual development, since in their androgynous and sacrificial nature they incorporate both the solar and lunar modes and transcend them in death." They disclose not the necessity of overcoming the feminine nor one's own natural instincts generally, but the importance of "the sacrifice of the ego itself to a higher spiritual principle," that is, to the principle known in Jungian psychology as the archetype of the Self--a complex figure containing all opposites and manifested by only a few historical figures such as Jesus the Christ. (359)

There is a valuable point being made here, but his suggestion has the same troubling dualism which has been seen to be so problematic. It is very difficult to rid ourselves of this method of thinking. Either one should be a solar hero or a lunar hero, either passive or aggressive, dark or light, female or male. A polytheistic approach imagines a life model that contains not only the extremes of opposites, but also all the in-between mixes which characterize most of life's experiences. Why is it not possible to be a hero, whose intention is to become the best person he or she can and to serve all of creation? Such commitment probably requires aggression and submission, just as living requires being a creature of the night and of the day. Most of the time, however, it probably requires being able to access any or all of one's God-given capacities appropriately. It means living in sunrise, twilight, mid-afternoon, and mid-morning. Life is not composed exclusively of high noons and

deep, dark midnights. There are many more not-so-special moments of being. The test of true heroism might be the capacity to handle these ordinary times and ordinary challenges.

In being willing to abandon placing such importance on the extremes, and being willing to give up our attachment to moral certainties, the concept of hierarchy loses some of its compelling certainty. Other ways of being suggest themselves to the imagination. Is it possible that there are no "superior stages of psycho-spiritual development?" Is it superior to learn to stand or to crawl, to speak or to sing? Is it more important to reach five or fifty? Is there any value in ranking life experience as if there were some heavenly progression? There are times when a dragon killer is required, just as there are times when it is appropriate to be a toddler or an adolescent. Life is a loop. We all end up where we began-- in no-thing-ness. "Psycho-spiritual development" happens, not necessarily in the same order or in the same way for everyone.

The Cure for Mono

The problem is not the myth. In the divine scheme of things, there is room enough for a multitude of myths and still we shall not have exhausted the possibilities. As David Miller puts it, "No story is the whole story" (78). Problems arise when we make any myth The Myth, ultimate myth, universal myth, for then we preclude the possibility of balance. The shadow of the archetype becomes "evil," along with the counterbalancing archetypal powers, for no other point of view is valued. The fallacies of the monomyth that we have been discussing are the result of an insistence upon spreading the heroic myth like peanut butter all over everything-- literature, religion, society, culture, psychology.

Miller, in his book The New Polytheism: Rebirth of the Gods and Goddesses, suggests that we attend to what he calls the "rebirth of the Gods and Goddesses" (ix).

When released from the tyrannical imperialism of monotheism by the death of [the monotheistic] God, man has the opportunity of discovering new dimensions hidden in the depths of reality's history. He may discover a new freedom to acknowledge variousness and many-sidedness. He may find, as if for the first time, a new potency to create imaginatively his hopes and desires, his laws and pleasures. (3-4)

This freedom to discover a variety of perspectives, Miller calls the "new polytheism." He examines polytheism as a religious situation, a social reality, a philosophical condition and a psychological construct which has replaced the monotheistic perspective, or the "orthodoxy." He writes: "The social, philosophical, and psychological polytheism of our time is an experience that is sufficiently radical to call for a polytheistic theology" (6). This polytheistic theology affords reverence and respect for a panoply of divinities. Miller characterizes these divinities:

[. . . T]he Gods and Goddesses are the name of powers, of forces, which have autonomy and are not conditioned or affected by social and historical events, by human will or reason, or by personal and individual factors. This is one meaning of our use of the word "Immortal" as it is applied to divinities. The Gods are not contingent upon the conditions of mortality. Insofar as they manifest themselves in life they are felt to be informing powers that give shape to social, intellectual, and personal behavior. The Gods and Goddesses are the names of the plural patterns of existence. Their stories are the paradigms and symbols that allow us to account for, to express, and to celebrate those multiple aspects of our reality that otherwise would seem fragmented and anarchic. (7)

Miller argues that "The quality of a God or Goddess is that he or she is potent; he or she is a structure of reality in whose world of meaning and being I am constantly living, or rather, being lived" (62). Further, he points out that for Hillman, polytheism poses a quite radical perspective. "It is not just that we worship many Gods and Goddesses (e.g., money, sex, power, and so on); it is rather that the Gods and Goddesses live through our psychic structures. They are given in the fundamental nature of our being, and they manifest themselves always in our behaviors. The Gods grab us, and we play out their stories" (59).

This raises a significant point. Exactly what is this re-found or reclaimed freedom if we are captive to forces over which we are powerless? Are these Gods and Goddesses omnipotent as well as immortal? Does this polytheism release us from a tyrannical grip only to drop us into a tumultuous panoply of shadowy figures who can do with us, "live" us, or "play" us as they will? Or is it possible that instead we are in a dance with these archetypal

creatures, entertaining them singly or in groups, discovering the many facets of being which are revealed to us by their presences? It is more in this joyous vein that Miller writes:

Attending the rebirth of the gods and Goddesses is an experience which can be liberating. The multiple patterns of polytheism allow room to move meaningfully through a pluralistic universe. They free one to affirm the radical plurality of the self, an affirmation that one has seldom been able to manage because of the guilt surrounding monotheism's insidious implication that we have to "get it all together." But the Gods and Goddesses help in another way, too. They give one distance-perspective--on the morass of contemporary confusions, not from the standpoint of well-known religious and philosophical systems, but from the multifaceted richness of Greek structures of consciousness which, though long forgotten or at least sneered at, nonetheless are the roots of meaning and being in Western thinking and understanding. What a relief it was to discover that myself, my society, and my cosmos can be confirmed in their radical disparateness without that disparateness leading to quiet desperation or noisy anarchy! (ix)

From Miller's point of view, these divinities have much to teach that will be quite useful in a global society. "[. . .] We aim at a new function for the old Gods and Goddesses, those sleeping beauties. We have a hunch that they and their stories can open our eyes to a new way of seeing the multiple dimensions of everything. But they can perhaps do more. The Gods and Goddesses may also teach us a new tolerance--even more an acceptance of the variousness of ourselves and others" (81).

Why Study Myth?

Edward Edinger provides this reason to study mythology:

What is mythology, and why should we study it? [. . .] It fixes in concrete, graspable forms the universal, archetypal realities which underlie psychic experience, and which determine that experience--especially whenever these determinant factors are unconscious. A knowledge of mythological images is an essential requirement if the ego is to have a conscious relation to the deeper layers of the psyche, for they provide forms and categories of understanding by which to grasp and consciously to realize the nature of the transpersonal powers. The ego that lacks these categories of understanding will be either confined to the shallow level of personalistic meanings, or it will be taken over by the archetypal energies and forced to live them out unconsciously. So, as I see it, the psychological answer to the question of "Why study mythology?" is that the psyche will otherwise be invisible and that only through acquaintance with the mythological images is the psyche made manifest in its origins, its structure, and its transformations. ("Tragic Hero" 66)

The significant point here is that we study myth in order to make it visible. However, like Jung and Campbell and Frye, Edinger is stuck in the quicksand of orthodoxy. His description of mythology uses very significant words to convey the nature of myth as he perceives it—*concrete*, *universal* and *determining*. He seems to be describing a world that is immutable, fixed, unchanging. This is probably not going to work. Edinger is describing a kind of truth which Hillman would say does not exist.

Mythical certitude is limited to what is possible in the moment. The rules of conduct with which myths are so lavishly describe perspectives woven into the web of events, so that their certitude corresponds to nothing but the crises and choices that turn up in the weave of each particular web. The Greeks called this limitation *Ananke*: necessity—which I use here to define a certitude that is governed by the specifics of a model and style of action placed in it that could not be otherwise. The model, like instinctive behaviour, could not be different, even if the crises affecting it bring the possibility of exercising discrimination and of making choices. If, at any given moment, we try to ignore this necessity by deducing a philosophical generalization from mythical stories, we will over-run these limits. *Hubris* starts here in the movement that risks at any moment exceeding our capacity for engagement, resulting in an anticipation or an interpretative conclusion about it. ("Mythical Certitude" 231)

Doty quotes Jane Flax, who writes: "'Modern' will not work any longer, and 'postmodern' will not if it is taken in the sense of defining exactly something that is not changing before our eyes. But 'postmodern' carries overtones of constant change: it means 'changing as fast as we can get it into view'" ("From the Traditional Monomythic Hero" 351). To understand a postmodern perspective is to abandon certainty, except in the relative context that Hillman describes as *Ananke* (necessity). To accept that all is in flux and that change is the only constant. Edinger, in describing the process by which the invisible becomes visible, has inadvertently let a very dangerous genie out of the bottle. Once we know what is there, we can engage it. There may be no more innocent protests and pretensions of ignorance. We have discovered that these potent forces which affect the way we live are creations of our own minds and hearts and that we must assume responsibility for them. Once we admit that we know what this and how it works, we can no longer pretend that we are powerless over it. "Removed from . . . all pretensions to truth, myths

become the ongoing fantasies concurrent with our behaviours in the world" (Hillman "Mythical Certitude" 229).

This line of logic leads to the mortifying conclusion that the responsibility for creating evil is our own. The patriarchal mythologies which we in the Western world have supported, perpetuated, endorsed, built cathedrals to, fought wars for, cast votes for and sacrificed our children to is the very entity that has created evil and projected it on to certain kinds of creatures with whom we share a planet. Just because these creatures have been cast in these roles, does not make the projections reality. These are metaphorical costumes that they have been made to wear. To assume that snakes and moons, women and toads, blood and the eyes of newt are really evil, is like confusing an actor with a role. People who play parts in soap operas tell of being accosted on elevators regarding the plots of their occupational dramas. However, television soaps and Bible stories, cowboys' tall tales and old folk tales, lullabies, love songs and raps, parables, epics, odes, ballads and novels, are mythic, metaphorical. They are designed to reflect life as it is experienced by the creators of the myth. We cannot doubt the report of the experience. Hillman writes, "I see only what I believe and believe precisely what I perceive" ("Mythical Certitude" 235). However, we do not have to accept that this is the truth about life. Neither we, nor the creators of the myth, *have to experience life in this way*. It is a choice we may make, if we are conscious. If Hillman is correct when he says that "*[T]he plot of things, the way in which the world appears and we are in its images, is myth*" (230) then it is important to me that I recognize the roles I am playing. In the case of the monomythic heroic perspective, I choose *not* to experience life in this way and will use the power of my myths to suggest other containers for culture--national or global. Neither Edinger nor I can rely on myth to justify unconscious acceptance of a mythology that is pathological.

[. . . M]yths do not save us from the adventure of going astray, they claim something more from us: an evermore careful attunement, an evermore particularised attention to the manner in which they play through consciousness. Realising that our certitude is mythical, that our certain acts are not founded upon truth but upon an animal faith, awakens us evermore keenly to the possibility of illusion and delusion in every move. Mythical

certitude thus prompts us—not to doubt and despair, but—to refinement of noticing. We are urged not only to look at what we see, but also to look into our seeing, behind our eyelids into our mists and mumblings, scrutinizing the beliefs we enact in the *complot* that engages us with the world. We become aware of the images in which we stand and where we are in their plot. (Hillman, "Mythical Certitude" 235)

If we study mythologies in order to become conscious of the "images in which we stand and where we are in their plot," how might we evaluate these in order to determine their usefulness in our lives? Paul Brockelman's book The Inside Story takes a careful and respectful look at what he calls "religious understandings" and we are calling mythology.

[. . .] Interpretive understanding is necessarily "seen" through and shaped by the interpretive glasses which an interpreter(s) bring to life and the evaluation of other views. That means, of course, that we should maintain a healthy scepticism and vigilance in actually evaluating religious understanding. We need to be suspicious of the degree to which our own biases enter into such assessments.[. . . S]elf-interest and self-deception may condition and determine our interpretive understandings. In other words, in assessing religious understanding, we must be on guard against our own possible perversity as well as our own points of view, our own self-interests and self-deception as well as our own situation and perspective. (145-46)

That being said, Brockelman offers a list of "evaluative criteria." The first is "disclosiveness." By this he means "the degree to which they [religious understandings] make available an interpretive vision of how to live life which was unnoticed beforehand. They must represent our experience to us in such a way that we are led to see it differently—that is, uncover or make noticeable an interpretive understanding of it which had hitherto remained hidden or unconscious" (146). Put to this test, the monomyth gets mixed reviews. The effect is to conceal as much as to reveal. Further, it is unusable as a "how to" for some of us.

The second criterion is "adequacy." "An acceptable religious understanding is one which fits our experience and in illuminating it remains faithful to it. To be adequate, it must be plausible or ring true to that experience and not run counter or be false to it" (147). The monomyth doesn't get very high marks here. The general experience of life doesn't seem to include everlasting life or eternal childhood. Nor does the characterization of female existence bear any resemblance to life as the archetypal mother experiences it.

The third is "comprehensiveness."

Since one distinctive task of religious understanding is to "see" life "as" a meaningful whole, then a measure by which it may be assessed is the degree to which it is genuinely overarching and comprehensive of the entirety of human experience. It must, then, "see together" the entirety of our experience from birth to death, with all of its joy as well as its suffering, with some indication of how it all has come about, and with a vision of our role and destiny as human beings within it. (147-48)

This is a hard call. Certainly every attempt is made to cover all the bases. Frye has tried to be all inclusive, as has Jung. Female existence has been lumped into some imaginary catchall containing evil and devils and matter—an exotic mixture of the real and the imagined. Perhaps it could be said that there is a genuine attempt to be inclusive, although there is much that is simply considered too insignificant for attention. These phenomena go in the category "other" and are included only for purposes of exclusion. The position seems to be, "we know that stuff is there, but we refuse to associate with it."

Fourth is "[u]ltimacy. [. . .] Genuine religious understanding must point beyond all that is finite and limited to that which is not finite, to that which is ultimate" (148). There is an aroma of hierarchy here and one doesn't necessarily have to buy it. If there exists an ultimate, it is the "all-there-is." The monomyth certainly qualifies as believing in an ultimate, however. The Great White Father God is the ultimate, joined by the penultimate or ultimate-in-waiting, his sons.

"Demand" is the fifth criterion. "A religious understanding is true to the degree that it is 'alive' and makes demands on people, to the degree that it stands out and forcefully draws them to the possible mode of existence exhibited in the mythological story" (150). The monomyth gets a ten here, particularly in the form of Christianity. Many, many have been drawn. However, might does not make right.

The sixth is "existential effectiveness."

Since religious understanding aims at transforming us and helping us to live more deeply and fully, then its truth can be assessed in part in terms of the degree to which that actually happens—i.e. the degree to which its adherents can be said to be living "truly." [. . .] Stanley Hauerwas expresses this powerfully: "[. . .] Thus a true story is one that helps me to uncover the true path that is also the path for me through the unknown and foreign " (151).

Transformation is indeed, the goal of the monomyth. One might take exception to the phrase "deeply and fully." Nature is transformed and subjugated. Human beings are objectified. Women are transformed into goddesses, whores, and/or witches. Mortals become immortal. Egotistical desires are transformed into holy crusades. Reality is twisted into a distorted fantasy. And yet, in the course of its patriarchal run, this drama has led many to aspire to "good behavior" and to transform their "baser instincts" into "loftier goals." I will concede that much that is fine has been done in the name of religion. Much that is harmful has also. However, it is the former that Brockelman refers to when he writes, "Far from arguments leading to faith, it seems more often that we become convicted by what appear to us to be truthful lives of, for example, courage and guts, simplicity, serenity, or reverence for life" (152). "Reverence for life" is not a central value of the monomyth. Reverence for power and control supersede. Courage and guts can be used in the service of just about anything. Simplicity and serenity are simply states of being, not particularly valenced one way or the other. There are times when they are appropriate and others when they are not.

The seventh is "Interpretive utility.[. . . T]he degree to which it helps us come to grips more adequately with the spiritual issues and difficulties which face us in the particular cultural situation in which we find ourselves" (152). Orthodoxy is certainly useful as a How and What To Do manual. "Spiritual issues and difficulties" are handled in a formulaic way and deviations are not encouraged. Faith is recommended over spiritual angst. There are no grips to come to. Rather, there is a code to follow.

The eighth, "coherence" seems to be similar to "comprehensiveness," but with an additional distinction. Brockelman explains that "to be true, religious understanding must constitute a consistent whole free from internal and self-destructive contradictions" (153). The mythologies which we have been considering would probably pass this test with flying colors. However, one might argue that this criterion is false. It is wishful thinking. Human comprehension being limited, the world appears to us as full of contradictions and paradox.

Any mythology or religious understanding which attempts to reduce these disparate elements to a consistent whole are doomed to failure-- happily so, from the point of view of the archetypal mother.

Number nine is "survivability":

Ultimately, of course the truth of any religious understanding must be tested by time and broad critical scrutiny. The variety of myths and historical revelations should be and are sifted through and evaluated by many people who confront them with the total context of human experience. Those religious truths which have survived such a test of time have been judged by the human faculty of practical reason to be, over the long haul, effective or successful and, in that respect at least, true. (154)

Of course, if this is a valuable measure the patriarchy wins the day. But "fifty million Frenchmen *can* be wrong." As a mother might remind her child, "just because everyone else is jumping off a bridge doesn't mean *you* have to." Brockelman's "survivability" factor does point out how difficult it is to disempower mythologies. This one has been around for a very long time, which says nothing about its moral value.

That brings us to the final criterion.

An ethical and critical sense. [. . . S]uch myths as absolute power, racisms of various kinds, some forms of nationalism, some varieties of "liberation," and even the constant demand for "progress" at the cost of members of the larger family of nature cannot and should not be taken at their own terms. [. . . S]uch human myths are not only unethical but humanly ineffective precisely because they are so thoroughly unethical. We need to step back from such myths, then, to critically unmask them for what they are and to insist that they live up to serious ethical standards. In other words, we can neither ignore myth nor take it at face value. Not only must we approach it with suspicion, but one of the primary criteria in terms of which we assess its effective truth must be the degree to which it lives up to the fundamental standards of ethical and social behavior which we all demand of ourselves. Those visions of human reality which marginalize or even victimize other peoples, classes, or races not only should be ethically judged as morally and spiritually inadequate, but precisely to that degree should be rejected as "untrue" visions of human life and history. Put in a more positive manner, we can demand that, to be "true," religious interpretive understanding must seek to integrate and incorporate different cultures and cultures of difference into their vision of life. (155)

Regardless of the other nine, this is the damning point. The monomyth fails this test. One might recall that morality must, according to Kant, be predicated upon the categorical imperative which states that the individual should "*Act only according to a maxim by*

which you can at the same time will that it shall become a general law.' Or: 'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a general natural law'" (qtd. in Russell 711). As reminiscent of the Golden Rule as this may be, as we have seen, it is not the message of the monomyth. Kant believes we have a choice about moral code that we adopt and that it applies to insiders and outsiders alike.

Power Over the Power Of Myth—Do We Live the Myths or Do They Live Us?

or, I Am Not a Fish

Hillman says that we do not live Christianity, but that Christianity lives us, whether we are Christian or not. ("InterViews" 77). Having considered the roles available for women, I would prefer not to live Christianity and certainly do not wish to be lived by it. Only by understanding the mythical function it plays in my own culture, is it possible for me to make that choice. Otherwise, I swim in it unconsciously and the limitations it imposes upon me would remain unrecognized. Unlike a fish, it is possible for me to know what kind of water I am swimming in.

Do universal archetypes exist in all of humanity, or are they images which evolve and sidle across cultural and geographical lines so smoothly that they give the illusion of universality? In Archetypal Psychology, Hillman writes:

From Jung comes the idea that the basic and universal structures of the psyche, the formal patterns of its relational modes, are archetypal patterns. These are like psychic organs, congenitally given with the psyche itself (yet not necessarily genetically inherited), even if somewhat modified by historical and geographical factors. These patterns or *archai* appear in the arts, religions, dreams and social customs of all peoples, and they manifest spontaneously in mental disorders. (2)

Perhaps our task is to separate the *archai* from the mental disorders, such as the infantile fantasy of patriarchy. Hillman continues:

For Jung, they are anthropological and cultural, and also spiritual in that they transcend the empirical world of time and place and, in fact are in themselves not phenomenal. Archetypal psychology, in distinction to Jungian, considers the archetypal to be always phenomenal. [. . .]

The primary, and irreducible, language of these archetypal patterns is the metaphorical discourse of myths. These can therefore be understood as the most fundamental patterns of human existence. To study human nature at its

most basic level, one must turn to culture (mythology, religion, art, architecture, epic drama, ritual) where these patterns are portrayed. (2-3)

However, as we have seen, it is possible to manipulate the medium of myth in order to favor certain kinds of human experience, to repress certain aspects of living and to vilify those who persist in presenting themselves. In following Hillman, one readily admits that some, but not all, of the "fundamental patterns of human existence" may be found in cultural mythologies. In some instances, however, such as Christianity, it is necessary to consider what has been omitted. Hillman says that through the study of mythology "[w]e may thereby see our ordinary lives embedded in and ennobled by the dramatic and world-creative life of mythical figures" (20). We may, but on the other hand, we may not. The role of wife and mother, in the heroic monomyth, is anything but ennobling. The archetypal mother might suggest that the available roles are unacceptable, not only for herself but for her daughters and sisters.

In his book, Myths to Live By, Campbell states that he concurs with what he perceives as the Jungian interpretation of the way that myths lead us to certain behaviors. (It is debatable that he is entirely accurate about Jung's position that all these imageries "serve positive, life-furthering ends".) It was the view of Jung that,

[. . .] the imageries of mythology and religion serve positive, life-furthering ends. According to this way of thinking, all the organs of our bodies--not only those of sex and aggression--have their purposes and motives, some being subject to conscious control, others, however, not. Our outward-oriented consciousness, addressed to the demands of the day, may lose touch with these inward forces; and the myths, states Jung, when correctly read, are the means to bring us back in touch. They are telling us in picture language of powers of the psyche to be recognized and integrated in our lives, powers that have been common to the human spirit forever, and which represent that wisdom of the species by which man has weathered the millennia. Thus they have not been, and can never be, displaced by the findings of science, which relate rather to the outside world than to the depths that we enter in sleep. Through a dialogue conducted with these inward forces, through our dreams and through a study of myths, we can learn to know and come to terms with the greater horizon of our own deeper and wiser, inward self. And analogously, the society that cherishes and keeps its myths alive will be nourished from the soundest, richest strata of the human spirit. (13)

As we have seen, this is not necessarily true. Some members of the society which will be nourished richly. Others will be expected to prepare the nourishment, serve it, and clean up afterward. Campbell is mostly, but not entirely, oblivious to the less positive aspects of adherence to mythological orthodoxy.

However, there is a danger here as well; namely, of being drawn by one's dreams and inherited myths away from the world of modern consciousness, fixed in patterns of archaic feeling and thought inappropriate to contemporary life. What is required, states Jung therefore, is a dialogue, not a fixture at either pole; a dialogue by way of symbolic forms put forth from the unconscious mind and recognized by the conscious in continuous interaction. (13)

The most important reason to study mythology is to preserve our right to choose. Brockelman calls this the dichotomy between heteronomy and autonomy. (Once again we are entangled in a duality.)

An autonomous life is one which is self-determined. A heteronomous life, on the other hand [sic], is a life which lacks this self-determination. An autonomous person is aware that any philosophy (including, of course, one's own) is built upon a pre- or extra-philosophical hermeneutic, and thus is never either objectively certain or absolute and exclusively true. That is, the autonomous person owns her philosophy in such a way that she takes responsibility for it. In a way, it is to philosophize while continuing to be aware through wonder of the mystery of existence and the evident fact that we do not know in the sense of 'knowing' certainly and absolutely. That is why [. . .] philosophy doesn't overcome wonder with absolute answers, but rather that wonder is the requisite condition for the possibility of continuing to philosophize at all. When wonder is overcome, philosophy is likewise overcome--in favor of ideology. (76-77)

When Jung wrote, "Man's suffering does not derive from his sins but from the maker of his imperfections, the paradoxical God" (qtd. in Edinger, New God Image 115), he was speaking from an heteronomous point of view. Jung had a great desire for the kind of moral certitude that life could not really offer, the kind his father claimed to believe in. One can see that there is an awful hopelessness in this position, for if human suffering is ordained by God, there is very little that we can do to alter the circumstances of our being. On the other hand, if this God is seen as a God-image, then we are capable of planning some alterations.

If existing autonomously is the goal of postmodern philosophy, [. . .] then there must be a way of living and holding a philosophy which falls short of

such autonomy. We call that 'heteronomy'—i.e. lacking self-determination. It is a way of existing in which wonder is abolished in favor of holding or simply assuming that one in fact has the answer. It is to deny or at least forget the hermeneutical construal of life which [. . .] underlies and conditions any philosophy in favor of a dogma which, insofar as it assumes that it is itself objectively true and certain, implies that other (contradictory) philosophies are false. (77-78)

Heteronomy is the condition of being under the domination of an outside authority, either human or divine. That "outside authority" can, in fact, live in our own minds. It can be a voice so inculcated into my psychological make-up that I am not always aware when it is speaking. It rides in on images, stories, sermons, and observations. However, if we can put it in there, we can take it out. This is how to escape heteronomy.

The Heroic Attitude: Wonder

"Heroic consciousness, once freed from its quest for ideological certainty, would no longer be obliged to oppose myth. On the contrary, it could re-form myth. The traditional heroic task is just that" (Hillman, "Mythical Certitude" 227). It is puzzling that Hillman calls this "heroic task" traditional. From Campbell's four functions we can see that the traditional task of the hero is to preserve the patriarchy and propel himself to the top of the pyramid. Nevertheless, Hillman seems to be arguing that there are other journeys, authentically heroic ones, which seek to discover rather than to perpetuate. Brockelman calls this a mode of wonder. "From this point of view, what we face in philosophizing is not a dilemma in which our choice is limited to either ignorance or truth, but a third option: living a life of wonder and the search for understanding in which we know we do not know in any certain or final sense and in which we come to better understand particular aspects of our lives" (76-77). "Wonder, then, is a stepping back from our immediate experience to notice aspects of it which until then were unnoticed because, as we said, we are too busy living them through to reflectively notice them" (69). Until we step into wonder, we will not even notice the water we are swimming in. We will remain fish.

There is an unbridgeable gulf between theories about existence and existence itself. When you add to this general picture the insight of quantum physics that nature is indeterminate and that our picture of such reality is not and cannot be objective (in that it is formed and shaped by our senses,

minds, and instruments), we are left with a permanent and unavoidable gulf between what is and what we can ever know about it. Reality is radically mysterious and transcendent to any possible theory. (69)

The study of mythology can lead us into wonder. The very thing that gets us in can get us out. Lest this be construed as a duality, let me point out that most of the time we live in the in between and wonder is an appropriate response. This is what Hillman suggests when he writes, "[. . . M]yth does not ground, it opens, inviting the mind beyond itself, outside its subjectivity" ("Mythical Certitude" 242). The myths truly come alive when they depart from heteronomy and lead us into autonomy. "So, too, a living myth is not recognised as myth until we step out of the certitude it affords" (242). Brockelman writes, "To enter into wonder is to be transformed from a state of opinion (*Doxa*) into a recognition of the amazing fact that not only are there various opinions about what such matters as truth, God and justice mean, but more importantly, there is no demonstrated and absolute understanding of what they actually do mean" (71).

Wonder is our passage to grace.

We do not have to accept that we are lived by the myths. We can become conscious enough to chose how we live them, or which ones we live. If we create them, then we can recreate them. We can mold, shape, alter, revise, distort, color, or subdue. What we cannot do, it seems, is destroy them. In that sense they are immortal. In no sense are they concretized. Like Mickey Mouse in the scene "The Sorcerer's Apprentice" (from Disney's Fantasia) when we tell a story we create a little broom that carries the water for us. However, as soon as the magic is out in the world, we lose control of it and it may run amuck, flooding the world with our little bit of mythological wishful thinking leading to consequences we never imagined. Nowhere is this more true than in the world of mass media, but the world affords all sorts of possibilities for making such mythological splashes. Examples that spring to mind are stories of terrorist attacks, dramatic rescues, and triumphant revenge. For readers there are award-winning novels, bodice-rippers, and science fiction and for movie-goers there are dynamic larger-than-life fantasy figures.

Stories of crime beget copy-cat crimes. Stories of abandoned, unwanted neonates result in more babies in dumpsters and public restrooms. Stories of kidnapped children provide the road map for kidnappings. Stories of heroines like Rosa Parks point down different pathways. We create mythologies, stories about how we can and do live, and we are also affected by them. Like the sorceress, we have great power and our word is our wand.

Ishmael, Daniel Quinn's wise and intelligent gorilla character says:

"There's nothing fundamentally wrong with people. Given a story to enact that puts them in accord with the world, they will live in accord with the world. But given a story to enact that puts them at odds with the world, as yours does, they will live at odds with the world. Given a story to enact in which they are the lords of the world, they will act like lords of the worlds. And, given a story to enact in which the world is a foe to be conquered, they will conquer it like a foe, and one day, inevitably, their foe will lie bleeding to death at their feet, as the world is now." (Ishmael 84)

We study mythology in order to discover how to write a greater variety of better stories.

Works Cited

- Brockelman, Paul. The Inside Story: A Narrative Approach to Religious Understanding and Truth. Albany: State U of New York P, 1992.
- Campbell, Joseph. The Hero's Journey: Joseph Campbell on His Life and Work. Ed. Phil Cousineau and Stuart Brown. San Francisco: Harper, 1990.
- . The Hero With a Thousand Faces. 1949. Bollingen Series 17. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1973.
- . Inner Reaches of Outer Space. New York: Harper, 1986.
- . The Masks of God: Occidental Mythology. New York: Viking, 1964.
- , ed. Myths, Dreams and Religion. 1970. Dallas: Spring Publications, 1988.
- . Myths to Live By. 1972. New York: Bantam, 1984.
- , with Bill Moyers. The Power of Myth. Ed. Betty Sue Flowers. New York: Doubleday, 1988.
- Carroll, Lewis. The Annotated Alice: Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through The Looking Glass. 1865 and 1871. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1960.
- Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. "Biographia Literaria." Bartlett's Familiar Quotations. 1855. Ed. John Bartlett and Emily Morison Beck. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982.
- Condren, Mary. The Serpent and the Goddess: Women, Religion, and Power in Celtic Ireland. San Francisco: Harper, 1989.
- Doty, William G. "'From the Traditional Monomythic Hero to the Contemporary Polymythic Hero/ine.'" Foundations and Facets Forum 8 (1992): 337-69.
- . Mythography: The Study of Myths and Rituals. Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 1986.
- Downing, Christine. Myths and Mysteries of Same Sex Love. 1989. New York: Continuum, 1996.
- Durant, Will. The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers. New York: Simon, 1953.

- Edinger, Edward F. The New God Image: A Study of Jung's Key Letters Concerning the Evolution of the Western God Image. Wilmette, Ill: Chiron Publications, 1996.
- . "The Tragic Hero: An Image of Individuation." Parabola 1.1 (Winter 1976): 66-73.
- Eliot, Thomas S. "The Hollow Men." Modern Poetry. Ed. Maynard Mack, Leonard Dean, and William Frost. 2nd. ed. Vol. 7. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961.
- Erdoes, Richard, and Alfonso Ortiz, eds. American Indian Myths and Legends. New York: Pantheon, 1984.
- Erikson, Erik H. Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence. 1970. New York: Norton, 1993.
- Fantasia. Perf. Leopold Stokowski and the Philadelphia Orchestra. Disney, 1951.
- Faulkner, William. Absalom, Absalom!. 1936. New York: Vintage, 1987.
- . The Sound and the Fury. 1929. New York: Vintage, 1946.
- Franklin, Benjamin. "Poor Richard's Almanac." Bartlett's Familiar Quotations. 1855. Ed. John Bartlett and Emily Morison Beck. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982.
- Frye, Northrop. Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957.
- Hawking, Stephen W. A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes. New York: Bantam, 1988.
- Harris, Joel Chandler. Uncle Remus: Legends of the Old Plantation. U of Virginia. Online. Alta Vista. 24 Jan. 1998.
- Hesse, Hermann. Siddhartha. Trans. Hilda Rosner. Forty-fifth printing. New York: New Directions-Penguin, 1951.
- Hillman, James. Archetypal Psychology: A Brief Account. 1981. Dallas: Spring. 1993.
- . Inter Views: Conversations between James Hillman and Laura Pozzo on Therapy, Biography, Love, Soul, Dreams, Work, Imagination and the State of the Culture. New York: Harper, 1983.

—. "On Mythical Certitude." Sphinx: A Journal for Archetypal Psychology and the Arts 3 (1990) 224-43.

It's a Wonderful Life. Dir. Frank Capra. Perf. James Stewart, Donna Reed, Lionel Barrymore, and Thomas Mitchell. RKO, 1946.

Jack, Homer A., ed. The Gandhi Reader: A Sourcebook of His Life and Writings. 1956. New York: Grove Press, 1989.

Jung, Carl G. "Answer to Job." The Portable Jung. Ed. Joseph Campbell. Trans. R. F. C. Hull. 1971. New York: Viking, 1984. 519-650.

---, M. -L. von Franz, Joseph L. Henderson, Jolande Jacobi, and Aniela Jaffé. Man and his Symbols. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964.

---. Memories, Dream, Reflections. Ed. Aniela Jaffé. Trans. Richard and Clara Winston. 1961. New York: Vintage, 1965.

---. "Psychology and Religion." The Basic Writings of C. G. Jung. Ed. Violet Staub DeLaszlo. New York: Random, 1959.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. 1781. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1990.

King, Martin Luther. "I Have a Dream." Web 66. Online. Yahoo. 24 Jan. 1998.

Kipling, Rudyard. "The White Man's Burden " and "Recession." Poetry of the Victorian Period. Ed. Jerome H. Buckley and George Benjamin Woods. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1965. 903-04.

Magruder, Kerry and Mike Keas. "Follow the Drinking Gourd." Oklahoma Baptist University Planetarium. Online. Infoseek. 24 Jan. 1998.

Mander, Jerry. In the Absence of the Sacred: The Failure of Technology and the Survival of the Indian Nations. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1991.

Miller, David L. The New Polytheism: Rebirth of the Gods and Goddesses New York: Harper, 1974.

- Morgan, Robin. The Demon Lover: On the Sexuality of Terrorism. New York: Norton, 1989.
- Nagy, Marilyn. Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C. G. Jung. Albany: State U of NYP, 1991.
- Neumann, Erich. The Origins and History of Consciousness. 1954. Trans. R. F. C. Hull. New York: Bollingen, 1970.
- Pankratz, Howard. "Turner Diaries and Inspiration?" The Denver Post (May 2, 1997) n.pag. Online, Internet. August 6, 1998.
- Quinn, Daniel. Ishmael. New York: Bantam. 1995
- Rollins, Wayne. "Psychology, Hermeneutics, and the Bible." Jung and the Interpretation of The Bible. Ed. David Miller. New York: Continuum, 1995. 9-39.
- Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. 1945. New York: Simon, 1972.
- Shakespeare, William. The Kittredge-Players Edition of the Complete Works of William Shakespeare. Ed. George L. Kittredge. New York : Grolier, 1958.
- Shelly, Mary Wollstoncraft. Frankenstein. 1831. New York: Broadview, 1994.
- Slick, Grace. White Rabbit. Jefferson Airplane. BMG Music., 1966.
- Smith, Robert. C. The Wounded Jung: Effects of Jung's Relationships on His Life and Work. Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1996.
- Stowe, Harriet Beecher. Uncle Tom's Cabin. 1852. New York: Bantam, 1983.
- Swift, Jonathan. "A Modest Proposal." Images of Man: Readings in English Literature. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 395-401.
- Twain, Mark. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. 1884. New York: Bantam, 1981.
- . The Adventures of Tom Sawyer. 1876. New York: TOR, 1989.
- . "The Quotable Mark Twain." Online posting. U of VA. Metacrawler. September 20, 1998.
- von Franz, Marie-Louise. The Feminine in Fairy Tales. 1972. Boston: Shambala, 1993.
- . Shadow and Evil in Fairy Tales. 1974. Boston: Shambala, 1995.

Wagner, Jane. The Search of Signs of Intelligent Life in the Universe. New York:
Harper, 1986.

Wizard of Oz. Dir. King Vidor. Perf. Judy Garland, Ray Bolger, Jack Haley, Bert Lahr,
and Margaret Hamilton. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1939.

Wehr, Demaris S. Jung and Feminism: Liberating Archetypes. Boston: Beacon Press,
1989.

Wilder, Thornton. Our Town. Adventures in American Literature. Ed. Edmund Fuller and
B. Jo Kinnick. New York: Harcourt, 1963. 365-402.